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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Seaports, or harbours, play a vital role in the logistical supply chain, since they 
handle the largest volumes of containerised cargo and bulk goods that enter any 
country. Over the decades, globalisation and free trade have resulted in increased 
movement of cargo and people through the sea ports. The security functions in all 
categories of the ports are of paramount importance, seeing that border posts or 
ports are the main entry and exit points of any country. The marine transport system 
is responsible for 95-98 per cent of South Africa’s imports and exports. South 
Africa’s maritime sector, and in particular its eight commercial ports-of-entry, play a 
major role in the South African economy, as well as those of South Africa’s 
neighbouring landlocked countries. As a result of the volume of cargo containers 
passing through these ports, it is often challenging to detect or even examine all of 
the cargo that enters or leaves the port. A 2007 report titled ‘The collective approach 
to Border Control’ states that the movement of illegal goods crossing South African 
borders is in the amount of 20 billion Rand per year. The illegal movement of goods 
represents an enormous loss to South Africa in terms of revenue, as well as customs 
and excise duties, and negatively impacts on the confidence of our international 
investors. One of South Africa’s busiest seaports-of-entry is the Durban harbour. 
This study sought to investigate the challenges presented by the illegal movement of 
goods through Durban harbour. The research sought to establish how the goods 
were being moved illegally through the Durban harbour area. The focus is on the 
security risk control measures that should control the illegal movement of goods from 
the Durban Harbour. 
 
The objectives of this study were: 
 
 to examine the existing security risk control measures at the Durban harbour;  
 
 to assess the risks associated with the illegal movement of goods at the 
Durban harbour; and 
 
vi 
 to identify the security risk control measures required to prevent the illegal 
movement of goods at the Durban harbour.  
 
The study made use of the qualitative research approach to research the unlawful 
transfer of goods entering through seaports. Three methods of data collection were 
used. These were a documentary study of police case dockets, an onsite security 
audit of the Durban harbour, and face-to-face interviews between the researcher and 
the interviewees in accordance with an interview schedule. Semi-structured 
interviews were conducted with the SAPS Border Police, customs officials and 
security officials who were stationed at the Durban harbour. Thirty (30) sample 
respondents were individually interviewed by the interviewer. An analysis of fifty (50) 
police dockets which were registered on the SAPS crime administration system for 
‘Theft and Contraband Smuggling’ were also analysed, where the scene-of-crime 
was the Durban harbour. In addition, an onsite evaluation of the current security 
measures at the Durban harbour was conducted. All of the data collected was 
analysed using a data-spiral method, which generated themes and categories. The 
findings established that there are shortcomings or gaps within the existing security 
measures for the prevention of, and safeguarding the harbour as a port against, 
criminal risks or security weaknesses. Accordingly, the researcher has 
recommended certain measures that should assist in eliminating or reducing the 
associated criminal risks affecting the harbour.  
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Chapter 1   
INTRODUCTION AND MOTIVATION FOR THE RESEARCH 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
As a result of the new democratic dispensation in 1994, South Africa rejoined the 
global economic world. The effect thereof was a substantial increase in the inflow of 
immigrants and goods, both legally and illegally, into the country (Operational 
Working Team on Border Control (OWTBC), 1997: 1). The movement of illegal 
goods entering our borders, coupled with the illegal inflow of aliens, had a 
significantly negative impact on South Africa’s economy and crime rate. Over the 
past decade, according to police statistics and media reports, the general crime rate 
in South Africa has increased at a disturbing and disconcerting rate. According to the 
South African Police crime statistics for the period 2012/2013, during the financial 
year 2011/12 there were 777 140 serious crime arrests effected and 806 298 in 
2012/13. There were 307 580 convictions in 2011/12 and 352 513 convictions for all 
serious crime during 2012/13. In total, 609 offenders were sentenced to 826 life 
sentences, while 1 586 offenders were sentenced to a combined total of 2 006 years’ 
imprisonment for serious crimes. The most notable aspect of the crime statistics for 
2012/13 is that the violent crimes that cause the most fear and trauma amongst the 
public have increased.  
 
When considering the global situation for the last twenty years, an increasing 
number of countries now report statistics concerning traditional crimes (murder, 
robbery, rape, theft, burglary, fraud and assault) to the United Nations surveys. Even 
though countries define crimes differently in their criminal codes, no country is 
without crime (United Nations Office for Drug Control and Crime Prevention 
(UNODCCP), 2013: 1). This situation can be attributed to factors such as 
globalisation, economic downturn, as well as better reporting of crimes. According to 
an internet article ‘Top ten countries with the highest crime rates’ (Anon., 2013c: 1), 
South Africa continues to experience high levels of crime, although it does not 
feature in the top ten list of countries with the highest reported crime. This is due to a 
number of factors, such as porous border controls, corruption and an ineffective 
criminal justice system, amongst others. The increase in crime included drug 
trafficking, firearm smuggling, human trafficking, contraband smuggling, and 
smuggling stolen goods and vehicles into South Africa. All of these are known to be 
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primary business activities of organised crime syndicates. This substantial increase 
in general crime and the unprecedented growth of organised crime syndicates had a 
consequential effect on the policing of borders and ports-of-entry (Geldenhuys, 2007: 
1).  
 
Seaports, or harbours, play a vital role in the logistical chain, since they handle the 
largest volumes of containerised cargo and bulk goods that enter any country. South 
Africa’s maritime sector, and in particular its eight commercial ports-of-entry, play a 
major role in the South African economy, as well as those of South Africa’s 
neighbouring landlocked countries (Khwela, 2009: 31). One of South Africa’s busiest 
seaports-of-entry is the Durban harbour (McCarney & Stren, 2003: 231). According 
to Minnaar (2003: 71), in a risk assessment conducted in 1997 by the United States 
Immigration and Naturalization Service (US Immigration and Naturalization Service's 
report on border control, cited in OWTBC, 1997), the Office of Inspections identified 
several problem areas at the Durban harbour. These included security issues, such 
as poor access control to the cargo warehouse areas and gaps in the security 
fencing, and problems with general crime, such as container thefts, contraband 
smuggling, illegal movement of goods and stolen vehicles.  
 
1.2 RATIONALE FOR THE STUDY 
 
A rationale statement contributes to the research process since it sets out the basis 
of why the research is being undertaken and what questions it seeks to answer (De 
Vos, Strydom, Fouché & Delport, 2011: 80). The rationale of this study was to 
investigate what type of security risk control measures currently exists at the Durban 
Harbour, what are the risks associated with the illegal movement of goods and to 
establish security risk control measures that can be put in place to prevent the illegal 
movement of goods at the Durban harbour. 
 
In 1997, it was estimated that the value of illegal goods crossing South Africa’s 
borders was in the order of 17 billion Rand (Geldenhuys, 2007: 1). Since 1997, there 
has been a global escalation in the value of illegal goods that are transferred from 
one country to another (Minnaar, 2003: 1). A 1997 report titled ‘Border control 
collective approach implementation plan’ states that the movement of illegal goods 
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crossing our borders is in the order of 20 billion Rand per year (OWTBC, 1997: 1). 
The illegal movement of goods represents an enormous loss to South Africa in terms 
of revenue and customs and excise duties, and negatively impacts the confidence of 
our international investors (Geldenhuys, 2007: 1). Hanrahan (2010: 1) notes that the 
primary focuses in port security have advanced since the 11 September 2001 
terrorist attacks in America, from simply preventing cargo theft to protecting people 
and critical infrastructure from terrorism. The Minister for Safety and Security, Mr 
Charles Nqakula, when presenting the 2007/2008 crime statistics, indicated that 
arrests at ports-of-entry for unlawful firearms, stolen vehicles, drugs, illegal goods, 
human smuggling, and trafficking in marine life resources, precious metals and 
stones and non-ferrous metals had intensified from 30 410 in 2006/2007 to 51 856 
arrests in 2007/2008 (Nqakula, 2008: 1). According to Martin (2011:1), during the 
2010/2011 financial year border patrol successes in South Africa resulted in the 
seizure of contraband to the value of sixty one million rand being seized, four 
hundred criminals being arrested and 19 641 illegal immigrants being recorded. 
These figures undoubtedly indicate the extent of the problems facing ports-of-entry 
of South Africa and these figures are increasing yearly. The increased criminal 
activity by organised crime and international syndicates, the ingress of smuggled 
goods and contraband, fraud committed through non-payment of customs and 
excise duties, and the round-tripping1 of vehicles and other manufactured goods, are 
all spinoffs of weak or poor controls at ports-of-entry (Geldenhuys, 2007: 1).  
 
 
1.3 PROBLEM STATEMENT 
According to De Vos et al (2011: 108), the problem statement serves as an effective 
point of departure for the study. It also delimits the focus of the study and spells out 
the specific problem that the researcher wishes to investigate (Fouche & Delport, 
2011: 108). This study, therefore, sets out to investigate the challenges around the 
illegal movement of goods at the Durban harbour. The research seeks to establish 
how goods are moved illegally through the Durban harbour area. This study will 
focus on the security risk control measures and risks associated with the threats of 
                                            
1
 Round-tripping involves the registration of an imported vehicle in a neighbouring country and 
bringing the same vehicle back to South Africa to be used locally. 
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criminal conduct that give rise to the illegal movement of goods from the Durban 
Harbour as a sea port-of-entry. 
 
1.4 RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
Research questions are core to the research process, accordingly the manner in 
which research questions are formulated and phrased is critical, since the objective 
of the research process is aimed at answering the research questions (Fouche & De 
Vos, 2011: 89).The research rationale and the problem statement helped develop 
the research questions for this study. The following research questions were adopted 
for this study: 
 
1.4.1 What type of security risk control measures are in existence at the Durban 
Harbour? 
 
1.4.2 What are the risks associated with the illegal movement of goods at the 
Durban harbour? 
 
1.44  Which type of security risk control measures can be put in place to prevent 
the illegal movement of goods through the Durban harbour? 
 
1.5 RESEARCH GOAL 
The research goal gives direction in a study and indicates the central thrust of the 
study (Fouche & De Vos, 2011: 91). The goal of this study was to  investigate the 
existing security measures at the Durban harbour and to identify the risks associated 
with the illegal movement of goods so that appropriate security risk control measures 
might be recommended to mitigate the threats.  
 
1.6 RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
Research objectives are the steps that a researcher will take within a certain 
timeframe to achieve his goal (Welman & Kruger, 2005: 196).  
 
The objectives of this study are: 
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 to examine the existing security risk control measures at the Durban harbour;  
 to assess the risks associated with the illegal movement of goods at the Durban 
harbour and; 
 to identify the security risk control measures to prevent the illegal movement of 
goods at the Durban harbour.  
 
1.7 KEY CONCEPTS 
1.7.1 Port of entry  
Ports-of-entry are points on a country’s border through which people and goods may 
enter or leave the country. This includes land, sea and air travel. Ports-of-entry are 
often manned by police officials, home affairs and security officials who have their 
individual tasks to carry out to ensure compliance with the laws of a country with 
regard to goods and people entering a country (Beneke, 2001: 1). 
 
1.7.2 Threat 
A threat is a negative consequence that can cause a risk to be the likelihood of the 
occurrence of an event. A threat may also be a natural phenomenon or a man-made 
incident, such as corruption, smuggling, fraud, and sabotage, etc. (Oxford South 
African Dictionary (Oxford Dictionary), 2009: sv threat). 
 
1.7.3 Security survey 
Lombaard describes a security survey as involving “… an in-depth, onsite study of a 
physical facility and its property, environment, activities and procedures” (Lombaard, 
2004: 21). 
 
1.7.4 Illegal goods 
The term ‘illegal’ is defined as anything that is not sanctioned by a country’s official 
rules (Oxford Dictionary, 2009: sv illegal). However, in the SAPS daily working 
environment, illegal goods are termed goods which are either unlawful to possess or 
goods requiring a permit or authorisation to be in lawful possession thereof. Goods 
that have been stolen or obtained through any illegal means, such as theft fraud or 
corruption, also fall within this category.  
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1.7.5 Vulnerability 
The term vulnerability means that there is a lack or an absence of security measures 
in relation to security risks, which in other words means that there are weaknesses 
or loopholes in the security measures or that the security measures are inadequate 
to combat the security risks (Rogers, 2005: 109). 
 
1.7.6 Risk 
According to Mackenzie, McLoughlin and Twiss (1983: 16), risk can be defined as an 
exposure to a probability of injury or loss, and can be divided into three categories: 
dynamic risk, pure risk and speculative risk. Dynamic risk is a risk that a person 
takes to further his or her own business interests, whilst pure risk involves events 
that might lead to loss, damage, injury or death. Lastly, speculative risk is a type of 
risk that, when undertaken, results in an uncertain degree of gain or loss.  
 
1.7.7 Risk analysis 
Risk analysis involves assessing the risk, i.e. identifying the potential threats to the 
organisation and the likelihood or frequency of their occurrence. Depending on the 
organisation involved, the risks may include disasters, crime, employee disloyalty, 
white collar crime and other crimes (Rogers, 2005: 102). 
 
1.7.8 Security risk control measures 
Security risk control measures are measures that are identified after conducting a 
comprehensive security survey and a risk analysis exercise for an organisation. 
Through this process, security weaknesses or loopholes in the existing security 
measures and assets which are susceptible to risks are identified. Security 
measures are then recommended to improve security in the organisation (Lombaard, 
2004: 45). 
 
1.7.9 Physical Protection Systems  
Physical protection systems are measures that involve the use of physical and 
technological aids in the protection of assets and include policies and procedures, 
human resources, barriers, equipment and records (Garcia, 2008: 11). 
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1.8 RESEARCH PLANNING (CHAPTER LAYOUT)  
The study is presented as follows: 
 
Chapter 1:  Introduction and motivation for the study 
This chapter provides a basic introduction to the study and the problem statement in 
order to give the reader a background to the area under research. Included in this 
chapter is the rationale for the research, the research questions, the goal and 
objectives of the research, short definitions of key concepts used throughout the 
study, and an outline of the dissertation. 
 
Chapter 2:  Methodological exposition of the research design 
This chapter presents in detail the methodology used in the study, including the 
research approach, research design and the methodology used to collect and 
analyse the data. Also included in this chapter is the value of the study to the various 
stakeholders, the validity and reliability of the data collection instruments, limitations 
to the study and ethical considerations. 
 
Chapter 3:  Security measures to prevent the illegal movement of goods at 
ports-of-entry 
This chapter provides a study of the literature on the issue of illegal goods and 
contraband which are smuggled through ports-of-entry. In particular, the following 
aspects are discussed: the international scenario, the South African border 
environment and the Durban harbour (with regard to the issue of illegal movement of 
goods and contraband) security at the port, reviewing of the existing border control 
mechanisms, weaknesses in the current security strategy, prevalent crimes 
associated with ports-of-entry, factors that contribute to crimes associated with the 
harbour, the security risk management model, tightening of border controls, and 
lastly, the implementation of new risk management procedures. 
 
Chapter 4:  Collection, analysis and interpretation of research data 
This chapter describes in detail how the data was collected and the results analysed 
and interpreted. The different levels of data analysis and a graphic representation of 
data are provided. The following characteristics are examined: the biographical 
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information of all respondents, vulnerabilities and risks in the Durban harbour, 
security protection systems, and security risk control solutions. 
 
Chapter 5:  Findings and recommendations 
This chapter critically discusses the outcome of the study and makes 
recommendations for the practical use of the study’s findings, with the aim of 
improving the security situation at the Durban harbour. 
 
1.9 CONCLUSION 
This chapter provided a detailed overview of the problems facing ports-of-entry, 
more especially seaports with regard to issues such as the illegal movement of 
goods. The challenges facing seaports or harbours with regard to the illegal 
movement of goods and the importance of this study, together with the reasons that 
gave rise to this study were also highlighted. The purpose of this study was to 
evaluate the existing security measures with the intention of establishing any gaps or 
problems in the security measures. This problem was highlighted on three levels, 
namely international, national, and domestic levels (Durban harbour). The research 
questions, purpose of the research and the objectives for conducting an onsite 
security assessment of the Durban harbour were discussed and justified. 
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Chapter 2  
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
The aim of Chapter Two is to set the context of the approach to the research, the 
design of the research and the methods used for the research study. The different 
steps in the qualitative approach are investigated, starting with the viewpoint of why 
the specific research approach was selected, and resolves with the moral attributes 
associated with the research. It centres on the procedures of the design, selection of 
a sampled target group, and the data gathering process and analysis. It also clarifies 
the data collection methods and the validity and reliability of the data. The chapter 
also examines the progress of a documentary checklist and an observation checklist. 
It further examines the qualitative interview schedule for the interviews intended to 
gather the opinions and viewpoints of all participants through semi-structured 
interviews. The data analysis strategy is considered and influenced within the 
background of a data analysis spiral (open coding).  
 
The chapter progresses to present a concise outline of what the assorted categories 
revealed during the development of the research study and was condensed into the 
concluding themes represented in the section examining data analysis. The chapter 
concludes with a discussion on the ethical issues confronted by the researcher. 
 
2.2 RESEARCH APPROACH 
Matthew and Ross (2010: 142) are of the opinion that a qualitative research 
approach involves the sentiments, viewpoints, stories, accounts, thoughts and the 
particular understandings of the participants. Leedy and Ormrod (2005: 95) and 
Matthews and Ross (2010: 142) are of a related viewpoint that qualitative research 
investigates the viewpoints, encounters and behaviours through interview processes 
or focus groups. In this research study, the researcher utilised the qualitative 
research approach of one-on-one interviews, observation, documented study, 
literature study, piloting and personal experience. The rationale for utilising a 
qualitative approach was to assess the subject of illegal movement of goods from the 
Durban harbour. The researcher heeded the responses of the participants in order to 
construct a representation, created on their thoughts and individual experiences 
(Creswell, 1994: 21). The port-of-entry at the Durban Harbour was used in the 
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research study to examine the illegal movement of goods through the port. The 
research study is a factual study, which endeavoured to depict, translate, and 
explore the illegal movement of goods through the Durban harbour.  
 
2.3 THE RESEARCH DESIGN 
According to Creswell (2007: 73), a case study entails the exploration of a bounded 
system or single or multiple cases over time through the profound collection of data 
entailing multiple suppliers of information. A data collection method involves 
interviews, documents, observations or archives and the essence of this research 
study is a thorough description of case-based themes (Fouche & Schurink, 2011: 
321). The research design stipulates what data is required, the methods to be used 
to gather and analyse the data, as well as how this would ultimately answer the 
research question (Creswell, 2007: 74). ).  
 
A qualitative case study research design was used for this research and the Durban 
Harbour, as a port, was used for the case study to investigate the illegal movement 
of goods at the port. The reasoning behind using a qualitative approach was to 
evaluate the issue of the illegal movement of goods from the Durban harbour. The 
researcher listened to the participants in order to build up a picture, based on their 
ideas and personal experiences (Creswell, 1994: 21). This research is a descriptive 
case study, which strives to describe, analyse and interpret the situation pertaining to 
the illegal movement of goods through the Durban harbour. 
 
2.4 POPULATION AND SAMPLING  
Wellman and Kruger (2001: 46) are of the view that the target population is the 
objective of the research study, which may include individuals, groups or 
organisations. Wellman and Kruger (2001: 55) also assert that the population is a 
collection of possible participants whose opinions are vital to the results of the 
research study. The population targeted in this study were the SAPS officials, 
security officials and customs officials positioned at the Durban Harbour. Owing to 
the size of the target population, comprising eighty (80) security officials, one 
hundred-and-forty (140) police officials and sixty (60) customs officials in the Durban 
harbour, the researcher decided to obtain data from only a sample of the population. 
The intended sample was ten (10) security officials, ten (10) police officials and ten 
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(10) customs officials. The reason for this is that it is uneconomical and impractical to 
take into account all the participants of the target population in the research study. 
Bailey (Bailey, 1987: 82) affirms that a sample population is a subcategory or a 
fragment of the targeted population. Wellman and Kruger (2001: 55) further assert 
that the sample must be illustrative for the outcome of the study to be generalised, 
i.e. the targeted sample should have the precise properties in similar ratios as the 
population it represented.  
 
In this research study, probability and non-probability sampling methods were 
utilised to choose the participants for the study. According to Nachmias and 
Nachmias (1987: 184) and Wellman and Kruger (2001: 56), probability sampling can 
ascertain the probability that individuals or associates of the population will be 
incorporated into the sample group, i.e. every individual or member has the 
equivalent probability of being included in the sample. The type of probability 
sampling method utilised in this research study was the simple random sampling 
technique. In simple random sampling, every associate member of the population is 
offered the same probability of being included into the sample (Welman & Kruger, 
2001: 59). Consequently, all members of the SAPS Border Police, Customs and 
Transnet security sections had an equal prospect of being chosen.  
 
In non-probability sampling, the probabilities of choosing a specific individual are not 
specified, the researcher does not know the real population size or the participants of 
the population (Strydom & Delport, 2011: 391). According to Denzin and Lincoln 
(2005: 378), qualitative researchers utilising the non-probability sampling method 
pursue individuals, groups and backgrounds where the specific processes being 
learnt are very probable in occurring. In this research study, the participants or 
groups intimately associated with the topic of study are in fact the anti-smuggling 
sections of the SAPS and Customs sections and the security portion specified to 
offer security in the container terminal areas.  
 
The type of non-probability sampling method utilised in this research study was the 
purposive sampling technique. Creswell (2007: 79) is of the opinion that with 
purposive sampling, participants and the sites encompass the maximum features, 
illustrative or comparable characteristics of the target sample that supply the 
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research best are sensibly elected and could resolutely form an insight to the 
research problem. The purposive method was utilised, given that the researcher 
sought to acquire distinctive and different data from a target group which best aided 
the objective of the research.  
 
In concurrence with the purposive sampling method, the researcher exercised the 
snowball sampling technique to decide upon the additional members of the target 
population, for instance high-ranking managers and professionals of the different 
divisions or relevant components. According to David and Sutton (2004: 152), the 
snowball technique is suitable when the target population is concealed and 
challenging to gain access to. Subsequently, the researcher made contact with a 
specific individual in the targeted population who thereafter referred the researcher 
to additional individuals with comparable qualities. The researcher initially convened 
with the relevant leaders of the Transnet, SAPS Border Police and Customs Anti-
Smuggling sections. Subsequent to conducting interviews with the relevant leaders, 
the leaders then referred the researcher to their managers. The managers 
subsequently referred the researcher to other people within their relevant divisions, 
who were in the position to best impart their experience and familiarity on the topic 
being researched. The researcher continued choosing participants until data 
saturation occurred. 
 
2.4.1 Sample size 
Mason (2006: 136) is of the view that the sample ought to be sizeably sufficient, 
relative to the research topic, but not so sizeable as to become so dispersed that an 
exhaustive and distinctive focus on something specific becomes unachievable. 
However, according to Grinnell and Williams (1990: 127), a ten per cent (10%) 
sample ought to be adequate enough for governing the sampling errors but maintain 
that thirty (30) is satisfactory in performing rudimentary statistical techniques.  
 
According Stoker (1989: 130), sample size is determined by practical considerations, 
such as cost and time, and the researcher should adapt his sampling procedure to 
these constraints. He adds that if the total population is fifty (50), then the sample 
size must be sixty-four per cent (64%), which equals thirty-two (32) participants. 
Alternatively, if the population is one hundred (100), the sample must be forty-five 
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per cent (45%) or forty-five (45) participants. According to Mathews and Ross (2010: 
154), purposive sampling is a sample of chosen cases that would best support the 
researcher to investigate the research questions extensively.  
 
The researcher limited the target population for one-on-one interviews to a sample of 
ten (10) Transnet security officials, ten (10) Customs officials from the Anti-
Smuggling Task Team, and ten (10) police officials of SAPS Border Police, who are 
all based at the Durban Harbour. The researcher determined that the target 
population would be illustrative of the total population of eighty (80) security officials. 
All these security officials were employed in relation to similar policy conditions, 
submitted to identical training programmes, and pursued similar career and 
promotion practices and roles, according to the same policy and procedures 
nationally. A similar contention followed regarding the target population of one 
hundred and forty (140) SAPS Border officials and the sixty (60) Customs Anti-
Smuggling officers in meeting the benchmarks of being illustrative of the total 
population of two hundred and eighty (280).  In respect of the SAPS members, only 
those members performing operational duties within the harbour were selected as 
the target population and not those performing general administration duties. 
Collectively, the researcher chose a total sample of thirty (30) participants from a 
combined population of two-hundred-and-eighty (280) from the diverse sectors, 
which is eligible as the illustrative sample which was greater than 10 per cent. 
 
Written permission to interview the Border Police officials at the harbour was 
obtained from the SAPS Head Office (which is appended as Appendix D below). A 
meeting with the head of the Customs Interdiction Section and the section 
commander of the Customs Anti-Smuggling Section was held and authorisation was 
obtained to interview the customs officials at the harbour (permission letter attached 
as Appendix F below). Following a meeting with the head of Transnet Security for 
terminals 1 and 2, authorisation was permitted to interview the security officials 
employed at the harbour (permission letter attached as Appendix H below).  
 
2.4.2 Selection of security officers for interviews 
The initial sample group comprised security officers deployed at the Durban Harbour. 
A simple random sampling technique (probability sampling) was used and a sample 
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size of ten (10) was selected from the population group of eighty (80) security 
officers positioned at the Durban Harbour. These participants are referred to as A1-
A10. 
 
The following method was used to choose the samples: 
 
The names of eighty (80) security officers positioned at the Durban Harbour 
(population group) were typed on A4 sheets, and the A4 sheets were then cut into 
eighty pieces each representing the name of each a security officer. The pieces of 
paper were then folded twice and stapled, put into a box and shuffled by an impartial 
co-worker. A third co-worker was invited to pull one piece of paper from the box. The 
researcher then noted the identity of the security official who would be selected as 
part of the target population. This procedure was conducted ten times to get the 
desired sample size of ten (10). 
 
2.4.3 Selection for interviews of members of the South African Border Police 
for interviews 
The following target population comprised police officials attached to the South 
African Police Border Policing Section and deployed at the Durban Harbour. A 
probability sampling technique was employed and a sample size of ten (10) was 
chosen from the target group of one-hundred-and-forty (140). These participants are 
referred to as B1-B10. 
 
The following method was used to choose the samples: 
 
The names of one hundred and forty (140) border police officials positioned at the 
Durban Harbour (population group) were typed on A4 sheets. Subsequently, the A4 
sheets were cut into one hundred and forty pieces, each representing a police 
official’s name. All pieces of paper were then folded twice and stapled, put into a box 
and shuffled by an impartial co-worker. A third co-worker was then asked to withdraw 
one piece of paper from the box. The researcher then noted the name of the police 
official who would then form part of the sample population. This process was 
repeated ten times to acquire the desired a sample size of ten (10). 
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2.4.4 Selection of customs officials for interviews  
The third target population comprised customs officials positioned at the Durban 
Harbour. A probability sampling technique was employed and the sample size of ten 
(10) was selected from the target population of sixty (60) customs officials positioned 
at the Durban Harbour. These participants are referred to as C1-C10. 
 
The following method was used to choose the samples: 
 
The names of sixty (60) customs officials positioned at the Durban Harbour 
(population group) were typed on A4 sheets. Subsequently, the A4 sheets were cut 
into sixty (60) pieces each recording a customs official’s name. Each piece of paper 
was then folded twice and stapled, put into a box and shuffled by an impartial co-
worker. A third co-worker was then requested to draw a piece of paper from the box. 
The researcher then noted the name of the customs official who would form part of 
the target population. This process was repeated ten times to get a sample size of 
ten (10). 
 
2.4.5 Selection of case dockets  
A selective random sampling technique was employed to select the dockets for the 
intended analysis. The sampling frame comprised two hundred and fifty (250) theft 
case dockets and two hundred and fifty (250) contraband smuggling case dockets 
which had been investigated from 1 January 2011 to 31 December 2011. These 
included guilty, reserved, undetected cases and cases pending investigation. For the 
purpose of the research study, the researcher elected to draw a sample of fifty (50) 
case dockets.  
 
The following technique was used to choose the samples: The station and CAS 
numbers for each were drawn out, and guilty, not guilty and warrants issued for theft 
dockets were tabulated on an A4 sheet. A copy of the A4 sheet was made. 
Subsequently, one of the A4 sheets was cut into five pieces, each denoting a Station 
and CAS number. The five pieces of paper were then folded twice and stapled, put 
into a box and shuffled by an impartial co-worker. A third co-worker was then invited 
to withdraw a piece of paper from the box. The researcher then noted the case 
docket that would be sampled. This was the initial case docket that would be 
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sampled. The balance of the case dockets were chosen at intervals of three (3) until 
the required number of twenty-five (25) dockets were obtained. The same process 
was followed in respect of the contraband smuggling dockets until the desired 
amount of twenty five (25) dockets had been obtained. Collectively, both processes 
resulted in a total sample of fifty (50) dockets. 
 
2.5 DATA COLLECTION INSTRUMENTS AND METHODS 
Several approaches, called triangulation, were utilised to observe reality and to 
gather data from different sides (Berg, 2004: 5). The principal purpose for using the 
triangulation method was to guarantee that what one technique could not expose, 
would be exposed by the other technique throughout the research study. The main 
source of information for this research study was the data collected from interviews 
and personal observation by means of an observation checklist. The secondary 
source of information was the material gathered by means of literature and 
documentary research studies. The researcher also employed his individual 
experience as a source for collecting information.  
 
The design of this research study is empirical in description, as it required the 
researcher to scan the field and gather data from the respondents participating in the 
research. Maxfield and Babbie (1995: 4) are of the view that experience and 
observation are the vital providers of knowledge in an empirical design. The 
researcher was able to gather information from those participating by utilising an 
empirical design for the subject of illegal trafficking of goods through the Durban 
harbour.  
 
Data gathering is reliant on the category and rationale of the research that is being 
carried out. Given that this is a qualitative research study, the researcher 
commenced by carrying out a comprehensive literature review. Furthermore, the 
researcher carried out a physical security survey (making use of the observation 
checklist) of the present security control measures at the Durban harbour to 
ascertain the precise nature of the weaknesses and security threats. In addition, 
semi-structured interviews were carried out with security, police, and customs 
officials. Finally, a documentary research study was carried out by examining the 
data from case dockets which were investigated by the SAPS for thefts and 
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smuggling of counterfeit goods and contraband during the period 1 January 2011 to 
31 December 2011.  
 
2.5.1 Design and development of data collection instruments 
The design and development of the data collection instruments is dependent on the 
overall research strategy. Since this is a descriptive study, it searches for a deeper 
understanding of the participants’ personal experiences of the phenomenon being 
studied, thus involving case study and field research. The data collection techniques 
best suiting this approach are participant observation, in-depth interviewing and 
document analysis. To this end, each instrument was designed and developed to 
provide adequate information on the research questions and the overall strategy of 
the study. In the discussion that follows, the design and development of each of the 
data collection instruments is explained under the respective headings. 
 
2.5.1.1 Semi-structured interviews schedule 
A literature review was initially performed to acquire pertinent literature concerning 
the research study. The widespread matters confronting the ports regarding illegal 
movement of goods were categorised into themes. The researcher transformed 
these themes into principle research questions. The researcher then composed a list 
of the principle research questions and sub-questions which would aid the 
researcher in attaining a clearer interpretation of the problematic areas during the 
conducting of the interviews. The questions were then clustered under the diverse 
categories and formulated part of an interview schedule. The result was a non-
specific interview schedule that comprised forty-nine (49) questions which were 
submitted in the semi-structured interviews (attached as Appendix A below). The 
researcher utilised semi-structured interviews, given that this was a qualitative 
research study and needed to uncover the thoughts of the participants, in order to 
discover what was imperative to the participants and to get an assortment of 
answers to the questions. The researcher initially piloted the interview schedule 
among a small group of five (5) border police officials. The questions were assessed 
and a few small alterations were made. Once confirmation was made that the 
revised questionnaire could produce the significant data required from the 
respondents, a generic interview schedule was composed and employed to conduct 
the interviews of the three different departments, i.e. the SAPS, Customs and 
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Transnet security officials who were responsible for providing security and law 
enforcement at the Durban Harbour. 
 
2.5.1.2 Documentary analysis of case dockets 
The researcher started off by examining twenty case dockets to establish what were 
the common issues or trends running through them. Thereafter, with this information, 
the researcher established a documentary pro forma checklist to be applied to each 
docket examined, with a specific focus on the importance of the date and time of the 
incident, the modus operandi used to remove the stolen goods, the description of the 
goods stolen or trafficked, and the places where the goods were stolen or being 
trafficked (attached as Appendix B below).  
 
As soon as the draft checklist was composed, the researcher then piloted it with 
twenty dockets, which were obtained and examined at the Maydon Wharf SAPS 
offices, in order to determine whether the instrument assessed the correct data. As 
soon as it was established that the instrument presented valid and reliable data, it 
was then confirmed and used in gathering data from the relevant target population. 
The researcher gathered significant data from the research study by holding 
meetings, and spending many days, with detectives involved in the investigation of 
case dockets. Data was then analysed and coded through the data analysis phase. 
 
2.5.1.3 Observation checklist 
The researcher planned and developed an observation checklist (attached as 
Appendix J below) to be utilised when performing the field research, which was 
implemented throughout the onsite inspection of the Durban harbour. During the 
design phase of the checklist, the researcher took into account the most crucial 
security measures that needed to be surveyed. The researcher then established a 
checklist for all the security measures which indicated if the relevant measures were 
adequate to prevent security risks or if there were vulnerabilities in the affected 
measures. This was the fundamental nature of the security survey (attached as 
Appendix J).  
 
A security survey is imperative, given that it will assess the present security 
measures that are in place at the Durban Harbour, with the purpose of recognising 
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the gaps, if any, or if the measures are satisfactory and sufficient to guard against 
vulnerabilities and security risks. As soon as it was finished, the researcher 
embarked on an onsite inspection of the Durban harbour. This entailed walking 
around the entire site of the harbour, utilising the observation checklist to make 
observations and record the findings thereof, in view of the prevailing security 
measures that are already in place at the harbour. The researcher piloted the 
checklist by testing it on specific security measures in the Durban harbour, thereafter 
confirming its validity and creating the checklist. 
 
2.5.2 DATA COLLECTION 
2.5.2.1 Literature study 
A literature study searches to uncover material that is associated with the topic and 
to evaluate the subject matter of that material in detail (David & Sutton, 2004: 07). 
Fouche and Delport (2011: 134) are of the view that a literature review is intended to 
gain a better grasp of the characteristics and significance of the research problem. 
The researcher undertook various steps in the implementation of the literature 
review, following the advice of Fouche and Delport (2011: 135). These were: 
 
 Refine the topic: The researcher restricted the subject matter to only the unlawful 
trafficking of goods through the port-of-entry so as to avoid squandering time 
gathering resources that related only indirectly to the research study. In 
enhancing the topic, the researcher was watchful against gathering a tremendous 
amount of literature, but was reluctant not to be left with only a limited amount of 
articles or books. 
 
 Design a search: The researcher utilised a well-defined strategy that embarked 
on the parameters of the search. The researcher utilised a computer to design a 
bibliography database. This was done to warehouse information of all authors 
and references with a concise synopsis of the contents of the source. 
 
 Locate sources of literature: The researcher utilised the expertise of the subject 
librarian at University of South Africa (UNISA) for purposes of finding indexes, 
abstracts and computerised databases relating to the research being studied. 
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The researcher visited the university library, the general library and the 
organisation that was being researched to obtain sources of literature. The 
researcher also consulted an assortment of sources which comprised scholarly 
books, articles in professional journals and publications, research reports, and 
theses and monographs. Furthermore, the researcher utilised the internet to 
locate national and international literature in books, journals, theses, government 
publications, official documents/records/handbooks/directives of the South 
African Police Service (SAPS) and Customs, as well as in other pertinent 
literature sources related to the subject being researched. 
 
 Use sources as a source of reference: The researcher emphasised the sources 
that were referenced in the literature study of books, articles and journals.  
 
 Evaluate the information contained in the various works: The researcher 
assessed the data of the different authors collectively and deduced the value and 
failures of the diverse concepts in the literature.  
 
2.5.2.2 Observation  
Observation was another method of data collection used by the researcher when 
conducting this research study. Matthew and Ross (2010: 255) state that observation 
is the simplest method that a researcher may utilise to gather data by observing and 
recording the phenomena as they occur in the real time. Gray (2000: 397) is of the 
opinion that observation is not purely a question of viewing something and then 
recording ‘the facts’. It is a complicated combination of sense (sight, sound, touch, 
smell, taste) and perception.  
 
2.5.2.3 Interviews  
According to Mason (2006: 62), interviewing is illustrated as an interactional 
exchange of dialogue. Obtaining in-depth information regarding a problem is often 
the primary purpose of the qualitative research method and an example of this 
technique is the interview process. With the above in mind, the researcher planned 
on acquiring ample information from the interviewees with regard to the unlawful 
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trafficking and movement of goods through the Durban Harbour, from the different 
viewpoints of the police, customs and security officials.  
 
The researcher pursued various stages in the process of assembling an interview 
schedule. Rule and John (2011: 65) suggest that every question in the interview 
schedule should be pertinent to the variables being researched. The researcher 
performed one-on-one interviews with the aid of an interview schedule. All 
interviewees were individually interviewed by the researcher, which relieved the 
difficulty of miscommunication and uncertainty, and aided the researcher in seeking 
clarity on problem areas as the interview advanced. The same questions were asked 
to all the participants, which allowed for reliability when gathering data. Regarding 
validity and reliability, the researcher trusted that the instrument would precisely 
determine the concept researched and could be utilised by other researchers, and 
would generate similar results.  
 
2.5.2.4 Documentary study of case dockets  
According to Greeff (2011: 376), documentary study signifies the interpretation and 
analysis of written information about the subject that is being researched. The study 
was performed on case dockets that were registered on incidents of theft, fraud, 
contraband smuggling and counterfeit goods at the Durban harbour. The purpose of 
the research study was to determine the modus operandi of the criminals and the 
kinds of goods that were susceptible to threats. The aim of commencing this 
research study was to determine whether the unlawful trafficking of goods happened 
on certain days of the week or whether the thefts and smuggling occurred more 
commonly over weekends. Following on from this, the aim was to ascertain the kinds 
of goods that were most frequently stolen or smuggled and the modus operandi of 
the criminals. Even though there are various specialised units that perform criminal 
investigations related to incidents affecting the harbour, it was recognised that the 
greater part of criminal cases were recorded and investigated by the Maydon Wharf 
police officials.  
 
A selective, random sampling technique was utilised to choose dockets for the 
analysis. The sampling frame included 250 theft and 250 contraband smuggling case 
dockets which had been investigated from 1 January 2011 to 1 January 2012 (a 
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period of twelve months). These comprised guilty, not guilty, and undetected 
perpetrator cases, as well as cases pending investigation. The researcher chose to 
draw a sample of 50 case dockets for the purpose of this research study. 
 
As stated above, the purpose of the documentary study was to ascertain the modus 
operandi of criminals and syndicates engaged in the unlawful trafficking of goods 
through the Durban harbour and to identify the types of goods that are vulnerable to 
theft or smuggling. 
 
2.5.2.5 Piloting 
According to Grinnell and Unrau (2008: 336), a ‘pilot study’ comprises the pre-testing 
of all facets of a measuring instrument on a minor scale. Barker (2003: 327) 
describes a pilot study as an approach to evaluate and validate an instrument by 
administering it to a lesser group of participants from the total envisioned population. 
For this research study, the researcher initially piloted the observation checklist on a 
small number of security measures at the Durban harbour to determine if it produced 
the desired outcome. The researcher thereafter piloted the interview schedule by 
field testing it among a small number of participants from the total population in order 
to make modifications or amendments to the instrument, if required. To conclude, the 
researcher piloted the documentary draft checklist on a few dockets before 
completing the documentary checklist. The findings of the pilot study indicated that 
the relevant data could be obtained from the dockets against the criteria contained in 
the documentary checklist. In addition to this, the pilot study assisted the researcher 
in estimating the time that it would take to obtain the information from the sample 
and the costs involved therein, as well as verifying the validity and reliability of the 
data collection instruments  
 
2.5.2.6 Experience 
The researcher has twenty-two years of knowledge in a policing environment, as well 
as thirteen years practical management experience in the investigation department 
of the SAPS Organised Crime division of the Directorate of Priority Crimes 
investigations also known as the ‘Hawks’. The researcher is regularly immersed at 
the Directorate of Priority Crimes investigations with crime pertaining to 
investigations of contraband or narcotics that have been unlawfully trafficked through 
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the various ports. With this experience and knowledge, the researcher conducted 
inspections on containers and goods that were apprehended or were of a suspicious 
nature. The researcher’s knowledge and experience with Organised Crime 
Investigations afforded him the insight needed to detect problem areas facing the 
harbour and also enabled the researcher to distinguish case dockets describing 
events of theft or contraband trafficking from the harbour.  
 
2.6 Data analysis 
All the data that was gathered by the researcher was examined with the purpose of 
obtaining a general opinion of the data. Patton (2002: 432) states that the aim of 
data analysis is to formulate findings by condensing volumes of unprocessed data, 
scrutinising and recognising patterns, and composing a framework for 
communicating what the data discloses. The researcher used a data analysis spiral 
(open coding) to organise and conduct an evaluation of the data gathered. Leedy 
and Ormrod (2005: 151) are of the view that the data analysis spiral is an 
extensively-utilised technique in qualitative research. In utilising this technique, the 
researcher undertook the following steps: 
 
 The data analysis commenced with the organisation of the gathered data, which 
involved creating an inventory of the researcher’s findings and establishing how 
the data was completed. The researcher began by evaluating the raw data that 
was gathered through the various data collection methods, namely interviews, 
onsite evaluations (observation) of security practices, and documentary and 
literature studies. The data gathered from interviews was recorded and grouped 
into categories and subjects. Data from the docket evaluations was grouped into 
categories and subjects corresponding to those categories utilised in the pro 
forma sheets for the analysis of dockets. Lastly, data relating to the modus 
operandi information was processed differently from other all other data. This 
information was read numerous times and then grouped according to distinctive 
categories and subjects of information. For example, the use of a bolt cutter to 
open the locks on the container, and the method in which access was gained.  
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 The data was arranged and grouped according to the crucial theoretical 
concepts: security risks, weaknesses, threats and security control measures. 
Files were opened for all key concepts and information under all categories was 
filed appropriately. The researcher considered all information gathered on issues 
relating to the unlawful trafficking of goods through the harbour and the constant 
struggles with the present security control measures. Through this procedure, 
common categories arose which were grouped methodically and classified 
appropriately. 
 
 Within the categories, the information was contrasted to identify variants and 
comparable significances. Variants and comparable data were grouped 
individually. According to Auerbach and Silverstein (2003: 32), a coding method 
is created on the basis that not one person is adequately intelligent or adequately 
intuitive to read a series of transcripts and instantly observe the patterns within. 
To prevail over this limitation, the coding method is used as a process for 
establishing the manuscripts and uncovering patterns within organisational 
structures. 
 
 After considering the databases of grouped information, the researcher 
systematically evaluated the data by incorporating and condensing it to determine 
findings.  
 
2.7 VALIDITY, RELIABILITY AND ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
2.7.1 Ensuring validity  
The concept of validity is concerned with data that has been obtained precisely and 
accurately. According to Denscombe (2002: 301), the data gathered must be honest, 
trustworthy and not conceal important matters. With regard to validity, the researcher 
noted that the phenomenon under examination had been previously studied. In this 
regard, the different forms of validity were applied to all of the instruments. 
 
2.7.1.1 Content validity  
This proposes that the complete subject matter of a conceptual definition be 
represented in the measure (Delport & Roestenberg, 2011: 173). For this purpose, 
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the researcher tested the content on the data collection instruments and confirmed it 
was capable of measuring the data which it was intended to measure. 
 
2.7.1.2 Face validity 
This concerns the superficial appearance of a measurement procedure and whether 
the instrument measured the variable that it claimed to measure (Delport & 
Roestenberg, 2011: 173). The construction and phrasing of the questions and 
variables in the data collection instruments appeared capable at face value to 
measure the variables and research questions. The researcher made use of an 
observation checklist to assess the present security measures at the Durban 
harbour. The standard set for the assessment was adequate to measure the 
strengths or vulnerabilities in the security measures. 
 
2.7.1.3 Criterion validity 
This is concerned with external standards for determining the concept and is more of 
an objective form of validity (Delport & Roestenberg, 2011: 173). The questions and 
variables in the research instruments must collectively be capable of measuring the 
research questions, goal and objectives of the study. The researcher utilised a semi-
structured interview, observation checklist and documentary study checklist and the 
questions and variables in these research instruments were collectively capable of 
measuring the research questions, goal and objectives of the study. In the interview 
schedule, the researcher confirmed that the identical criteria for questions were 
exercised for all participants, which also which guaranteed consistency. To ascertain 
the validity of the questions, all questions were verified to establish if all information 
provided regarding the unlawful trafficking of goods from the harbour was legitimate. 
This also identified the problematic areas in the present security initiatives. To 
ascertain the validity of the information obtained from participants, the interviewer did 
steer or lead the questions. The participants responded to the questions 
unreservedly and voluntarily.  
 
2.7.1.4 Construct validity 
This is related to the meaning of the instrument and how and why it works the way 
that it does (Delport & Roestenberg, 2011: 174). Questions and variables that 
evaluated a certain construct were grouped together into categories in the interview 
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schedule. The design and construction of the interview schedule was set out so as to 
measure the questions and variables which related to the different themes. 
 
2.7.2 Ensuring reliability 
Reliability involves the replicability of findings (Rule & John, 2011: 104). According to 
Neuman (1997: 138), reliability concerns the dependability and reliability of data 
throughout the research process. The reliability of data is impelled by four variables, 
namely the researcher; the participant; the measuring instrument; and the research 
context and the situation in which the research was conducted (Leedy & Ormrod, 
2005: 92). To guarantee reliability, the researcher administered methods that were 
dependable and unvarying for all individuals and situations. The research was 
conducted fairly and equitably, since the study was free from personal bias and 
assumptions of the researcher.  
 
The researcher took precautions to guard against ambiguity and used a variety of 
methods to check the findings (data triangulation). The researcher also guarded 
against value judgements in collecting the data and the findings (Marshall & 
Rossman, 1995: 146). The researcher also ensured consistency in the study by 
establishing and documenting procedures that were used in the collection and 
analysis of the data. The data was also preserved and is available for re-analysis, 
and if other researchers were to make use of similar methods at a different time, they 
should achieve similar results and findings. 
 
2.7.3 Ethical considerations 
It is a requirement that ethical considerations be employed throughout the complete 
research process. The researcher adhered to UNISA’s Policy of Research Ethics 
when conducting the research study. According to the University of South Africa 
Research Council’s policy on research ethics (2007: 3), the researcher must show 
consideration for the autonomy, rights and dignity of all research participants. 
Furthermore, the researcher should not subject participants to processes not linked 
or associated with the research project or its methodology.  
 
The researcher took cognisance of this whilst conducting the research study and 
ensured that participants were aware that participation in the research was voluntary. 
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The participants were chosen, based on their agreement to participate in the 
research study. The rationale for the research study was explained to all participants. 
Furthermore, participants were guaranteed that confidentiality and anonymity would 
be adhered to. Participants were notified about the purpose of the research study 
and what the intended results would be. All the information that was collected was 
treated with confidentially and anonymity. When the data had been gathered and 
evaluated, the researcher scripted the findings precisely and objectively. The UNISA 
Ethics Committee granted consent for the conduct of the empirical research, and the 
UNISA Code of Ethics was adhered to, to ensure ethical standards of quality, 
confidentiality and anonymity. The researcher obtained permission to conduct the 
research from the Provincial Commissioner of the South African Police Service, 
KwaZulu-Natal, from the Transnet Port Office, and from the Customs agency 
stationed at the Durban Harbour. Ethical consideration was duly given to all 
participants throughout the research process.  
 
2.8 THE VALUE OF THE RESEARCH 
2.8.1 The value of the research to Transnet 
Presently, there is limited research being undertaken concerning the factors that 
affect or lead to the unlawful trafficking of goods through seaports-of-entry. Transnet 
is a government parastatal organisation which is predominately responsible for the 
management, safety and security all South African seaports-of-entry. The research 
provided in this study should be valuable directly to Transnet and should establish 
and create an awareness of the problems concerning the unlawful trafficking of 
goods through Durban harbour. It will also offer guidelines and recommendations of 
how to assist in combating or reducing these problems by minimising security and 
crime risks. Transnet will, therefore, be in a position to provide more effective and 
efficient services by implementing a co-ordinated and detailed security management 
programme to lead the maritime sector in the fight against contraband smuggling, 
unlawful aliens and container thefts. 
 
2.8.2 The value of the research to the private security industry 
The private security industry will gain insight into the weaknesses, risks and 
vulnerabilities identified in the present security measures at the Durban Harbour. 
This will help to identify fraudulent documentation and combat the trafficking of 
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goods, smuggling of contraband,, and ingress of unlawful immigrants through the 
harbour. 
 
2.8.3 The value of the research to law enforcement agencies 
Law enforcement agencies, such as the border police unit of the SAPS and the 
Customs and Excise Division of the South African Revenue Service (SARS), should 
be able to gain a better understanding of their shortcomings in terms of crime 
prevention methods. Furthermore, they would be able to comprehend the modus 
operandi of criminal organisations in the unlawful trafficking of goods and 
contraband.  
 
Law Enforcement agencies should increase their understanding of the present global 
trends in the stealing of containers. This information will enable law enforcement 
agencies to carry out suitable planning sessions and improve operational plans 
which will aim at limiting crime at South African harbours. This will assist in the 
implementation of more effective management of policing at the Durban harbour 
(and consequently at all harbours) and this should decrease the unlawful trafficking 
of goods, thus decreasing criminal activities. A complete, co-ordinated security 
management programme involving all role players might finally be developed for all 
South African seaports-of-entry. Such a security (risk) management programme 
could then serve to distinguish the role clarification of all security officials at Durban 
harbour.  
 
2.8.4 The value of the research to UNISA and other academic institutions 
Students will be informed and empowered by the knowledge gained when reading 
this dissertation, which will be accessible at the UNISA library and will also be 
accessible on the departmental website. This information will be valuable to other 
students who intend to further their studies in security risk management. It could, 
therefore, provide an additional foundation to their future post-graduate studies, if 
they choose to study a related topic.  
 
2.8.5 The value of the research to the community 
The findings may, perhaps, be used to help the South African public to recognise the 
security risks and challenges confronting the harbour at Durban regarding the 
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unlawful trafficking of goods and contraband. Furthermore, if the community is 
mindful of the above-mentioned problem, they can assist by offering information to 
the relevant authorities concerning the individuals or syndicates committing these 
criminal activities. This community support for crime prevention would, hopefully, 
assist in decreasing crime and would contribute to a more secure and safe society. 
 
2.9 LIMITATIONS 
2.9.1 Issues regarding the Durban Harbour site audit 
While conducting a site audit of the Durban Harbour, the researcher was given a 
general view of the security measures that were in place. This was required for the 
researcher to put together recommendations for the further enhancing of the 
measures. However, selected areas of the harbour where access was controlled 
made it difficult for the researcher to finish the checklist regarding the security 
measures in place. A security layout plan, though, was obtained from Transnet which 
helped to alleviate this problem. 
 
2.9.2 Availability of candidates for interviews 
The candidates from the different departments had some difficulty in ensuring that 
they kept their appointments for the one-on-one interviews. This was because of 
their demanding workload and their flexible working hours. Furthermore, several of 
the participants were only accessible after working hours or late at night, owing to 
their working schedules. This made it challenging for the researcher to make 
appointments to meet after working hours with these specific individuals. Certain 
customs officials declined to be interviewed, owing to the sensitivity and 
confidentiality of information in their possession. Divulging such information in an 
interview could see them being in direct conflict with their work policies. 
 
2.10 CONCLUSION 
This chapter described and discussed the research design and the methodology 
used by the researcher in this study. The qualitative research approach was selected 
in order to investigate in greater detail and depth the opinions, views and perceptions 
of the participants. The objective of utilising descriptive research in this research 
study was to evaluate and illustrate the reasons, causes and manner in which the 
trafficking of goods from seaports-of-entry has occurred in South Africa, but more 
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specifically as illustrated by the case study of Durban Harbour. Data was gathered 
using one-on-one, semi-structured interviews utilising an interview schedule; a 
documentary study of SAPS case dockets was performed utilising a documentary 
study checklist; and an on-site evaluation of the present security measures was 
performed with the help of an observation checklist. It also explained the significance 
of this research study to the various agencies providing security and law 
enforcement at the harbour. Validity and reliability was maintained throughout the 
research and limitations were discussed. All research guidelines, including ethical 
issues, were correctly followed. Confidentiality, anonymity and the protection of 
respondents was followed in the process of gathering the relevant data. 
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Chapter 3  
THE ILLEGAL MOVEMENT OF GOODS FROM THE SEA PORTS-OF-ENTRY  
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
Africa experiences a number of security threats in the maritime arena which 
negatively impacts on its economic growth. One such challenge is the smuggling of 
weapons, drugs and people through Africa’s porous land borders or the maritime 
domain (Haveman & Shatz, 2006: 4). Port security, from a South African 
perspective, can be likened to border control of seaports and the coastal waters of 
South Africa. It is a broad focus area and includes aspects such as physical security 
measures, registration of ships, shipboard security, piracy, marine safety issues, 
illegal immigration, stowaways and terrorism (Pommerin & Potgieter, 2009: 31). The 
steady increase in organised crime and criminal organisations involved in the cross-
border smuggling of drugs, firearms, illegal immigrants, stolen goods and vehicles 
has also contributed to the rise in the crime rate. This increase in cross-border 
crimes had a subsequent effect on the policing of borders and ports-of-entry.  
 
The lack of proper controls at borders and ports-of-entry is a key contributing factor 
to cross-border crimes and South Africa’s escalating crime problem. In the case of 
this research study, access control and egress control were highlighted as the most 
problematic areas of security at the Durban harbour. This was followed by deficient 
CCTV cameras, perimeter fencing and X-ray scanners. Other physical protection 
systems, such as inadequate security guards, are also highly problematic areas. 
Malfunctioning X-Ray scanners featured as the most problematic area facing the 
Durban harbour. Where the security principles and practices and the security 
professionals employed in the Durban ports are not functioning properly, these 
instituted security systems/measures may prove to be ineffective and unsuccessful 
in reducing the illegal movement of goods in the ports. This is due to the fact that 
these illegal goods are not only a port security problem that has to be dealt with by 
the port authorities, but it also needs the assistance of other role-players, such as 
SARS, customs, SAPS and government.  
 
This chapter provides a literature study on the illegal movement of goods and 
contraband smuggled through the ports-of-entry, vulnerabilities and risks that 
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confront ports-of-entry, and the current security risk measures used at ports-of-entry 
to prevent the illegal movement of goods. 
 
3.2 DEFINING PORT SECURITY  
Port security is defined as the defence, law enforcement and counterterrorism 
activities that fall within the port and maritime domain and includes the protection of 
the seaports themselves, the protection and inspection of the cargo moving through 
the ports, and maritime security (Frittelli, Lee, Medalia, O’Rourke & Perl, 2003: 1). 
According to a Californian Public Policy Institute report, port security is defined as 
protective measures that are taken to secure the maritime-related intermodal supply 
chain from terrorism, the unwitting transportation of terrorism-related assets and 
crime (Motorola, 2009: 36). A slightly different perspective is held by Haveman and 
Shatz (2006: 36), who define port security as securing the complete maritime supply 
chain, starting from the factory gate in a foreign country to the final destination of the 
product, which stipulates a need to secure ports, as well as the supply chain feeding 
goods into the ports. As noted above, port security from a South African perspective 
can be likened to border control of seaports and the coastal waters of South Africa. It 
is a broad focus area and includes aspects such as physical security measures, 
registration of ships, shipboard security, piracy, marine safety issues, illegal 
immigration, stowaways and terrorism (Pommerin & Potgieter, 2009: 31). The 
Operational Working Team on Border Control (OWTBC, 1997: 1) define border 
control as the facilitation of legitimate trading and movement of people through the 
country’s borders, which the primary service is accountable for, and includes the: 
 
 avoidance, detection and concern of the unlawful trafficking goods and people 
across borders; 
 avoidance of people in the unlawful trafficking of people and goods across 
borders and 
 apprehension of goods that are trafficked unlawfully across borders.  
 
In contrast, Minnaar (2001: 1), says that border controls should not be viewed as 
preventing the cross-border movement of people and goods, but rather as assisting 
in regulating orderly, legal movement. A more specific and detailed definition of 
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border control is provided by Steinberg (2005a: 1), who sums it up as a 
comprehensive process that ensures the seamless working together of all functions 
that set strategies for, regulates and manages the cross-border movement of goods 
and people. 
 
3.3 AIMS OF PORT SECURITY 
In broad terms, good border management seeks to facilitate access for people and 
goods that are both needed and desired, but also aims at interdicting and stopping 
‘bad’ people and ‘bad’ things from entering the country (Heyman, 2001: 1). This can 
be successfully achieved by accurately and efficiently identifying high-risk 
passengers and cargo for inspection and preventing the entry of dangerous goods 
and people, without impeding the flow of legitimate cross-border traffic. For this 
purpose, policy makers should endeavour to identify and promote those policies that 
will enhance the effectiveness of the filters employed for these tasks (Heyman, 2001: 
682).  
 
Hanrahan (2010: 1) notes that the primary focuses in port security have advanced 
since the September 9/11 terrorist attacks in America, from simply preventing cargo 
theft to protecting people and critical infrastructure from terrorism. For this purpose, 
there have been several programme initiatives taken by the federal government in 
line with those at Canada’s ports, related to implementing the ISPS code, including 
threat assessments, security plans, federal funding for port security, background 
checks for port workers and the implementation of sophisticated technologies 
(Hanrahan, 2010: 1). Beneke (2001: 1) states that the objectives of border policing, 
amongst others, include the control and policing of the illegal movement of narcotics, 
contraband, vehicles and weapons, as well as the control and policing of the illegal 
movement of people. In addition to this, Beneke (2001: 1) further states that within 
these two objectives; the aim is to: 
 
 detect corruption,  
 detect and identify fraudulent documents,  
 detect the illegal trade in drugs, vehicles, firearms and human beings, 
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 stop the illegal movement of criminal elements across borders, and 
 detect illegal people and goods, with the aim of eradicating their source points 
within the country. 
Pommerin and Potgieter (2009: 31) strengthen this argument by saying that the 
Transnet National Ports Authority (TPNA) is mandated with the ultimate 
responsibility of security of the overall port system and should aim to achieve 
maritime security in the port of Durban by identifying threats and implementing 
appropriate counter measures in accordance with the following legislative measures:  
 
• The SA Maritime Security Regulations: ISPS Code, 
• South African Port Legislative Arrangements, and 
• The SA Maritime Security Regulations. 
 
3.4 OVERVIEW OF SECURITY MANAGEMENT AT THE SEA PORTS-OF-
ENTRY  
3.4.1 International perspective 
The 9/11 terrorist attacks against the United States played a pivotal role in prompting 
a global survey of border security practices and policies. Before the 9/11 terrorist 
attacks, border security focused on unauthorised immigrants and contraband 
smuggling, however, after those attacks, the focus was redirected to counteracting 
terrorism (Heyman, 2008: 315). The United States marine transport system 
comprises 300 sea and river ports, with 3 700 cargo and passenger terminals 
(Greenberg, Chalk, Willis, Khilko & Ortiz, 2006: 1).  
 
An attack on any of the major ports could severely disrupt global trade and the global 
economy by causing a loss of billions of dollars. The security of ports and their 
deficiencies are numerous and leaves US ports vulnerable to terrorist attacks 
(Greenberg et al, 2006: 1). There are many vulnerabilities in the US seaports, with a 
potential risk of security breaches in almost every aspect of the container shipping 
industry, given the overwhelming number of ships and containers (Frittelli et al, 2003: 
1). Containers represent the largest area of concern in terms of security and 
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vulnerability. More than six million containers enter US seaports annually, of which 
only two per cent are physically inspected by Customs (Frittelli et al, 2003: 1). A 
2000 Interagency report on crime and security in United States seaports concluded 
that there was a general lack of security at US seaports, coupled with relaxed 
policies which resulted in the high incidence of cargo theft, as well as other crimes 
(Grillot, Cruise & D’Erman, 2010: 3). The report estimated the cost of cargo theft to 
be in the region of $12 billion dollars per annum (Anon., 2000: 73). A similar view is 
held by Grillot et al (2010: 98), who state that there has been a lack of security policy 
for physical, procedural, and personnel security for US seaports, as well as a lack of 
access control within sensitive areas of seaports. 
 
In Australia, border protection is the primary responsibility of the Australian Customs 
and Border Protection Agency. It is responsible for the security of the border and the 
legitimate movement of goods and people (Australian Government Border and 
Protection Service, 2001: 1). Australia has experienced many challenges in the 
control of its borders as a result of globalisation and the increased cross-border 
movement of goods and people, which has resulted in an increase in the level of 
transnational crime, including the illegal movement of drugs, arms and people. Each 
year, four million people are estimated to be smuggled across Australia’s 
international borders. In this light, the Australian government has endeavoured to 
enhance its border controls and increase its cooperation with international law 
enforcement (Australian Government Border and Protection Service, 2001: 1).  
 
In the port city of Rotterdam, border policing is carried out by the local policing 
agency. Rotterdam is the largest seaport in the world and the threat to the security of 
the port is viewed in a serious light by the government of the Netherlands. Some of 
the problems experienced at the port of Rotterdam include drug trafficking, human 
trafficking, illegal immigration and cross-border crimes (Koslowski, 2011: 2).  
 
Similarly, in Namibia, a performance audit carried out by the Directorate of Customs 
and Excise established that inspections and observations had not been given 
sufficient attention and were seen as a less important function (Auditor General 
Namibia, 2001: 15). Additional findings by the Directorate disclosed a lack of staff 
and equipment to carry out the inspections and a lack of physical examinations for 
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preventing the importation and exportation of restricted or prohibited goods (Auditor 
General Namibia, 2001: 15).  
 
According to the Canadian Security Guide Book on Seaports (Kenny, 2007: 39), 
Canadian ports channel close to four million containers filled with assorted 
commodities into and out of Canada every year and any one of these containers 
could contain chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear or explosive devices 
designed to lay waste to a large Canadian or US target. Taking into account the 
huge volumes of container traffic coming into the Canadian ports, no amount of 
scrutiny would ever be able to guarantee that a renegade container could not get 
through (Kenny, 2007: 40). This view is supported by Schneider (2009: 366) who 
states that in Canada’s three largest marine ports, Montreal, Vancouver and Halifax, 
the illegal entry and exit of goods have been assisted by corrupt border officials and 
dockworkers working at these ports. 
 
In a 2008 report entitled The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, 
industry analyst ‘Gartner Incorporated’ concluded that 80 per cent of all world trade 
is transported on ships via cargo containers (cited in Motorola, 2009: 3). These 
containers are relocated between the world’s major seaports more than 200 million 
times a year, which suggests that merchandise can be stolen and that there is 
sufficient opportunity for dangerous disruptions at port operations (Motorola, 2009: 
3). It is for these reasons that ports are targeted by organised crime and terrorist 
organisations. Seaports act as a gateway for plots to disrupt the US, as well as other 
countries’ economies (Motorola, 2009: 3). 
 
On a global perspective, the international community has made significant 
improvements in protecting the global supply chain through the implementation 
of Program Global Shield (Department of Homeland Security, USA, 2012: 1). A 
sub-programme of this initiative is the Cargo Security Initiative (CSI), which 
aims to increase the security of containers that are shipped to the US from 
countries around the globe. In this regard, the US customs officials address the 
threat to border security by potential terrorists who utilise maritime containers to 
deliver weapons. This initiative also allows US customs officials to work in 
collaboration with foreign agencies to inspect containerised cargo at the foreign 
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seaports, before being loaded onto cargo vessels (Department of Homeland 
Security, USA, 2012: 1). 
 
3.4.2 South African perspective 
The port of Durban handles the greatest volume of sea-going traffic of any port in 
southern Africa (Bhikraj, 2011: 1). During 2008/2009, the Durban container terminals 
handled 2 560 366 TEUs (twenty-foot equivalents), of which 948 237 were imports, 
994 651 were exports, and 617 478 were being transhipped (Ntamutumba, 2010: 
61). Forty thousand, nine hundred TEUs were shipped along the coast. During the 
above period, the amount of containers handled at Durban represented sixty-seven 
per cent of the total number of containers handled at South African ports. During the 
same period, the Durban Car Terminal, which is deemed to be the country’s largest 
import and export facility for the motor industry, handled 372 557 motor units (Ports 
& Ships 2013: 1).  
 
According to Stead, Chitiyo, Potgieter and Till (2010: 8), it is evident that there is 
inadequate security at South African borders and ports-of-entry. Owing to a lack of 
information coordination and intelligence, life has become easier for organised crime 
syndicates to flourish, which in itself has serious implications for the country. In a 
proposal by the Democratic Alliance (DA) to tackle cross-border crime and illegal 
immigration, it was stated that the South African borders are so porous that this fails 
to prevent the illegal flow of aliens and illegal goods being imported or exported 
through the borders or ports (Democratic Alliance, 2008: 2).  
 
The DA further mentions that the Border Control Coordinating Committee (BCOCC) 
does not have a strategic plan in respect of border policing and that it has failed in its 
duties of coordinating and maintaining border control operations and improving the 
legal flow of goods and persons (Democratic Alliance, 2008: 3). Media reports often 
publish articles relating to crime in South African ports and harbours and from the 
negative reports that are published on this issue, it was concluded that the overall 
lack of control at South Africa’s land, sea and air borders was unacceptably high and 
there was a general lack of security which left the ports vulnerable to the smuggling 
of goods, weapons, people and drugs. Since 1994, the border policing component of 
the South African Police Service (SAPS) has increased its efforts directed at dealing 
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with the increase in these activities. The efforts were mainly centred on the 
tightening of controls at all ports-of-entry and on the co-ordination of 
interdepartmental activities (Minnaar, 2001: 1). The illegal flow of goods and people 
across the borders contributes to significant national problems, such as the 
availability of illegal drugs, threats of terrorism, increase in transnational organised 
crime syndicates, growth in population, and crimes such as money laundering, 
prostitution, vehicle hijackings and cross-border smuggling (Hennop, Jefferson & 
McLean, 2001: 12). 
 
According to Minnaar (2003: 73), a security threat analysis conducted in 2000 by the 
National Ports Authority identified the following problems with regard to the illegal 
movement of goods:  
 
 Cargo theft; 
 Illegal or undocumented immigrants and stowaways; 
 Vehicle theft; 
 Drug smuggling; 
 Trade fraud (such as under-valuations and sale of counterfeit goods); and 
 Firearms smuggling.  
 
This view is supported by Mayer (2003: 44), who indicates that sea ports-of-entry are 
a major locus of federal crimes, which include drug trafficking, cargo theft, 
contraband and alien smuggling. In the United States, there is a nexus between 
criminal activity and seaports, and this encompasses a broad range of crimes, such 
as illicit drug trafficking, contraband and counterfeit goods, alien smuggling, trade 
fraud, bribery, extortion, racketeering, environmental crime and cargo theft (Mayer, 
2003: 44).  
 
In 1997 it was estimated that the value of illegal goods crossing South Africa’s 
borders was in the order of US $2.5 billion (Geldenhuys, 2007: 1). Minnaar (2001: 1), 
states that the illegal movement of goods, contraband, and people in and out of 
South Africa has dramatically increased since 1994. This is a demonstration that, 
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without proper border control, crime will continue to increase in South Africa. This 
viewpoint is supported by Geldenhuys (Geldenhuys, 2007: 1), who points out that 
after 1994, South Africa was not only influenced in an economic, political and social 
way, but also developed vulnerabilities to corruption and crime more extensively than 
previously. The rise in unlawful activities had an influence on the regulation of the 
country’s borders, on criminal activities and criminal organisations aggressively 
engaged in the smuggling of narcotics, unlawful immigrants, firearms, and the 
unlawful exporting of stolen vehicles and endangered species and other goods 
across borders (Geldenhuys, 2007: 1). 
 
3.5 THE CHALLENGES FACING BORDER CONTROL IN SOUTH AFRICA 
AND GLOBALLY 
The challenge of effective border control has grown substantially over the decades. 
Currently in the United States, over 400 million people cross the border via the ports-
of-entry, with hundreds of thousands of these people entering the ports illegally 
(Koslowski, 2011: 2). The US Government has provided more resources for the 
enforcing of its border policies in order to enable them to deal with this problem. 
Although the resources have funded a number of initiatives, including improving 
border systems, screening procedures and technological aids that assisted in 
immigration control at border posts, these systems have proved to be expensive and 
have pushed up costs in implementing these systems (Koslowski, 2011: 2).  
 
Africa endures a number of security threats in the maritime arena which negatively 
impacts on its economic growth. One such challenge is the smuggling of weapons, 
drugs and people, which are smuggled through Africa’s porous land borders or the 
maritime domain (Haveman & Shatz, 2006: 4).  
 
In the South African environment, Beneke (2001: 1) has stated that the objectives of 
border policing, amongst others, include the control and policing of the illegal 
movement of narcotics, contraband, vehicles and weapons, as well as the control 
and policing of the illegal movement of people. In addition to this, Beneke (2001: 1) 
states that within these two objectives, the aim is to: 
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 detect corruption,  
 detect and identify fraudulent documents,  
 detect the illegal trade in drugs, vehicles, firearms and human beings, 
  stop the illegal movement of criminal elements across borders, and 
  detect illegal people and goods with the aim of eradicating their source points 
within the country. 
 
Pommerin and Potgieter (2009: 31), on the other hand, state that responsibility for 
security at the ports lies with the Transnet National Ports Authority (TNPA), which is 
mandated with the ultimate responsibility for the security of the overall port system, 
and that the TNPA should aim to achieve maritime security in the port of Durban by 
identifying threats and implementing appropriate counter measures in accordance 
with the following legislative measures: 
 
 The SA Maritime Security Regulations: ISPS Code, 
 South African Port Legislative Arrangements, and 
 The SA Maritime Security Regulations. 
 
The problem of illegal movement of goods at the Durban harbour cannot always be 
compared to illegal movement of goods in other parts of South Africa, or in other 
countries, owing to the various differences in crimes occurring in other parts of South 
Africa and around the world, and because of the fact that definitions of the types of 
illegal goods vary from place to place. However, we can learn from other ports in 
South Africa and from international experiences and outcomes. 
 
3.6 INSTITUTIONS INVOLVED IN PREVENTING THE ILLEGAL MOVEMENT 
OF GOODS AT SOUTH AFRICAN SEAPORTS-OF-ENTRY 
According to Beneke (2001: 1), the key role-players in terms of regulatory functions 
at South Africa’s borders are: 
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South African Revenue Services (SARS)  
South African Police Service (SAPS) 
South African National Defence Force (SANDF) 
Department of Home Affairs (DHA) 
Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) 
Department of Transport (DoT) 
Department of Agriculture (DoA) 
Department of Health (DoH). 
 
The Border Control Operational Coordinating Working Team (BCOCC) splits the role 
players at ports and places of entry into two groups, namely the ‘key role players’ 
and the ‘additional role players’. The key role players are named as the Department 
of Home Affairs, the South African Revenue Services, and the South African Police 
Service (Taute, 2007: 1).The additional role players include the South African 
National Defence Force, the National Intelligence Agency, the South African Secret 
Service, the Department of Trade and Industry, the Department of Health, the 
Department of Agriculture, the Department of Foreign Affairs, the Department of 
Environmental Affairs and Tourism, the Department of Correctional Service, the 
Department of Transport, the Department of Public Works, the Department of 
Justice, and the Department of Welfare (OWTBC, 1997: 1). 
 
The police, by virtue of their primary role specified in Section 205 of the Constitution 
of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, as well as in the Police Act No 68 of 1995, are 
responsible to ensure effective and proficient policing of South Africa’s international 
borders. The South African Police Service is a member of Interpol and is, therefore, 
also obligated to liaise with other law enforcement agencies internationally to take 
action on any issue that affects the security of the state, and this includes border 
protection. In most instances, the police complement the efforts of the other law 
enforcement agencies in ensuring security at the borders.  
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Beneke (2001: 1) states that the control of the borderline is the responsibility of the 
South African National Defence Force, but will remain the responsibility of SAPS 
until the SANDF is able to perform this function entirely on its own. Hennop et al 
(2001: 23) argue that the main functions of the SAPS Border Police are the 
prevention and detection of cross-border crime and the illegal movement of people 
and goods into or out of South Africa, both internally and at the country’s borders. In 
addition to this, Beneke (2001: 1), states that the SAPS Border Police also perform 
functions on an agency basis for the Department of Home Affairs (Immigration) and 
SARS (Customs and Excise). Port security, on the other hand, is the responsibility of 
Transnet, which is mandated to manage and control all seven commercial seaports 
along South Africa’s coastline (Transnet National Ports Authority, 2013: 1). 
 
3.7 THE ISSUES THAT CONFRONT SOUTH AFRICAN SEAPORTS-OF-
ENTRY  
According to Stead et al (2010: 8), it is evident that there is inadequate security at 
South African borders and ports-of-entry. Owing to a lack of information coordination 
and intelligence, it has become easier for organised crime syndicates to flourish. 
This in itself has serious implications for the country. After the September 9/11 
terrorist attacks in the USA, there has been an increase in awareness of the security 
of goods entering and leaving US ports (Stead et al, 2010: 14). In a proposal by the 
Democratic Alliance to tackle cross-border crime and illegal immigration, it was 
stated that the South African borders are so porous that they fail to prevent the illegal 
flow of aliens and illegal goods from being imported or exported through South 
African borders and ports (Democratic Alliance, 2008: 2).  
 
Furthermore, the Democratic Alliance proposal states that the Border Control 
Coordinating Committee (BCOCC) does not have a strategic plan in respect of 
border policing and that it has failed in its duties of coordinating and maintaining 
border control operations and improving the legal flow of goods and persons 
(Democratic Alliance, 2008: 3). Media reports often publish articles relating to crime 
in South African ports and harbours and from the negative reports that are published 
on this issue, it was concluded that the overall situation at South Africa’s land, sea 
and air borders was unacceptable and that a general lack of security has left the 
ports vulnerable to the smuggling of goods, weapons, people and drugs.  
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Since 1994, the border policing component of the South African Police Service has 
increased its efforts directed at dealing with the increase in these activities. The 
efforts were mainly centred on the tightening of controls at all ports-of-entry and the 
co-ordination of interdepartmental activities (Minnaar, 2001: 1). In a report by the 
South African Auditor General on borderline security, several challenges with respect 
to various aspects of border security were identified (Democratic Alliance, 2008: 6). 
According to this report, the following issues were identified: 
 
 There is an absence of an overall strategic plan or divisional policy on border 
security. No security analysis has been conducted on the state of border fences 
which has severe implications for controlling the flow of illegal people, smuggled 
weapons, drugs and vehicles (Democratic Alliance, 2008: 6). 
 
 There is no specific border training curriculum for members performing border 
duties (Democratic Alliance, 2008: 6). 
 
 The borders are understaffed and under-facilitated and the primary aim of 
combating the illegal movement of persons and goods cannot be adequately 
performed (Democratic Alliance, 2008: 6). 
 
 There is no central database for collected and analysed statistics for border 
crimes, such as illegal immigrants, criminal syndicates linked with the illegal 
movement of goods, people and weapons (Democratic Alliance, 2008: 6). 
 
 
 
3.7.1 Drug trafficking 
According to the 2013 United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime world report, 
maritime trafficking poses challenges to authorities (UNODCCP, 2013). The UN 
report says, given the large quantities of illicit substances that make their way across 
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oceans and continents every day, in containers and even small boats, maritime 
trafficking poses a particularly knotty challenge for the authorities. East and West 
Africa seem to be gaining in prominence with regard to routes for maritime 
trafficking. The report further mentioned that maritime seizure is consistently more 
likely to be larger than a seizure involving transport by road or rail. Maritime seizures 
constitute no more than 11 per cent of all cases across all drug categories globally, 
although each maritime seizure was on average almost 30 times larger than seized 
consignments trafficked by air. Targeted interdiction efforts by the authorities would 
enable them to seize larger quantities of drugs being trafficked over water 
(UNODCCP, 2013: ix). 
 
Owing to the large volume of containers moving through the Durban harbour on a 
daily basis, coupled with the fact that there is a low level of security checks, the 
volume of contraband being smuggled through the port is relatively high (Minnaar, 
2003: 77). Globally, border control agents only search a small fraction of cargo and 
passengers that pass through a port. At the Durban Harbour, less than one per cent 
of cargo containers are searched, while at Johannesburg International Airport (JIA), 
the official figure is three to five per cent of incoming cargo (Steinberg, 2005b: 3). In 
order to be successful in the detection of contraband goods, it is imperative, then, for 
border control agents to select the appropriate containers.  
 
According to Dammer (2000: 84), drug smuggling is one of the primary activities of 
the Chinese Triads, an organised criminal group who in 1997 had two containers 
containing 2.9 million mandrax tablets with a street value of R112 million seized in 
the Durban harbour. A similar incident was recorded by Port and Ships magazine 
(Anon., 2006: 1), which reported that a container holding two million mandrax tablets 
with a street value of R156 million was found at Johannesburg’s City Deep terminal. 
Investigations traced the container back to Durban harbour, where it entered from 
China. The drugs were concealed inside a hollowed-out section of declared cargo of 
wooden doors. Another example of the relation between poor border control and 
drug smuggling is provided by Steinberg (2005b: 10), who states that during 2004, 
two shipments of cannabis, which originated from the Durban harbour, were seized 
at the Rotterdam harbour. Steinberg (2005b: 10), is of the view that the modestly-
resourced anti-smuggling team based at the Durban harbour primarily focuses its 
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efforts on profiling imports and not on exports, and it is for this reason that containers 
containing narcotics such as the above are not detected. In addition, Steinberg 
(2005b: 10) states that there is a relationship between border control agencies and 
drug smugglers, which can be likened to playing a cat-and-mouse game, with the 
odds being in favour of the drug smugglers.  
 
Mayer (2003: 44), confirms that seaports are a major locus of federal crimes, which 
include drug trafficking, cargo theft, and contraband and alien smuggling. In the 
United States, there is a nexus between criminal activity and seaports and this 
encompasses a broad range of crimes, such as illicit drug trafficking, contraband, 
and counterfeit goods, alien smuggling, trade fraud, bribery, extortion, racketeering, 
environmental crime, and cargo theft (Mayer, 2003: 44).  
 
3.7.2 Cargo theft 
According to Minnaar (2003: 78), there are several ways in which cargo theft takes 
place at the Durban harbour. One such method is to steal the container while it is 
removed-in-bond (RIB) and transported to the City Deep (an inland port depot) in 
Johannesburg, Gauteng. If a container is to be removed-in-bond, then it does not 
require customs’ clearance at the harbour and only requires a bill of lading and 
manifest in order to be released. The theft occurs when false documentation is 
produced to release a container from the harbour (Minnaar, 2003: 78). Another 
method described by Minnaar (2003: 78) is the tampering, replacing and 
counterfeiting of Customs or Border Police container seals and the removal of the 
contents while the container is in the harbour or en-route to the City Deep depot. The 
reduction of import and export tariffs, as well as the deregulation of South African 
ports, has resulted in an increase in the number of containers moving through the 
Durban harbour. Organised crime syndicates that have links to established importers 
are operating significant container theft operations from the deregulated port system 
(McCarney & Stren, 2003: 231). 
 
As described by Hare (2009: 72), there have been incidences at port terminals 
where syndicates are stealing full containers. These thefts were not only limited to 
full containers but included small packages that are shipped in containers. Hare 
(2009: 72) further mentions that several years ago, an organised criminal group stole 
 46 
only the obscured centre cartons from palletised cartons of fresh oranges which 
were shipped from Cape Town to Europe. The theft was only discovered several 
months later when the recipient noticed that there was a consistent deficiency of 
three per cent in each load. An investigation into the matter revealed that the theft 
occurred at the Cape Town harbour at the time of loading the ship (Hare, 2009: 72). 
In July 2009, four people were arrested by detectives at the Durban harbour for the 
theft of R200 000 worth of ethanol. Police found drums containing 13 000 litres of 
ethanol which were stolen from the Durban harbour in a Pinetown warehouse. Two 
of the four suspects arrested were harbour workers. One was a security guard, 
another was a crane operator. The third suspect was a truck driver and the fourth 
was the owner of the storage facility (Anon., 2009: 1). 
 
3.7.3 Illegal or undocumented immigrants and stowaways 
According to an article entitled ‘Durban stowaways burn down building’ which was 
published in a local magazine, Ports and Ships Maritime News (Anon., 2006: 1), it 
was reported that a group of 30 stowaways were found in a derelict building which 
was located within the Durban harbour area. Police also found a large quantity of 
stolen property, some of which is thought to have come from ships along the 
adjacent Maydon Wharf. This incident highlighted the issue of lax security in sections 
of Durban harbour, where vehicles are routinely stopped and the occupants are 
requested to produce a permit before entering, while pedestrians are not subjected 
to the same scrutiny and are able to walk in and out at their own free will. The lack of 
security guards on the various entrances to Maydon Wharf, and the lack of control 
over pedestrian traffic is obvious and constitute some of the causes of this problem.  
 
It sometimes happens that illegal immigrants enter the country without any 
assistance, but, as described by Väyrynen (2005: 7), there are occasions where 
some illegal immigrants would require assistance from professional smugglers to 
bring them in clandestinely. There is a direct link of corruption between border 
control authorities and smugglers/traffickers, with the latter providing the immigrants 
with fraudulent documentation, such as passports, visas, and job letters, or in other 
instances, bribing the immigration officials (Väyrynen, 2005: 7). In a few documented 
cases, consulate officials of a country sold visas to would-be migrants for a hefty fee 
(Väyrynen, 2005: 7). Corruption of border officials is the key factor associated with 
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migrant trafficking (Hoag, Vigneswaran, Araia & Tshabalala, 2010: 465). Immigration 
inspectors and border guards are poorly paid and trained and are easily bribed to 
assist illegal migrants who enter through the ports. Certain law enforcement 
authorities are hesitant to dedicate resources to migrant trafficking cases, since they 
feel that it is a victimless crime (Hoag et al, 2010: 465). 
 
3.7.4 Vehicle theft 
The smuggling of vehicles across South Africa’s borders has been a problem since 
the 1980s and has increased ever since the growth of organised crime syndicates in 
South Africa (Irish, 2005: 1). Vehicles have been identified as a form of currency and 
are often used in exchange for other illegal goods (Irish & Qhobosheane, 2003: 103). 
Border smuggling of luxury vehicles is the most common form of vehicle smuggling 
from South Africa and numerous methods are used to smuggle vehicles across the 
borders. In some instances, luxury 4 x 4 vehicles are smuggled across the borders 
without going through an official port of entry. One scenario is where vehicles are 
smuggled across without going through the ports-of-entry. Another method of 
smuggling vehicles through a port of entry involves the use of duplicate documents, 
where stolen or hijacked vehicles are taken out of the country by using duplicate 
papers that do not belong to the said vehicle. In such cases, the duplicate 
documents used actually belong to a vehicle of the same model and make as the 
one being smuggled out of the country, and often belong to another vehicle that has 
either been scrapped or disassembled (Irish, 2005: 1). 
 
An example of this is mentioned in a Zimbabwean newspaper, NewsdzeZimbabwe, 
where it was reported that in December 2010 police seized a four million Rand Rolls 
Royce car that was travelling from the Durban harbour en route to Zimbabwe. 
According to police, the vehicle was stolen from the Durban harbour in order to take 
it to Zimbabwe and then to bring it back to South Africa to be sold (Anon., 2010: 1). 
Another example of luxury vehicles being smuggled through the Durban harbour is 
set out in a newspaper article in The Mercury, dated 18 November 2010. In this 
article, it was reported that seventeen luxury vehicles, which had been stolen in the 
United Kingdom, were seized at the Durban harbour. The vehicles were seized in 
containers which were destined for Mozambique and the neighbouring countries and 
were already cloned with engine numbers and number plates (Magwaza, 2010: 1).  
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According to an article contained in the CAR magazine, countless numbers of 
imported, previously-owned vehicles from Japan are being trafficked unlawfully 
through Durban harbour and these vehicles are being sold locally in South Africa. 
The vehicles are believed to be ‘legally’ imported into South Africa as trans-
shipments to neighbouring countries. The engine and chassis numbers of these 
vehicles are subsequently altered and sold locally through car dealerships to gullible 
purchasers who are uninformed that these vehicles are illegally imported. This influx 
of used cars coming through the Durban harbour has resulted in a number of 
opportunities for criminal activity (Anon., 2003: 1). 
 
3.7.5 Trade fraud 
According to the 2010 US Interagency report, trade fraud (such as under-valuations 
and sale of counterfeit goods) is understood to include the diversion of imported 
merchandise into the commercial industry of the United States, with the 
undervaluation of imported or exported goods, or the false description of imported 
merchandise designed to avoid customs and excise duties (Anon., 2000: iv). It also 
includes the importation, transportation, and distribution of counterfeit goods subject 
to trademark and copyrights; and the importation, transportation, and trans-shipment 
of items that pose a threat to consumers or the environment, including tainted or 
prohibited foodstuffs, medicines, unapproved drugs, and chlorofluorocarbons (Anon., 
2000: iv). 
 
In a newspaper article, ‘Harbour mafia bust,’ an undercover investigation in the 
Durban harbour exposed a multi-billion dollar syndicate involving corrupt customs 
and police officials (Nair, 2012: 1). The article mentioned several SARS and police 
officials who were arrested for allegedly allowing containers of contraband to pass 
through undetected, in return for bribes amounting to more than R30 000 per 
container. Police seized more than R1 billion worth of counterfeit goods and 
contraband during the period of investigation. The chief investigator revealed that the 
SARS and police officials were integrated and working with teams from other 
provinces who assisted in the inspection of the containers and granting of the final 
clearance. It was mentioned that the Durban harbour is the biggest port authority in 
South Africa that handles 40 per cent of the containers nationally. Several thousands 
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of containers pass through the harbour daily which makes it is impossible to check 
each and every one. As a result, counterfeit goods and contraband pass through 
easily (Nair, 2012: 1). Customs fraud, through the under-declaration of imported 
goods passing through ports or harbours, is closely linked to the trading of grey 
products and counterfeit goods. In these instances, fraudulent bills of lading and 
false documentation are used to get the goods released (Irish & Qhobosheane, 
2003: 101). 
 
3.7.6 Firearm smuggling 
During the post-1994 period, illicit firearms were still being smuggled across the 
borders. There are still many opportunities for enterprising smugglers to smuggle 
AK-47s across the borders, since law enforcement agencies lack the capacity to 
enforce border controls rigorously (Hennop et al, 2001: 55). According to Minnaar 
(Minnaar, 2003: 77), firearms are smuggled in containers and smugglers might pack 
AK-47 rifles in containers containing second hand clothes, as they have the 
knowledge that such firearms can only be detected by an X-ray scan or by means of 
a full unpack. Minnaar (2003: 77) notes that if such containers are identified as low 
risk, then that risk profiling analysis would not identify such containers for further 
inspection (i.e. by a scan or full unpack action).  
 
3.8 THE FACTORS THAT CONTRIBUTE TO THE ILLEGAL OF MOVEMENT 
AND GOODS FROM THE SEA PORTS-OF-ENTRY IN DURBAN 
3.8.1 Insufficient profiling and inspections done on containers 
There is a clear distinction between the terms ‘screening’ and ‘inspection’. Screening 
a container or person will entail applying a filter to persons or cargo entering the port, 
while inspection will require some level of physical action in conducting an 
examination of the contents thereof (Wasem, Lake, Seghetti, Monke & Vina, 2004: 
51). According to Steinberg (2005b: 3) and Kenny (2007: 35), border control agents 
around the world only search a small percentage of cargo and passengers. At 
Johannesburg International Airport (JIA), for instance, only three to five per cent of 
the cargo is searched, while at the Durban harbour only one per cent of the cargo is 
searched. This view is supported by Minnaar (2003: 76), who states that only three 
per cent of all containers arriving at Durban Harbour are physically inspected by 
means of tailboard inspections or random searches. In Port Louis, Mauritius, only 
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two per cent of containers are physically inspected, while empty containers are 
seldom inspected (Narsoo, Muslun & Sunhaloo, 2009: 1). According to Minnaar 
(2003: 75), only import containers with contents in the high-risk category are 
selected for inspection and search. In an article published in the Port Financial 
International, it was stated that the Durban harbour has an annual capacity of 3,6 
million TEUs per annum, which is equivalent to 9 863 TEUs per day (Anon, 2013: 1). 
Owing to the huge volume of containers that are offloaded on a daily basis, only 100-
120 containers can be selected for inspection and it is for this reason that the 
profiling thereof has to be accurate, if contraband and other illegal goods are to be 
detected. According to the semi-structured interviews conducted with officials 
employed within the Durban harbour precinct, it was found that electronic goods 
were at the highest risk of being moved illegally, followed by illicit narcotics, 
counterfeit cigarettes, and counterfeit clothing and textiles. Precursor chemicals and 
tools were not in demand and featured low in this study. Contraband that includes 
counterfeit cigarettes and clothing, as well as narcotics, is high on the agenda of 
smugglers, as is the increased demand for electronic items at the Durban harbour.  
 
The use of false documentation is the most popular method for removing goods from 
the Durban harbour. Corruption and the assistance provided by security and police 
officials are also popular methods for removing goods illegally from the Durban 
harbour. According to the semi-structured interviews conducted with officials 
employed within the Durban harbour precinct, it was found that customs officials 
provided the least assistance in removing illegal goods.  
 
According to Martonosi, Ortiz and Willis (2006: 221), in the US, only five per cent of 
all incoming containers are selected for security checks, which comprises of a two-
stage inspection process. The primary inspection consists of X-Ray or Gamma ray 
scanning, and if a container still appears suspicious after the first inspection, it is 
thereafter subjected to a physical inspection, which requires a full unpack. This is a 
time-consuming process and involves a great deal of manpower (Martonosi et al, 
2006: 221). In contrast to their neighbours, the Canadian Border Security Agency 
relies on its container-targeting regime to recognise suspicious containers, because 
of its incapacity to scan, open or inspect anything more than a small percentage of 
containers. 
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On average, containers go through multiple persons or agencies that handle them, 
which can sometimes be as many as 17 between the manufacturer and the final 
seller. This situation provides ample opportunity for would-be criminals or terrorists to 
tamper with the contents (Kenny, 2007: 30). A ‘hit-and-miss system’ of profiling and 
securing containers entering Canada is not a responsible way to protecting 
Canadians or the residents of any other country to which the contents may be 
transhipped (Kenny, 2007: 30). According to Wasem et al (2004: 17), customs’ 
inspections of high risk shipments are based on a risk assessment system, which 
requires timeously delivered, accurate manifest information in order to execute the 
risk assessment and targeting procedures before the shipments reach the border. 
However, one of the challenges in this area is the use of the cargo manifest 
document as the primary document from which information is obtained to conduct 
risk assessments (Wasem et al, 2004: 17).  
 
3.8.2 The lack of proper security policies and procedures  
According to Minnaar (2003: 21), a 1997 assessment of South African ports by the 
US Immigration and Naturalization Service, Office of Inspections, found that the 
greatest challenge confronting border control is the actual deployment of staff at 
these ports who handle the actual border control. The assessment team found that 
there was an absence of security personnel and, with the exception of the police, the 
other agencies responsible for border control were not physically situated within the 
confines of the harbour areas. The report concluded that a lack of security measures 
made the ports vulnerable to security risks, such as illegal immigrants and the theft 
of goods (Minnaar, 2003: 21). Taute (2007: 2) supports Minnaar’s view to say that 
the insufficient security at borders and ports-of-entry and the absence of effective 
information coordination leave the ports vulnerable to organised crime. This view is 
further supported by Kenny (2007: 28) who states that the transfer of the security 
function of seaports and airports to the local authorities has failed and that the 
security services at seaports and airports are under-staffed and are not able to deal 
with organised crime and terrorism. According to Mayer (2003: 44), an unsecured 
environment breeds opportunities with serious consequences which can be 
accessed freely, making it easy for terrorists to retrieve illegal arms and explosives 
or to even to commit acts of piracy, such as the hijacking of ships. 
 52 
 
3.8.3 Ineffective and insufficient security systems for restricted areas 
According to the ‘Border Control Collective Approach Implementation Plan’ 
(OWTBC, 1997: 31), the US assessment of border control in South Africa 
established that in 1997 there was a shortage of technical tools and basic equipment 
to aid in border control at all South African border posts. These include:  
 UV lights and portable document verification equipment;  
 Four-wheel drive vehicles; 
 Binoculars;  
 Sensors;  
 Radios;  
 Devices for night vision.  
 
Some border posts lack the basic facilities to undertake effective border policing, 
such as decent accommodation for border officials, storage facilities, proper search 
areas, vehicles, and even facsimile machines (Hennop et al, 2001: 9). In 2003, 
Minnaar found that the Durban harbour lacked a central container terminal, which 
results in containers being offloaded in all areas of the harbour (Minnaar, 2003: 77). 
According to the onsite security audit of the Durban harbour, it was that found the 
situation has not changed since 2003 and that containers are still being off-loaded in 
different areas of the Durban harbour, owing to the poor design and layout of the 
harbour. The lack of physical protection systems, internal and external threats, as 
well as poor design and layout of the harbour, are some of the issues experienced 
currently at the Durban harbour. The current method of randomly scanning 
containers is responsible for the large amounts of contraband moving through the 
Durban harbour without being detected. 
 
3.8.4 The lack of on-going (security-specific) training pertaining to the 
Durban harbour for law enforcement agencies  
According to the 1997 US Assessment report quoted by Minnaar (2003: 71), security 
officials assigned to the ports lacked proper training in access control in order for 
them to effectively maintain the high levels of security necessary for control and 
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deterrence. This view is supported by Kenny (2007: 44) who states that customs 
officials at seaports have often not received the training they require to operate 
equipment, especially newer equipment for searching cargo containers. A parallel 
view is held by US Interagency Commission on Crime and Security in US Seaports 
(Anon., 2000: 36), which asserts that most US ports do not have security forces and 
therefore rely on contract security to provide security at the gates, cargo areas, and 
passenger embarking and disembarking areas. The personnel who are employed by 
the security contractors might, or might not, be trained in security matters.  
 
According to the semi-structured interviews conducted with officials employed within 
the Durban harbour precinct, it was found that problems of imbalances of work 
procedures and inadequate distribution of information exist between the various 
enforcement agencies appointed to protect the Durban harbour. The absence of the 
required levels of training and regular on-the-job training is evident through the poor 
performance of the security officers at the Durban harbour. The findings obtained 
from the semi-structured interviews also indicated that the security officers were 
provided with the just the basic skills to do a job which they do not thoroughly 
understand. In order to reduce some of the factors contributing to the illegal 
movement of goods, security measures can be put in place to mitigate and prevent 
some of security weaknesses and the factors that contribute to them. The security 
measures should not be used in isolation, but rather in conjunction with one another 
in an integrated manner. 
 
3.8.5 Corruption and bribery  
In this section, corruption and bribery involving shipping agents, police officials, 
customs and security guards will be discussed in some detail. Corruption is defined 
in section 1 of the Prevention and Combating of Corrupt Activities Act, 12 of 2004, as 
“the unlawful, international giving or offering to give any benefit not legally due in 
circumstances where there is a prohibition, or any offer or acceptance of such 
benefit, in return for commission or omission of an act in relation to certain powers 
and duties” (Department of Justice, South Africa, 2004). 
 
According to the Border Control Collective Approach Implementation Plan (OWTBC, 
1997), the types of corruption taking place at South African borders are as follows: 
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 Bribes are unlawfully obtained by officials/police, customs officers, and 
immigration officers;  
 Official documents/stamps are illegally dispensed by officials who do not have 
authority to do so; 
 Officials accept fictitious or forged permits, certificates, written authority or 
other document (ID, passports, etc.) for personal advantage; 
 Officials gain favours during line of duty without declaring it.  
 
Minnaar (2003: 76) is of the opinion that corruption might take place in any leg of the 
container handling process and this includes people in the chain of offloading, 
transportation and storage of containers, as well as the customs officials involved in 
the inspection and stamping of documentation, who could be bribed or subjected to 
acts of corruption. A similar viewpoint is held by Hennop et al (2001: 13), who state 
that corruption and officials working at border posts, go hand-in-hand. Criminal 
organisations often bribe police, customs, immigration and South African National 
Defence Force (SANDF) officials to overlook crimes at borders that involve the 
smuggling of drugs, cars, prostitutes, endangered species products, and firearms. 
This issue was highlighted in a newspaper article published in the Daily News titled 
‘Corruption at the Durban harbour - The Plot thickens’, where it was reported that 
alleged corrupt South African Revenue Service (SARS) and police officials were 
believed to be working in teams between Kwazulu-Natal and Gauteng (Anon., 
2012b). According to the article, these officials were allegedly paid bribes of up to 
R30 000 for each container that was allowed to pass through customs undetected. A 
member of the SARS anti-corruption unit in Durban was arrested on 25 April 2012 on 
80 counts of corruption for allegedly allowing contraband through the Durban 
harbour in return for receiving substantial benefits (Anon., 2012b: 1). Although the 
findings from the onsite security survey indicated that the general lack of security risk 
control measures contributed largely to the crime problem, the findings from the 
semi-structured interviews conducted with officials within the Durban harbour 
precinct suggested that bribery and corruption of port officials as well as poor 
salaries paid to law enforcement agencies and security officials was a major 
contributory factor to the occurrence of crime at the Durban harbour. 
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3.8.6 The significant presence of organised crime syndicates within the 
harbour 
Several factors exist for the presence of organised crime in South Africa, such as 
modern infrastructure, growth potential and transformation processes. However, the 
existence of these criminal groups at ports-of-entry can be linked to factors such as 
porous borders, the global positioning of South Africa as a major maritime trade and 
air traffic route, and the corruption of port officials (Irish & Qhobosheane, 2003: 83). 
A similar argument is contained in the international crime threat assessment report 
which states that South Africa’s modern financial system, coupled with its 
infrastructure of modern airports and seaports at Durban, Cape Town, Port 
Elizabeth, and East London, attract criminal organisations to use the country for the 
smuggling of narcotics and other contraband (Anon., 2013c: 1). According to the 
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, South Africa’s sea-ports were being used 
by organised criminal groups to transport illicit commodities into and out of the 
country. These criminal groups favour the use of commercial containers to ship 
commercial goods and to conceal and transport contraband, using the assistance of 
criminal associates within the port industry and the corruption of port officials 
(UNODCCP, 2013: 1).  
 
The Durban harbour is the busiest port in Africa and the largest in terms of container 
capacity. Approximately forty-four per cent of South Africa’s break bulk cargo and 
sixty-one per cent of all containerised cargo move through the Durban harbour. In 
2010 alone, the port handled 2 5 million TEUs (Poverello, 2013: 1). The Durban 
harbour is also a sub-continental hub, acting as a trans-shipment port for countries 
as far away as Tanzania (Steinberg, 2005b: 1). If Durban is the hub of legal trade, 
then it is also a hub for illicit trade or contraband. The integrity of border control is 
necessary for collecting government revenue and to protect legal businesses against 
illegal structures, such as organised criminal groups. The lack of border control, ill-
trained security officials and the lack of physical security measures have resulted in 
the general public gaining access to cargo areas, vessels and warehouses, which 
favours the presence of organised crime syndicates (Steinberg, 2005b: 9 & 
Govender, 1999: 1).  
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The Chinese Triads, which are a more sophisticated criminal group, are involved in 
customs fraud and dealing in ‘grey products’. Grey products are replicas of an 
original item, which is not covered by any guarantee or customer support by the 
manufacturer or its agent. Customs fraud occurs through the incorrect or under-
declaration of imported goods to avoid customs duties. Such goods are termed ‘grey 
goods’, which are ‘legal goods’ sold by companies other than the manufacturer or 
registered supplier. It often involves branded items, which if the goods were 
declared, would attract higher customs and import tariffs. This occurs in collusion 
with the syndicates’ own clearing or forwarding agents, as well as corrupt customs 
officials. The reason for South African ports being targeted by organised crime 
syndicates is due to their geographic positioning as a major maritime and air traffic-
route between the western and eastern trading blocs (Irish & Qhobosheane, 2003: 
83).  
 
Internationally, in a country such as Canada, the ports are riddled with organised 
crime and the problem with widespread criminality is that it requires holes in the 
security system to be successful (Kenny, 2007: 14). In addition, it is stated that 
seaports are exploited by organised crime to move contraband in and out of Canada, 
particularly illicit drugs. Even in instances where these criminal elements are not 
based in the port, they show their presence by means of hiring, coercing or 
otherwise influencing port workers who have access to cargo (Kenny, 2007: 14). In 
the case of this research study, it was found that the presence of organised crime 
syndicates and the collusion between the various role-players increase the risk of 
corruption at the Durban harbour. If the port is well maintained and has a safe and 
secure physical environment, it would be more difficult for criminals to move illegal 
goods out of the port. 
 
3.8.7 Tampering with containers  
According to Minnaar (2003: 78), a portion of the containers arriving at Durban 
Harbour are removed-in-bond (RIB). These containers are moved either by road or 
rail to City Deep, which is an internal port in Johannesburg, where they are cleared 
by customs. While in transit, these containers are tampered with, stolen or broken 
into. Customs and Border Police have experienced problems where the respective 
container seals are tampered with, replaced or counterfeited (Minnaar, 2003: 78). 
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The customs wire seal pin needle can be pulled out and a duplicate seal with the 
same number then reinserted, after the container has been opened and the goods 
removed (e.g. drugs coming from Brazil into South Africa). With regard to aluminium 
seals, they can be loosened and a replica seal then put on with the same number. 
Plastic seals can be broken and resealed using superglue to fix the break. Bolt-type 
seals can be sawed through and thereafter resealed with the insertion of a pin and 
superglue. Lastly, containers can be opened with the seal still intact. This is achieved 
by merely taking out the whole bolt, without breaking the seal. The bolt is later 
replaced and a nut welded on top (Minnaar, 2003: 78).  
 
In the United Kingdom, a security company specialising in container security has 
identified several new methods of container tampering, such as the removal of the 
actual door locking mechanisms, the cloning of container seals, and the removal of 
the security bar/bracket locks (Hawkins, 2013: 1)  
 
3.9 Possible solutions to security risks at ports-of-entry 
In broad terms, good border management seeks to facilitate access for people and 
goods that are both needed and desired, but also aims at interdicting and stopping 
‘bad’ people and ‘bad’ things from entering the country (Heyman, 2001: 1). This can 
be successfully achieved by accurately and efficiently identifying high-risk 
passengers and cargo for inspection and by preventing the entry of dangerous 
goods and people without impeding the flow of legitimate cross-border traffic. It is 
within this context that policy makers should endeavour to identify and promote 
those policies which will enhance the efficacy of the filters employed for these tasks 
(Heyman, 2001: 682). Koslowski (2011: 1) has emphasised and strengthened the 
view of Heyman by saying that the ultimate objective of port security is to be able to 
reduce the likelihood that dangerous people and dangerous capabilities enter the 
ports-of-entry. In Canada’s sea-ports, there have been several programme initiatives 
taken by the federal government related to implementing the ISPS code, including 
threat assessments, security plans, federal funding for port security, background 
checks for port workers and the implementation of sophisticated technologies 
(Hanrahan, 2010: 1).  
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The Container Security Initiative (CSI) is a programme implemented in 2002 by the 
US Customs and Border Protection agencies which aims to increase the security for 
containerised cargo that is shipped globally into the United States. This initiative 
addresses the potential threat of terrorists using a maritime container to deliver 
weapons. In addition to this, this programme also allows US Customs and Border 
agencies to work with other host countries and inspect or examine high risk maritime 
containerised cargo even prior to them being loaded onto ships destined for the 
United States (Department of Homeland Security, USA, 2012: 1).  
 
Another initiative in cargo security is that of the Container Trade Partnership Against 
Terrorism (C-TPAT). This initiative has been recognised as one of the most 
important methods of providing the highest levels of cargo security through the close 
coordination and cooperation between all role-players involved in the maritime 
sector, such as importers, carriers, shipping agents and manufacturers. All role-
players are required to maintain high security measures and also to communicate 
these measures and security practices with others within the supply chain (Minarro, 
2013: 1). According to the semi- structured interviews conducted with officials 
employed within the Durban harbour precinct, it was found that the levels of cargo 
security are very low, owing to insufficient container searches and profiling, as well 
as a lack of communication and coordination between all responsible agencies within 
the maritime sector. The implications of this is that it results in large amounts of 
contraband and other illegal goods entering or leaving the country, with the 
consequence that it creates a serious security risk, as well as negative economic 
implications for the country. 
 
According to Fleming (2005: 1), technology plays a major role in providing solutions 
to enhancing border control at US ports and borders. One such initiative is the US 
‘visit program’, which utilises a biometric identification system, whereby foreign 
visitors are required to have their index fingers scanned and their photographs 
digitally taken for travel document identification purposes. Another initiative is the 
implementation of the ‘PRAETORIAN’ surveillance software, which integrates 
multiple cameras and sensors into a single, 3D ‘game-like’ display, permitting fly-
through abilities. Users of this software have full situational awareness, even in 
complex security environments such as borders and ports. This will resolve the 
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problem of human security guards not being able to be everywhere at the same time 
Fleming (2005: 1).  
 
According to the onsite security audit of the Durban harbour, it was ascertained that 
the key to improving access control involves drafting an appropriate access control 
policy, with procedures, followed by increasing the number of security guards at 
access/egress control points. The proper searching of visitors and vehicles entering 
Durban harbour is another way of improving access control. Other methods, such as 
the monitoring of all persons entering the harbour and the installation of a biometric 
identification system, were identified in the study as ways to improve access control 
at the Durban harbour. The implementation of an access control policy and an 
increase in the number of trained personnel deployed for access control would 
improve the current situation at the Durban harbour. Having policies in place and 
ensuring that all law enforcement agencies operating in the harbour are aware of the 
crime problem in the Durban harbour could assist in reducing the number of illegal 
goods entering the Durban port. 
 
A similar view on technology is held by Motorola Incorporated (2009: 1), which 
reports that new technology, equipment and integrated solutions would significantly 
increase port security;, while at the same time enhancing the synchronisation of port 
operations. According to this source, there are five categories of wireless 
technologies which can provide solutions to improving port security, which are as 
follows: 
 
• Access management: 
Wireless technology is used in a program termed ‘The Transportation Workers 
Identification Credential’ (TWIC), whereby all port workers are issued with a 
biometrics-enabled smart ID card, featuring leading-edge technology, such as 
fingerprint scanning. This system uses wireless, hand-held devices to verify workers’ 
credentials, improve employee access control, and unescorted access to secure 
areas of the port, thereby reducing the number of security officials needed. The use 
of this system should result in increased security and improved operational 
efficiency. 
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• Asset tracking and controlled movements: 
Assets are monitored using Radio-Frequency Identification (RFID), bar coding and 
optical scanning. These systems assist in identifying each container and can 
remotely control the movement of the containers using advanced technology, 
thereby reducing human intervention and keeping container areas secured. In this 
way, the containers and port assets can be tracked and the system also assists in 
prevents thefts.  
 
• Video security and management: 
Video security is a highly sophisticated program with advanced video software that 
allows a person to analyse what the camera is seeing and provide information on 
global positioning systems (GPS location), as well as all available information on the 
incident.  
 
• Real-time mobile communications: 
This system uses dedicated internet protocol (IP) networks, which enables 
individuals and groups to communicate with each other and to analyse data in a 
more uniform manner. This system uses real-time streaming video and data from 
other sources to provide more actionable intelligence to security teams attending 
crime scenes or security incidents. 
 
• Integrated command and control centres: 
This measure refers to a 24-hour, centralised command and control centre where 
information from all security technology and operational applications is collected, 
consolidated, coordinated, stored, managed and distributed. This centre will utilise 
sophisticated computer systems and technologies to enable command centre 
personnel to analyse problems and data, and then distribute it to the nearest team of 
security personnel or law enforcement officials, providing them with real-time 
information on the situation. 
 
3.10 CONCLUSION 
There are two main aspects to border control. The first is the handling of tourists 
entering South Africa, which involves ensuring that tourists have the correct 
documentation in terms of their visas and that they will adhere to the terms stipulated 
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by their relevant visa in order to curb illegal immigration (South African Borders, 
2013: 1). The second aspect, with regard to the proper management of ports-of-entry 
and border posts, is the handling of goods for import and export. This involves 
ensuring that no illegal goods are imported or exported, which include weapons, 
drugs and contraband, and that the proper collection of customs duties and taxes 
takes place.  
 
Seaports are highly attractive targets for terrorist organisations and organised crime 
syndicates. According to the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, 
80 per cent of all world trade is shipped via cargo containers (cited in Motorola, 
2009: 1). These containers move among the world’s major seaports more than 200 
million times a year, which in essence means that there are large amounts of 
merchandise that can be stolen, which presents a huge opportunity for dangerous 
disruption to port operations. Seaports are an inviting gateway for terrorists to further 
their plots for disrupting a country’s economy. Terrorists have knowledge on global 
economies which rely on the movement of goods and are aware that striking a port 
facility could significantly impact a nation’s economy. For organised crime 
syndicates, containers make inviting targets for wholesale theft of valuable products, 
ranging from electronics to apparel. It is for this reason that port security has become 
such a high priority for governments around the world (Motorola, 2009: 1).  
 
This chapter provided a review of literature on the challenges and problems facing 
ports-of-entry with regard to the illegal movement of goods. The chapter also 
provided an understanding of what constitutes port security and the aims thereof. It 
also provided a discussion on the challenges and the causes of crime at ports-of-
entry. An overview of the issue of the illegal movement of goods from seaports on a 
global, national and regional perspective was discussed. A background of how the 
Durban harbour operates, the current state of security at the port, the prevalent 
crimes associated with the Durban harbour, and finally, a discussion on security risk 
management models and security solutions on how to curb the issue of illegal goods 
moving in and out of the harbour was discussed.  
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Chapter 4  
COLLECTION, ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION OF COLLECTED RESEARCH 
DATA 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter discusses how the data was collected by means of different 
instruments, analysed and interpreted. It is divided into three sections, the first 
dealing with the information that was collected from the analysis of the case dockets. 
This is followed by a section that deals with the information from the observation 
checklist complied during the onsite inspection of the Durban harbour. lastly, the 
chapter deals with the information collected utilising a semi-structured interview 
schedule. The researcher analysed and interpreted the data, resulting in specific 
deductions being formulated. The collected and analysed data is presented in the 
form of frequency tables, together with interpretations and deductions. 
 
4.2 COLLECTION OF DATA 
The researcher employed three methods of data collection during this study, namely 
a docket analysis (documentary study), an onsite security audit of the Durban 
harbour, (observation checklist) and semi-structured interviews with security, 
customs and border police officials deployed at the Durban harbour. Dockets of 
cases of theft and contraband smuggling, which had been registered on the SAPS 
Crime administration system at the Maydon Wharf police station, were selected for 
this study. A thorough review of the contents therein was conducted with the aim of 
answering the identified variables on the documentary checklist. An onsite security 
audit or risk analysis of the Durban harbour was conducted to obtain data on the 
state of existing security measures at the harbour (Onsite security audit is the 
terminology that is used in security management studies at UNISA). Regarding the 
semi-structured interviews, the data was collected by means of one-on-one 
interviews in which respondents from the security, customs and border police 
components, all of whom were stationed at the Durban harbour, participated in the 
study. A total of thirty (30) respondents participated in this study, giving an intended 
response of one hundred per cent. The researcher conducted observations at the 
Durban harbour and evaluated the existing security measures against an 
observation checklist. 
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4.3 DATA ANALYSIS, INTERPRETATION AND DEDUCTION 
A documentary checklist was used to collect data from the case dockets. Upon 
completing the analysis for each docket, the data was then coded and categorised 
according to the following variables: date of reported incident, time, place of theft, 
method used, and type of goods involved. The data was then analysed with the aim 
of identifying similarities or differences and trends within the data, which was then 
interpreted according to the results and thereafter presented in the form of frequency 
tables.  
 
4.4 DOCKET ANALYSIS 
Each docket which formed part of the sample was analysed from the front cover 
which provided information on the day, date, time and place of the incident, as well 
as the type of incident (crime) and the goods taken, with the respective value. The 
“A” clip of the docket was then analysed, which contained all statements pertaining 
to the respective offence. Information from this section was extracted by the 
researcher concerning the modus operandi and as to how the crime took place. The 
information obtained from the perusing the contents assisted the researcher in 
completing the docket analysis checklist. All of the data collected from the case 
dockets were primary data. The researcher then categorised and coded the following 
variables according to the docket analysis:  
 Time frame for incidents of Theft/Contraband Smuggling, i.e. weekdays or 
weekends; period when theft was committed; and time of occurrence. 
 Methods used to commit the thefts or smuggling of contraband (modus 
operandi). 
 Place where the theft/smuggling occurred. 
 Type of goods that were stolen or smuggled. 
 
This section contains an examination of all the results obtained from the docket 
analysis. 
 
 64 
Table 4.1:  Day of the week that theft/contraband smuggling took place (N=50) 
 
Docket Analysis: Day of the week that Theft/Contraband Smuggling took place. 
 Frequency Percentage 
Monday 
 
6 12% 
Tuesday 5 10% 
Wednesday 9 18% 
Thursday 7 14% 
Friday 8 16% 
Saturday 9 18% 
Sunday 6 12% 
TOTAL 50 100% 
 
If we examine the docket analysis in Table 4.1 above, it can be seen that the highest 
incidents of theft/contraband smuggling occurred on Wednesday and Saturday, 
followed by Friday and Thursday. It can also be observed that thirty-five (70 %) of the 
incidents took place on weekdays, while fifteen (30 %) took place over a weekend. 
However, upon closer analysis of the figures, it can be established that the majority 
of the incidents took place from Wednesday to Sunday, a total of thirty-nine (78 %) 
incidents. An inference can be drawn that the number of incidents increases with the 
approach of weekends. 
  
 65 
 
Table 4.2:  Period when theft occurred (N=50) 
 
Docket Analysis: Period when theft occurred  
 Frequency Percentage 
Same day 44 88% 
Over a period of days 6 12% 
TOTAL 50 100% 
 
In analysing the period over which the respective crimes took place, it was 
established that 88 per cent of the crimes took place on the same day, as opposed 
to 12 per cent which took place over a period of two days. Upon closer analysis of 
the dockets, it was established that those crimes which took place over two days 
were in fact ones which were committed late on Sunday evenings and only 
discovered on a Monday morning, hence the longer period. 
 
Table 4.3:  Time of occurrence of theft/contraband smuggling incidents (N=50) 
Docket Analysis: Time of occurrence of theft/contraband smuggling incidents 
 Frequency Percentage 
06h00-11h59 
 
18 36% 
12h00-17h59 22 44% 
18h00-23h59 8 16% 
00h00-05h59 2 4% 
TOTAL 50 100% 
 
In analysing the times over which the respective crimes took place, it was 
established that 44 per cent of the crimes took place between 12h00-17h59, 36 per 
cent between 06h00-17h59, 16 per cent between 18h00-23h59, and 4 per cent 
between 00h00-05h59. It can be deduced that 80 per cent of the crimes took place 
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during working hours of 06h00-18h00, while the remaining 20 per cent occurred after 
normal operational hours. 
 
Table 4.4:  Methods used to commit the thefts or smuggling of contraband (Modus 
Operandi) (N=50) 
 
Docket Analysis: Methods used to commit the thefts or smuggling of 
contraband (Modus Operandi) 
 
 Frequency Percentage 
Passed through security control check point 0 0% 
Did not go through security control checkpoint 3 6% 
False documentation used 11 22% 
Assisted by security officials 6 12% 
Assisted by Law Enforcement officials 5 10% 
Container door forced open 6 12% 
Container locks picked or cut open 3 6% 
Container Seals removed  4 8% 
Container seals tampered with 4 8% 
Gate locks forced open 3 6% 
Climbed over perimeter fence  2 4% 
Access gained through unmanned security checkpoint 3 6% 
TOTAL 50 100% 
 
According to Table 4.4 above, the most popular methods are the use of false 
documentation (22 %), container doors being forced open (12 %), assistance by 
security officials (12 %) and assistance by law enforcement officials (10 %). Another 
key aspect was the issue of container tampering (8 %), which included the locks 
being picked or seals being removed. This is an indication of the poor security 
measures that are in place at the harbour, where criminals have access and 
 67 
sufficient time to tamper with containers and remove the cargo without being 
detected. 
 
Table 4.5:  Place of Theft (N=50) 
 
Docket Analysis: Place of Theft 
 
 Frequency Percentage 
General Storage area 20 40% 
Hazardous Goods storage area 2 4% 
Bonded Warehouse 6 12% 
Container terminal area 13 26% 
Customs Warehouse 1 2% 
Customs Detention Facility 8 16% 
SAPS Scanning area 0 0% 
TOTAL 50 100% 
 
In analysing the areas of the harbour where the crimes predominantly took place, the 
general storage area for containers was at the highest risk (40  %) in terms of theft, 
followed by the container terminal area (26 %), the customs detention facility (16 %), 
and the bonded warehouses (12 %). In these areas the security aspect is minimal, 
hence the high incidence of thefts. Incidents of theft were minimal in the customs 
warehouse and the SAPS scanning area, owing to the heightened sense of security 
in those areas. 
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Table 4.6:  Type of Goods being smuggled or stolen (N=50) 
 
Docket Analysis: Type of Goods being smuggled or stolen 
 
 Frequency Percentage 
Electronic goods 14 28% 
Textiles 9 18% 
Manufactured clothing items 11 22% 
Machinery or tools 3 6% 
Stationary or books 0 0% 
Furniture 1 2% 
Tobacco 7 14% 
Alcohol 2 4% 
Spices  0 0% 
Meat 0 0% 
Maize/Sugar/Wheat 1 2% 
General grocery items 2 4% 
TOTAL 50 100% 
 
The analysis of the dockets revealed that the highest incidence of thefts involves 
goods of an electronic nature (28 %), followed by manufactured items of clothing 
(22 %), textiles (18 %), and tobacco (14 %). General grocery items (4 %), as well as 
wheat and sugar (2 %), featured at the lower end of the scale. According to the 
findings in this study, there is a great demand for electronic equipment, such as cell 
phones, and it was noted that a demand for televisions has contributed to the 
increase in the theft of these items. In addition, items of imported clothing (both 
counterfeit and original items) have been seized in large quantities at various flea 
markets and shops in the Durban area. The huge demand for contraband, such as 
counterfeit cigarettes, has also created a market, and organised crime syndicates 
are increasing their efforts to bring in containers of these goods to supply the market. 
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4.5 ON-SITE AUDIT OBSERVATION ANALYSIS  
In accordance with the UNISA Security Risk Management Model (as developed by 
Rogers, (2005) and revised by Olckers, (2007) and Kole, (2010)), a site audit of the 
Durban harbour was conducted to evaluate the existing security measures at the 
harbour. The researcher physically inspected the state of the existing security 
measures against a security survey checklist by walking around the harbour and 
making observations and notes on these measures (‘security survey checklist’ is the 
terminology used in security studies at UNISA). The collected data was then entered 
onto the checklist to establish the security weakness factor of the respective 
measures. This section provides an analysis of the information gathered during the 
examination of the Durban harbour, as elaborated with the aid of the researcher’s 
observations with regard to the prevailing security measures that are employed at 
the Durban harbour.  
 
4.6 FINDINGS FROM DURBAN HARBOUR SITE AUDIT AND OBSERVATION 
ANALYSIS 
During the site audit of the Durban harbour, the following existing security measures 
were surveyed and evaluated in terms of their effectiveness against security risks or 
threats: security policies and procedures, perimeter fencing, security lighting, access 
control and Closed Circuit Television (CCTV). In evaluating these measures, it 
became apparent to the researcher that there was a general lack of security within 
each of these measures.  
 
4.6.1 Security policies and procedures 
The research established that there are currently no existing security policies in 
place for any of the security measures being evaluated at the Durban harbour. It was 
found that the harbour did not have any written security policy or procedure 
effectively in place. The study found that without an access control policy, the 
security officers posted at the access points are limited in the performance of their 
duties and will not be effective at any access or egress control point in preventing 
any illegal goods or persons entering or leaving the harbour.  
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The key issue highlighted by the respondents was that they only received verbal 
instructions from their management on how to conduct their duties because there is 
no written policy issued by the Durban ports authority to the security service 
providers on how to conduct their duties. The researcher is of the view that the 
necessary security policies and procedures will become increasingly critical as the 
reliance on security systems continues to increase in order to prevent the illegal 
movement of goods at the Durban harbour. This is a serious shortcoming as a 
written policy should dictate what needs to be done and the manner in which it 
should be done in order to render effective security services against any risks or 
vulnerabilities.  
 
4.6.2 Parking areas 
The researcher surveyed the parking areas and established that there are four 
official parking areas within the Durban harbour. These parking areas accommodate 
staff parking and visitors to the Durban harbour. The study found that all four of the 
parking areas were not sufficiently protected by physical security measures, such as 
security officials or CCTV surveillance. The study further found that the lighting does 
not provide sufficient illumination at specific areas in the parking areas so as to 
adequately monitor security risks. The research found that access into the parking 
areas was not controlled and that some of these parking areas were within close 
proximity to the storage areas. 
 
4.6.3 Access control 
Access control is a system which enables an authority to manage access to a 
specific area. Applied in the context of this study, the Durban ports authority should 
provide written and clear instructions to the security officials as to how people should 
be allowed to access the Durban harbour. The study found that access control at the 
main points of entry and exit are controlled by security officials who work on a 12-
hour shift cycle and that the number of personnel at each of these entry and exit 
points varies between two to four personnel, depending on the size of the gates. A 
total of 80 PSIRA registered security officials are utilised on these shifts. The study 
found that this number is far too low to provide an effective level of security in 
respect of access and egress control. 
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4.6.4 Security lighting 
The study found that although most of the perimeter is equipped with security 
lighting, there are some points along the perimeter fence in the container depot 
where there is a lack of security lighting. The container depot is an area which is 
used for the loading and off-loading of containers. Another shortcoming was that the 
existing lighting does not provide a sufficient degree of illumination for the inspection 
of goods and vehicles. In addition, the high-risk areas within the harbour are not 
equipped with emergency standby lighting, which is necessary in the event of power 
failures. The study further found that although the lighting was installed at critical 
areas in the Durban port, the lights were not being switched on, possibly because of 
human neglect and a lack of electronic day and night automatic switches.  
 
4.6.5 Closed circuit television 
The study found that not all areas of the harbour are monitored by CCTV cameras. 
The storage areas and certain access control points were not fitted with CCTV 
cameras. The study found a total of 120 cameras which were positioned along the 
perimeter of the Durban harbour, and which included 13 PTZ (Pan, Tilt and Zoom) 
cameras. These cameras report to a central control room, which the study found to 
be not sufficiently manned. The study found that these devices record poor images, 
which creates difficultly in analysing the number plates of vehicles and in allowing 
the facial recognition of people. The study found that the cameras were not tamper 
proof, since their power connections were easily accessible and could be tampered 
with by rogue elements. The cameras were not linked to an alarm which would 
activate the recording of images in the event of an alarm, nor were the cameras 
connected to a backup power supply or battery, which would enable them to record 
images in the event of a power failure.  
 
These findings were reinforced when it was established during the docket analysis 
that in most of the cases, there was no available CCTV footage, which tends to 
indicate that the cameras are not operational at all times. The benefits of properly 
functioning security cameras at the Durban port are that they will mitigate theft 
because studies have shown that visible security cameras are known to deter theft. 
Security guards could perform more patrols and actively protect the assets, instead 
of watching monitors for hours on end. The cameras could also be viewed remotely 
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from any location so as to trigger the transmission of footage from the surveillance 
system over the internet. 
 
4.7 INTERVIEW SCHEDULE ANALYSIS 
4.7.1 Biographical Information 
The following is a representation of the biographical information of all the 
respondents (30) who were interviewed for the study. 
 
4.7.1.1 Present employer  
Table 4.7:  Sector of employment (N=30) 
Respondents (30) 
 Frequency Percentage 
Security 10 33.3% 
Customs 10 33.3% 
Border police 10 33.3% 
Total 30 100% 
 
This question was asked in order to ascertain the representivity of the respondents 
employed at the Durban harbour during this research. A total of thirty (30) 
respondents were interviewed for this study, with an equal number of ten (33.3  %) 
per sector. It can, therefore, be deduced that there will be equal input from all 
sectors, which will lead increased validity and reliability. 
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4.7.1.2 Current position in company 
Table 4.8:  Current job description of respondents (N=30) 
Respondents (30) 
 Frequency Percentage 
Guard 5 16.67% 
Patrol officer 10 33.3% 
Investigator 10 33.3% 
Supervisor 3 10% 
Manager 2 6.67% 
Total 30 100 
 
This question identified the type of work that was performed by the respondents at 
the time of the study. Ten respondents (33.3 %) indicated that they performed patrol 
duties at the harbour, followed by investigators (33.3 %), guards (16.67 %), 
supervisors (10 %) and managers (6.67 %). The data in Table 4.8 above indicates 
that the study will be well balanced, since the majority (83 %) of the respondents are 
made up of guards, patrol officers and investigators, and it is these persons who 
come into contact daily with security weaknesses and risks.  
 
4.7.1.3 Period in which the respondents are employed at the current 
employer 
Table 4.9:  Number of years with current employer (N=30) 
Respondents (30) 
 Frequency Percentage 
Less than one year 4 13.33% 
Between one to two years 4 13.33% 
Between two and three years 5 16.67% 
More than three years but less than 
five years 
10 33.33% 
More than five years 7 23.33% 
TOTAL 30 100% 
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In terms of years employed with the current employer, 33.3 % of the respondents 
indicated that they were with the current employer for more than three years, 
followed by 23.3 % who were employed for more than five years, and 16.7 % for 
more than two years. Only a small minority (26.6 %) were employed for less than two 
years. In analysing the data, it can be established that a large majority (56.66  %) of 
the respondents were employed in the same jobs for more than three years. This 
means that these individuals have more experience at the Durban harbour as a 
result of their years of service with the current employer 
 
4.7.1.4 Duties performed by the respondents at the Durban harbour 
Table 4.10: Duties performed at the harbour (N=30) 
Respondents (30) 
 Frequency Percentage 
Access Control 4 13.33% 
Patrol Duties 6 20% 
Guard Duties 7 23.33% 
Inspection of 
Goods/Permits 
11 36.66% 
Surveillance/Control 
room 
2 6.67% 
TOTAL 30 100% 
 
In terms of the duties performed, 36.66 % of the respondents indicated that their 
duties involved the inspection of goods/permits, while 23.33 % performed guard 
duties, followed by patrol duties (20 %), access control (13.33 %) and surveillance 
duties (6.67 %). A large majority (43.33 %) of the respondents are involved in 
patrolling and guarding of the harbour, while only 13.33 % conduct access control 
duties. 
 
4.7.1.5 Security training pertaining to the Durban harbour 
The respondents were asked if they had undergone security training pertaining to 
Durban harbour (see Appendix A, Question 1.5). The respondents were given a Yes 
or No option to indicate their answer to this question. The results were as follows:  
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Table 4.11:  Security related training (N=30) 
Respondents (30) 
Responses Security 
Officers 
Border 
Police 
Customs 
Officials 
Total Percentage 
Yes 4 5 10 19 63.33% 
No 6 5 0 11 36.67% 
Totals 10 10 10 30 100% 
 
This question was asked in order to find out if all of the respondents had undergone 
any security-related training pertaining to security risks and border control issues. All 
30 (100 %) respondents answered this question. Nineteen of the respondents 
(63.33 %) indicated that they had received some form of security training, while 
eleven (36.67 %) indicated that they had never received any training. This indicates 
that the majority of the respondents should have an understanding of what 
constitutes security risks and weaknesses at the harbour. According to Kenny (2007: 
44), customs officials at seaports have often not received the training they require to 
operate equipment, especially newer equipment for searching cargo containers. A 
parallel view is embraced by the US Interagency Commission on Crime and Security 
in US Seaports (Anon., 2000: 36), which asserts that most US ports do not have 
security forces and therefore rely on contract security to provide security at the 
gates, cargo areas, passenger embarking and disembarking areas. 
 
4.7.1.6 Frequency of training  
The respondents were asked to provide information on the frequency of training 
provided by their company (see Appendix A, Question 1.7). The results were as 
follows: 
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Table 4.12:  Frequency of training provided by company (N=30) 
Respondents (30) 
Responses Security 
Officers 
Border 
Police 
Customs 
Officials 
Total Percentage 
Daily 0 0 0 0 0% 
Weekly 0 0 0 0 0% 
Every 
Fortnight 
0 0 0 0 0% 
Monthly 4 2 5 11 36.67% 
Quarterly 6 8 5 19 63.33% 
Totals 10 10 10 30 100% 
 
In terms of onsite training on security and crime-related issues pertaining to the 
Durban harbour, nineteen of the respondents (63.33 %) indicated that they only 
received training once in three months. Eleven of the respondents (36.67  %) stated 
that they received training once a month. None (0 %) of the respondents reported 
that they received training daily, weekly or fortnightly. Although every PSIRA 
registered security officer should have completed a basic security officer’s training 
course, it does not, however, equip him or her to deal with security and crime-related 
risks at the Durban harbour, which essentially requires advanced or specialised 
training courses. In a report by the South African Auditor General into borderline 
security, several challenges with respect to various aspects of border security were 
identified (Democratic Alliance, 2008: 6). One of the challenges was the lack of a 
specific border training curriculum for members performing border duties. 
 
4.7.1.7 Skills and abilities possessed for working at the harbour 
The respondents were asked what skills and abilities they possessed to work at the 
harbour (see Appendix A, Question 1.9).  
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Table 4.13:  Competencies of respondents (N = 30) 
Respondents (30) 
Theme Frequency Percentage 
Security Supervisor (Grade A) 1 3.33% 
Security Supervisor –first line (Grade B) 2 6.67% 
Asset and Reaction officer (Grade C) 2 6.67% 
Access Control officer (Grade D) 2 6.67% 
Patrol security officer (Grade E) 6 20% 
Fire risk training 4 13.33% 
Security threat Assessment 2 6.67% 
Risk Analysis and assessment 2 6.67% 
Intelligence gathering and Informer handling 3 6.67% 
Investigation of Crime 3 10% 
Drug interdiction 2 6.67% 
Patrol Duties 4 13.33% 
Skippers licence 1 3.33% 
Identification of counterfeit goods 5 16.67% 
Occupational health and safety 5 16.67% 
Totals   
 
In terms of competencies, all thirty (30) respondents answered this question. This 
was a multiple-response question and the respondents provided more than one 
response per variable. All of the respondents (100 %) indicated that they possessed 
some form of security-related training to work in the harbour. All security officials 
(100 %) stated that they had only completed their basic security course (PSIRA 
Grade ‘C’), while more than half (60 %) of the police and the customs officials 
reported that they had only completed basic training modules at their respective 
academies. However, of concern was the fact that only 14 per cent were trained in 
security or risk assessment. It was established that the respondents had attended 
more than one training course or were in possession of more than one skill to work 
at the harbour. 
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4.8 SECURITY WEAKNESSES 
4.8.1 The concept ‘security weakness’ 
The respondents were asked what they understood by the concept ‘security 
weakness’ (see Appendix A, Question 2.1). All 30 respondents answered this 
question. 
 
Table 4.14:  The concept ‘security weakness’ (N=30) 
Respondents (30)   
Theme Frequency Percentage 
Problems within the existing security systems  6 20% 
Inadequate security physical protection systems 5 16.6%7 
Poor design and layout of the harbour 
 
4 13.33% 
Understaffing of law enforcement and security 
officials 
4 13.33% 
Lack of training for law enforcement and security 
officials 
5 16.67% 
Poorly paid security officials 3 10% 
Internal and external threats affecting the harbour 3 10% 
Totals 30 100% 
 
In terms of security weakness, 20 per cent of the respondents indicated that security 
weakness constitutes problems within the existing security measures, while 16 per 
cent cited inadequate security measures as a weakness. Other respondents 
(16.67 %) cited the lack of training of law enforcement and security officials, internal 
and external threats (10 %) and poorly paid security officials (10 %). As it has 
emerged from this study’s findings, all the respondents are aware what constitutes a 
security weakness at the Durban harbour. It can be deduced from this that there are 
several categories of security weaknesses facing the Durban harbour.  
 
4.8.2 Security weaknesses observed by respondents  
The respondents were asked the question: “Can you identify some of the security 
weaknesses observed by you?” (See Appendix A, Question 2.7.)  
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Table 4.15:  Security weaknesses encountered at the Durban harbour (N=30) 
Respondents (30) 
Theme Frequency Percentage 
Lack of Access Control in some areas of the harbour 6 20% 
Lack of coordination between law enforcement and 
security  
4 13.33% 
Ineffective security measures  5 16.67% 
Insufficiently trained law enforcement and security 
officials  
5 16.67% 
Shortage of manpower to effectively carry out duties 4 13.33% 
Lack of equipment such as scanners, metal detectors 
and x-ray machines 
6 20% 
Totals 30 100% 
 
In terms of observed weaknesses, 20 per cent of the respondents cited the lack of 
access control in certain areas of the harbour, coupled with a lack of equipment as 
the main security weaknesses, followed by insufficiently trained law enforcement and 
security officials (16.67 %) and ineffective security measures (16.67 %). In assessing 
the respondents’ responses, it is evident that these are clear examples of security 
weaknesses at the Durban harbour which presents a problem to the security of the 
harbour. The human resource problem of insufficient manpower, coupled with a lack 
of training and coordination between the various departments to work together in 
providing effective security at the port, is the major weakness at the harbour. 
Minnaar (2003: 21) mentions that an assessment of South African ports by the US 
Immigration and Naturalization Service, Office of Inspections, found that the greatest 
challenge confronting border control is the actual deployment of staff at these ports 
who handle the actual border control. The assessment team found that there was an 
absence of security personnel and, with the exception of the police, the other 
agencies responsible for border control were not physically situated within the 
confines of the harbour area. 
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4.8.3 Areas in which security weakness contribute to the illegal movement of 
goods 
The respondents were asked the question: “Can you tell me in which area is the 
security weakness which contributes to the illegal movement of goods?” (See 
Appendix A, Question 2.6.) 
 
Table 4.16: Area of security weakness in the harbour (N=30) 
Respondents (30) 
Theme Frequency Percentage 
Access Control  6 20% 
Harbour Perimeter 4 13.33% 
Container Terminal 7 23.33% 
Container storage areas including warehouses  9 30% 
Parking areas 4 13.33% 
Totals 30 100% 
 
This question was aimed at identifying the areas of weakness at the Durban harbour 
in relation to security risks. In terms of the responses, 30 per cent of the respondents 
indicated that the container storage areas were the most vulnerable to security risks. 
This was followed by the container terminal (23.33  %) as the second highest 
vulnerable area according to the respondents. Access control (20 %) was again 
highlighted as an area of weakness in terms of security measures, in conjunction 
with the perimeter fencing (13.33 %) and the parking areas (13.33 %). It can be 
deduced that there are serious problems in the areas where goods or containers are 
being stored, such as the container storage areas and the container terminals, hence 
the thefts and contraband smuggling.  
 
4.8.4 The period of time that they observed the vulnerability to be in existence 
The respondents were asked to indicate the period of time that they observed the 
vulnerability to be in existence. (See Appendix A, Question 2.8). The responses of 
the respondents are contained in the Table 4.17 below. 
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Table 4.17:  Period of existence of security weakness (N=30) 
Respondents (30) 
Responses Security 
Officers 
Border 
Police 
Customs 
Officials 
Total Percentage 
0-3 months 2 0 0 2 6.67% 
4-6 months 2 2 3 7 23.33% 
7-12 
months 
3 5 4 12 40% 
More than 1 
ye 
3 3 3 9 30% 
Totals 10 10 10 30 100% 
 
In terms of the period of existence of security weaknesses, 40 per cent of the 
respondents indicated that they had observed the weakness to exist for more than 
seven (7) months, while 30 per cent indicated that some weaknesses had existed for 
more than one year without any intervention. The majority of the respondents 
(93.33 %) indicated that specific weaknesses had existed for more than six months 
without any intervention. This means that security weaknesses exist for extremely 
long periods of time without any intervention from the respective authorities.  
 
4.8.5 Awareness of any illegal movement of goods taking place at the 
Durban harbour 
The respondents were asked the question: “Are you aware of any illegal movement 
of goods taking place at the Durban harbour?” (See Appendix A, Question 2.4.) 
 
Table 4.18:  Officials’ awareness of goods being moved illegally through the Durban 
harbour (N=30) 
Respondents (30) 
Responses Security 
Officers 
Border 
Police 
Customs 
Officials 
Total Percentage 
Yes 6 8 9 23 76.67% 
No 4 2 1 7 23.33% 
Totals 10 10 10 30 100% 
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A large majority of the respondents (76.67 %) indicated that they were aware of 
illegal goods being moved in and out of the harbour, while 23 per cent indicated that 
they were unaware of the situation. It can be deducted that there is indeed a problem 
of illegal goods being moved through the harbour. The small minority of respondents 
(23.33 %) who indicated otherwise were in fact those who had only a short period of 
employment with their current employer. Organised crime syndicates that have links 
to established importers are operating significant container theft operations from the 
deregulated port system (McCarney & Stren, 2003: 231). 
 
4.8.6 Type of goods are being moved illegally 
If the respondents answered “YES” to question 2.4., they were asked a follow up 
question, “What type of goods are being moved illegally?” (See Appendix A, 
Question 2.4.1.) The responses were as follows: 
 
Table 4.19:  Type of goods being moved illegally at the Durban harbour (N=30) 
Theme Frequency Percentage 
Electronic goods 7 23.33% 
Counterfeit Cigarettes 5 16.67% 
Counterfeit clothing 5 16.67% 
Illicit Narcotics 6 20% 
Precursor Chemicals 2 6.67% 
Tools and machinery 2 6.67% 
Textiles 3 6.67% 
Totals 30 100% 
 
In response to this question, 23.3 per cent of the respondents indicated that 
electronics goods were at highest risk of being moved illegally, followed by illicit 
narcotics (20 %), counterfeit cigarettes (16.67 %), counterfeit clothing (16.67 %) and 
textiles (10 %). Precursor chemicals and tools featured at the bottom of the list 
(6.67 %). It can be deduced that contraband, which includes counterfeit cigarettes, 
clothing, and narcotics, were high on the agenda of smugglers, as well as the 
increased demand for electronic items. Hare (2009: 72) reports that there have been 
incidences at port terminals where syndicates are stealing full containers. These 
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thefts were not only limited to full containers, but included small packages that are 
shipped in containers. 
 
4.8.7 Methods used to move the illegal goods through the harbour 
The respondents were asked the question: “What methods are used to move the 
illegal goods through the harbour?” (See Appendix A, Question 2.4.2.) 
The responses were as follows: 
 
Table 4.20:  Methods used to move illegal goods through the harbour (N=30) 
Respondents (30) 
Theme Frequency Percentage 
False Documentation 6 20% 
Concealment 4 13.33% 
Theft 6 20% 
Corruption 5 16.67% 
Assistance by Security officials 4 13.33% 
Assistance by Police Officials 3 10% 
Assistance by Customs officials 2 6.67% 
Totals 30 100% 
 
In response to this question, the respondents indicated that theft (20 %) and the use 
of false documentation (20 %) were the most popular methods for removing goods 
from the harbour. Corruption (16.67 %) and the assistance provided by security 
officials (13.33 %) and by police officials (10 %) were also popular methods. Customs 
officials (6.67 %) provided the least assistance in removing illegal goods. The modi 
operandi, as indicated by the figures in Table 4.20 above, include the use of false 
documentation, theft and the concealment of goods. According to Minnaar (2003: 
78), theft occurs when false documentation is produced to release a container from 
the harbour. Minnaar (2003: 78) also refers to occurrences of tampering with, 
replacing and counterfeiting Customs or Border Police container seals and the 
removal of the contents while the container is in the harbour or en route to City Deep 
depot. 
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4.9 SECURITY RISKS 
4.9.1 Security risks facing the Durban harbour 
The respondents were asked what they understood to be a security risk facing the 
Durban harbour. (See Appendix A, Question 3.1.) 
 
Table 4.21:  The concept ‘security risk’ (N=30) 
Respondents (30) 
Theme Frequency Percentage 
A situation that negatively affects the harbour 5 16.67% 
Internal and external threats affecting the harbour 3 10% 
Inadequate physical protection systems 5 16.67% 
Poor design and layout of the harbour 3 10% 
Inadequate technical protection systems 4 13.33% 
Crimes affecting the harbour 8 26.67% 
Financial losses due to thefts and other crimes 2 6.67% 
Totals 30 100% 
 
In examining the responses, 26.67 per cent of the respondents indicated that a 
security risk means crimes which affect the harbour, while 16.67 per cent of the 
respondents referred to it as any situation that negatively affects the harbour. Other 
respondents (16.67 %) considered the lack of physical protection systems as a 
security risk, (10 %) internal and external threats, and poor design and layout of the 
harbour (10 %). As has emerged from this study’s findings, all the respondents are 
aware of what constitutes a security risk at the Durban harbour. It can be deduced 
that there are several categories of security risks within the Durban harbour. 
 
4.9.2 Numbers of incidents of crime discovered during a month 
The respondents were asked the question: “How many incidents of crime do you 
discover during a month?” (See Appendix A, Question 3.2.) The results thereof are 
indicated in the Table 4.22 below. 
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Table 4.22: Incidents of crime discovered during the month (N=30) 
Respondents (30) 
Responses Security 
Officers 
Border 
Police 
Customs 
Officials 
Total Percentage 
1-5 incidents 5 2 3 10 33.33% 
6-9 incidents 4 4 6 14 46.67% 
10-14 incidents 1 4 1 6 20% 
15-19 incidents 0 0 0 0 0% 
20 and more incidents 0 0 0 0 0% 
Totals 10 10 10 30 100% 
 
A large majority (46.67%) of the respondents indicated that they witnessed between 
6-9 incidents of crime a month, while ten (33.33 %) of the respondents indicated that 
they experienced five (5) or less incidents of crime and 20 per cent indicated that 
they observed over ten (10) incidents per month. It can be deduced that the majority 
(66.67 %) of the respondents discovered just under 15 incidents of crime during their 
tour of duty in a single month.  
 
4.9.3 The most prevalent crimes affecting the harbour 
The respondents were asked the question: “What are the most prevalent crimes 
affecting the harbour?” (See Appendix A, Question 3.4.) 
 
Table 4.23:  Crimes associated with the harbour (N=30) 
Respondents (30) 
Theme Frequency Percentage 
Theft 8 26.67% 
Corruption 4 13.33% 
Bribery 3 10% 
Fraud 5 16.67% 
Trespassing 3 10% 
Drug Smuggling 5 16.67% 
Illegal immigrants 2 6.67% 
Totals 30 100% 
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In answering this question, 26.67 per cent of the respondents cited theft as the most 
prevalent crime associated with the harbour, while fraud and drug smuggling 
(16.67 % each) ranked joint second in the list of crimes identified by the respondents. 
The issue of corruption (13 %) and bribery (10 %) also often go together and made 
up of almost 24 per cent, or one quarter, of the replies by respondents.  
 
4.9.4 Causes of crimes associated with the harbour 
A follow-up question was put to the respondents with the aim of understanding the 
causes of the respective crimes identified in question 3.4. (See Appendix A, 
Question 3.5.) 
 
Table 4.24: Causes of crimes associated with the harbour (N=30) 
Respondents (30) 
Theme Frequency Percentage 
Poor Salaries of Law enforcement and security 
officials 
3 10% 
Corruption involving shipping agents, police officials, 
customs and security guards 
5 16.67% 
Bribery of Port security and law enforcement officials 3 10% 
The presence of Organised Crime syndicates within 
the harbour 
2 6.67% 
Insufficient security measures such as proper access 
control which reduces the issue of trespassing 
7 23.33% 
Untrained port officials to detect contraband and 
illegal goods 
3 10% 
Lack of equipment i.e. container scanners 4 13.33% 
Staff shortages 3 10% 
Totals 30 100% 
 
In terms of the causes of crimes, most of the respondents (23.33 %) cited the general 
lack of security risk control measures as the primary factor resulting in crime at the 
harbour, followed by the corruption of port officials (16.67 %), the lack of equipment, 
such as container scanners (13.33 %), poor salaries of law enforcement and security 
officials (10 %) and bribery (10 %). According to Steinberg (2005b: 3) and Kenny 
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(2007: 35), border control agents around the world only search a small percentage of 
cargo and passengers. At Johannesburg International Airport (JIA), for instance, only 
between three to five per cent of the cargo is searched, while at the Durban harbour 
only one per cent of the cargo is searched.  
 
4.9.5 Methods used to smuggle goods through the harbour 
The respondents were asked to indicate by means of a number (1-5) which method 
is used to smuggle goods through the harbour. (See Appendix A, Question 3.6.) The 
responses were as follows: 
 
Table 4.25: Method which is used most often used to smuggle goods through the 
harbour (N=30) 
Respondents (30) 
Responses Security 
Officers 
Border 
Police 
Customs 
Officials 
Total Percentage 
Concealment 1 2 1 4 13.3% 
False 
Documentation 
3 2 2 7 23.33% 
Counterfeit 
Goods 
1 1 1 3 10% 
Assistance by 
Security 
Personnel 
2 2 2 6 20% 
Corruption by 
Port Officials 
3 3 4 10 33.33% 
Totals 10 10 10 30 100% 
 
In terms of the smuggling methods, the most common method to smuggle goods via 
the harbour is through the corruption of port officials (33.33 %), followed by the use of 
false documentation (23.33 %), concealment of goods (23.33 %), with assistance of 
security personnel (20 %), and concealment (13.33 %). Counterfeit goods, according 
to the respondents, is the least-used method to smuggle goods through the harbour. 
The use of false documentation is the most popular method for removing goods from 
the Durban harbour. Corruption and the assistance provided by security and police 
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officials are also popular methods for removing goods illegally from the Durban 
harbour. This study further found that customs officials provided the least assistance 
in removing illegal goods. 
 
4.9.6 Methods most often used for the theft of containers from the harbour 
The respondents were asked to indicate by means of a number (1-5) which method 
is most often used for the theft of containers from the harbour. (See Appendix A, 
Question 3.7.) The responses were as follows: 
 
Table 4.26: Method which is most often used for the theft of containers from the 
harbour (N=30) 
Respondents (30) 
Responses Security 
Officers 
Border 
Police 
Customs 
Officials 
Total Percentage 
Poor 
access/egress 
control 
2 1 1 4 13.33% 
False 
Documentation 
3 3 3 9 30% 
Corruption by 
Port Officials 
3 3 3 9 30% 
Assistance by 
Security 
Personnel 
1 2 1 4 13.33% 
Container 
tampering 
1 1 2 4 13.33% 
Totals 10 10 10 30 100% 
 
In response to this question, the respondents indicated that the use of false 
documentation (30 %) and corruption of port officials (30 %) are the most common 
methods for committing the theft of containers from the harbour. Poor access control, 
the assistance of security guards, and container tampering have all been rated 
equally (13.3 %) as methods for the theft of containers from the harbour.  
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4.9.7 Methods most often used for the theft of goods from the harbour 
The respondents were asked to indicate by means of a number (1-5) which method 
is most often used for the theft of goods from the harbour. (See Appendix A, 
Question 3.8.) The responses were as follows: 
 
Table 4.27:  Most common reasons for theft of goods from the harbour (N=30) 
Respondents (30) 
Responses Security 
Officers 
Border 
Police 
Customs 
Officials 
Total Percentage 
Poor 
access/egress 
control 
2 1 1 4 13.33% 
False 
Documentation 
2 3 3 8 26.67% 
Corruption by 
Port Officials 
2 3 3 8 26.67% 
Assistance by 
Security 
Personnel 
1 1 1 3 10% 
Container 
tampering 
3 2 2 7 23.33% 
Totals 10 10 10 30 100% 
 
In terms of the responses, the use of false documentation (26.67  %) and corruption 
of port officials (26.67 %) are the most common reasons why goods are stolen from 
the harbour, followed by container tampering (23.33 %), poor access control 
(13.33 %), and assistance by security guards (10 %). It can be deduced that the lack 
of training in detecting fraudulent documentation is a primary reason for containers 
and goods leaving the harbour illegally. In 2003, Minnaar found that the Durban 
harbour lacked a central container terminal which results in containers being 
offloaded in all areas of the harbour (Minnaar, 2003: 77). In the case of this research 
study, it was that found that the situation has not changed since 2003 and that 
containers are still being off-loaded in different areas of Durban harbour owing to the 
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poor design and layout of the harbour. The lack of physical protection systems, 
internal and external threats, and poor design and layout of the harbour are some of 
the problems experienced currently at the Durban harbour. 
 
4.9.8 Factors that lead to crimes such as contraband smuggling through the 
harbour 
The respondents were asked, “What are the factors that lead to crimes such as 
contraband smuggling through the harbour?” (See Appendix A, Question 3.8.) 
 
Table 4.28: Factors that lead to contraband smuggling through the harbour 
Respondents (30) 
Theme Frequency Percentage 
Corruption and bribery involving shipping agents, 
police officials, customs and security guards 
5 16.67% 
Collusion between border police and customs 
officials in releasing goods 
5 16.67% 
Insufficient scanning of containers and inspection of 
cargo 
7 23.33% 
The presence of organised crime syndicates within 
the harbour 
2 6.67% 
Insufficient security measures such as proper access 
control  
4 13.33% 
Untrained port officials to detect contraband and 
illegal goods 
3 10% 
Lack of equipment i.e. container scanners 4 13.33% 
Totals 30 100% 
 
In terms of the respondents’ responses, insufficient container scanning (23  %) was 
the key factor responsible for the smuggling of contraband through the harbour. 
Another key factor which had been identified was the corruption of police, customs 
and security officials (16.67 %) as well as the collusion between officials (16.67 %) to 
release contraband and illegal goods. Insufficient security measures such as proper 
access control (13.33 %) and untrained port officials were also identified as 
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significant factors contributing to this problem. In analysing the responses, it can be 
deduced that the current method of randomly scanning containers is responsible for 
the large amounts of contraband moving through the harbour without being detected. 
 
4.9.9 Factors that lead to crimes such as theft of containers from the harbour 
The respondents were asked the question: “What are the factors that lead to crimes 
such as theft of containers from the harbour?” (See Appendix A, Question 3.10.) 
 
Table 4.29: Factors that lead to the theft of containers from the harbour 
Respondents (30) 
Theme Frequency Percentage 
Corruption and bribery involving shipping agents, 
police officials, customs and security guards 
8 26.67% 
Collusion between border police and customs 
officials in releasing goods 
4 13.33% 
The presence of Organised Crime syndicates within 
the harbour 
3 10% 
Insufficient security measures such as proper access 
control  
6 20% 
Untrained port officials to detect false documentation 4 13.33% 
The use of false documentation in the release of 
containers 
5 16.67% 
Totals 30 100% 
 
In response to this question, the respondents highlighted corruption as the key factor 
responsible for the theft of containers from the harbour, followed by insufficient 
security measures (20 %), the use of false documentation in the release of 
containers (16.67 %), and port officials who are untrained in detecting false 
documentation (13.33 %). The presence of organised crime syndicates within the 
harbour (10 %) did also contribute to the theft of containers. It can be deduced that 
the presence of organised crime syndicates and the collusion between the various 
role-players increases the risk of corruption at the harbour. According to Hennop et 
al (2001: 13), corruption and officials working at border posts go hand-in-hand. 
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Criminal organisations often bribe police, customs, immigration and South African 
National Defence Force (SANDF) officials to overlook crimes at borders that involve 
the smuggling of drugs, cars, prostitutes, endangered species products and firearms. 
 
4.10 SECURITY PROTECTION SYSTEMS 
4.10.1 Physical protection systems in place to reduce or eliminate the illegal 
movement of goods from the Durban harbour 
The respondents were asked the question, “From your experience please tell me 
what physical protection systems are in place to reduce or eliminate the illegal 
movement of goods from the Durban harbour?” (See Appendix A, Question 4.3.) 
 
Table 4.30: Physical security protection systems at the Durban harbour (N=30) 
Respondents (30) 
Theme Frequency Percentage 
Security officials employed by Transnet 6 20% 
Fencing and Boom Gates 5 16.67% 
Security Lighting  4 13.33% 
Patrol duties of the harbour by Border police officials 5 16.67% 
Establishment of Anti-Smuggling task teams 6 20% 
Advance profiling of containers prior to their arrival at 
port 
4 13.33% 
Totals 30 100% 
 
In terms of physical protection systems, 20 per cent of the respondents referred to 
the security function carried out by the guards employed by Transnet, and 16.67 per 
cent referred to the patrols carried out by the police. Another important measure was 
the establishment of Anti-Smuggling Task teams (20 %) to combat threats and risks 
within the harbour area. Fencing and boom gates (16.67 %) were also cited by the 
respondents as an important measure in place to combat such risk.  
 
It can be established that the respondents view physical security measures as a 
responsibility of the security department. According to the ‘Border control collective 
approach implementation plan’ (OWTBC, 1997: 31), a US assessment on Border 
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Control in South Africa established that there is a shortage of technical tools and 
basic equipment to aid in border control at all border posts. 
 
4.10.2 Adequacy of physical security protection systems to combat the risks 
and vulnerabilities facing Durban Harbour 
The respondents were asked the question: “From your experience can you tell me if 
the physical security protection systems are adequate to combat the risks and 
vulnerabilities facing the Durban Harbour?” (See Appendix A, Question 4.7.) The 
results are shown in Table 4.31 below, from which it will be seen that 80 per cent 
replied ‘no’. 
 
Table 4.31:  Are the physical protection systems adequate to combat risks or 
vulnerability? 
Respondents (30) 
Responses Security 
Officers 
Border 
Police 
Customs 
Officials 
Total Percentage 
Yes 3 2 1 6 20% 
No 7 8 9 24 80% 
Totals 10 10 10 30 100% 
 
4.10.3 Shortcomings or problems in physical protection systems 
The respondents were asked the question: “Can you tell me if there are 
shortcomings or problems in any of the physical protection systems mentioned 
below? Indicate your answer by inserting a number (between 0-3) alongside each 
measure. 0= no risk & 3 = high risk.” 
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Table 4.32: Shortcomings or problems in security measures 
Respondents (30) 
Responses Security 
Officers 
Border 
Police 
Customs 
Officials 
Total  
(n/90) 
Percentage 
Access Control 27 28 27 82 91.11% 
Egress Control 28 26 27 81 90% 
Perimeter 
Fencing 
26 27 27 80 88.89% 
Perimeter 
Lighting 
25 19 21 65 72.23% 
Human 
Security/Guards 
23 27 26 76 84.44% 
CCTV cameras 25 28 27 80 88.89% 
X Ray 
Scanners 
25 27 28 80 88.89% 
Metal Detectors 26 25 27 68 75.55% 
Security Flood 
Lighting 
23 26 21 70 77.78% 
Alarm systems 26 24 21 71 78.89% 
Totals 10 10 10 30 100% 
(Maximum points = 30 (10 responses x3)) (N=30) 
 
In terms of shortcomings in the security measures, access control (91.11 %) and 
egress control (90 %) were highlighted as the most problematic areas, followed by 
CCTV cameras (88.89 %), perimeter fencing (88.89 %) and X-ray scanners 
(88.89 %). Other physical protection systems, such as security guards (84.44%), are 
also highly problematic areas according to all categories of respondents. In 
analysing the results in Table 4,32 above, it can be established that access control, 
egress control and CCTV surveillance and X-Ray scanners feature as the most 
problematic areas, according to all three categories of respondents. 
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4.10.4 Security policies and procedures in place to combat security risks at 
the harbour 
The respondents were asked the question, “From your experience please tell me 
what security policies and procedures are in place to combat security risks at the 
harbour?” (See Appendix A, Question 4.5.) The responses were as follows: 
 
Table 4.33: Security policies and procedures at the Durban harbour (N=30) 
Respondents (30) 
Theme Frequency Percentage 
Access Control 3 10% 
Search and seizure Policy 5 6.67% 
No policy or procedure  17 56.67% 
Non response 5 16.67% 
Totals 30 100% 
 
In terms of security policies and procedures, in excess of half of the respondents 
(56.67 %) specified that there is no security policy or procedure in place, followed by 
five respondents (16.67 %) who did not respond. Three respondents (10 %) indicated 
that there was an access control policy, followed by 6.67 per cent who indicated that 
there was also a search policy. In analysing the responses of the respondents, it can 
be established that, with the exception of a few Customs policies that govern the 
import and export of goods together with the procedure to detain and inspect goods, 
other security policies and procedures are almost non-existent in the harbour to 
prevent the illegal smuggling of goods and contraband.  
 
4.10.5 UPS (uninterrupted power supply) for electronic security systems in 
the event of power outages 
The respondents were asked the question: “In your experience, can you tell me if 
there is a UPS (uninterrupted power supply) for the electronic security systems in the 
event of power outages? Kindly indicate either YES or NO.” (See Appendix A, 
Question 4.8.) 
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Table 4.34: Uninterrupted power supply (UPS) for the electronic security 
Respondents (30) 
Responses Security 
Officers 
Border 
Police 
Customs 
Officials 
Total Percentage 
Yes 4 2 4 10 33.33% 
No 6 8 6 20 66.67% 
Totals 10 10 10 30 100% 
 
In analysing the responses of the respondents to the question of whether the 
electronic security systems have a backup UPS system, 66.67 per cent of the 
respondents said ‘NO’, while the remaining 33.33 per cent indicated that the harbour 
is equipped with a backup UPS system. With regard to the respondents who 
indicated ‘YES’, it was established that the battery backup systems were not 
sufficient to power up the entire electronic security system, including the security 
flood lighting and CCTV surveillance, which are vital components in the provision of 
security and protection in the harbour.  
 
4.10.6 Access control in the harbour 
The respondents were asked the question: “How would you describe access control 
in the harbour?” (See Appendix A, Question 4.9.) 
 
Table 4.35: Access control in the Durban harbour (N=30) 
Respondents (30) 
Theme Frequency Percentage 
Ineffective implementation of access control 5 16.67% 
No proper policies and procedures on access control 6 20% 
No monitoring of visitors gaining access o the 
harbour 
4 13.33% 
No verification of documentation by security officials 
of goods and persons entering or leaving the harbour 
6 20% 
No visitors register at access control points 2 6.67% 
No searching of visitors and vehicles by security 
officials 
4 13.33% 
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Respondents (30) 
Theme Frequency Percentage 
Visitors are not escorted to their destinations within 
the harbour 
3 10% 
Totals 30 100% 
 
In answering this question, 20 per cent of the respondents indicated that there is no 
verification of documentation by security officials with respect to people entering and 
leaving the harbour. Another 20 per cent of respondents stated that there were no 
access control policies or procedures in existence, while 16.67 per cent indicated 
that there was ineffective implementation of access control, followed by 13.33 per 
cent of respondents who indicated that there was no searching and monitoring of 
visitors entering or leaving the harbour. In analysing the responses, it can be 
established that no positive feedback was received from any of the respondents 
regarding access control. 
 
4.10.7 Effectiveness of the current system in access control 
The respondents were asked the question: “Can you tell me if the current system is 
effective or not in access control and give reasons for your answer?” (See Appendix 
A, Question 3.12.) 
 
Table 4.36: Effectiveness of current access control system (N=30) 
Respondents (30) 
Responses Security 
Officers 
Border 
Police 
Customs 
Officials 
Total Percentage 
Yes 3 2 2 7 23.33% 
No 7 8 8 23 76.67% 
Totals 10 10 10 30 100% 
 
In answering this question, 76.67 per cent of the respondents indicated that the 
current access control system was ineffective, while 23.33 per cent indicated 
positively. It can be established from the responses that a large majority of the 
 98 
respondents were in agreement that the current system was ineffective in protecting 
the harbour against any risks or vulnerability.  
 
4.10.8 Measures suggested to improve the current system 
A follow up question was asked in relation to the responses provided to question 
4.11.1: “In the event of the access control system being ineffective, what measures 
can you suggest to improve the current system? (See Appendix A, Question 4.12.) 
 
Table 4.37: Measures to improve access control (N=30) 
Respondents (30) 
Theme Frequency Percentage 
Drafting of an access control policy with access 
control procedures 
6 20% 
Increasing the number of security officials at 
access/egress control points 
6 20% 
Upgrading the lighting conditions at access/egress 
control points 
3 10% 
Monitor all visitors gaining access by completing a 
visitors control register and escort them to their point 
of destination 
4 13.33% 
Installation of a biometric identification system to 
identify all persons entering the harbour 
3 10% 
No visitors register at access control points 3 10% 
No searching of visitors and vehicles by security 
officials 
5 16.67% 
Totals 30 100% 
 
In answering this question, 20 per cent of the respondents indicated that the key to 
improving access control involves drafting an access control policy with procedures, 
followed by another 20 per cent who indicated that the number of security guards at 
access/egress control points should be increased. The issue of searching of visitors 
and vehicles entering the harbour was highlighted by 16.67 per cent of respondents 
as another way of improving access control. Other methods, such as the monitoring 
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of all persons entering the harbour (13.33 %) and installation of a biometric 
identification system, were also identified as ways to improve access control at the 
harbour. It can be deduced that the implementation of an access control policy and 
an increase in the number of personnel in access control would improve the current 
situation. In the case of this research study, it was found that the key to improving 
access control involves the drafting of an access control policy with procedures, 
followed by an increase in the number of security guards at access/egress control 
points. The searching of visitors and vehicles entering the harbour is another way of 
improving access control. 
 
4.10.9 Suggested training for officials employed at the Durban harbour 
The respondents were asked the question: “What training do you suggest that needs 
to be provided to officials in your department employed at the Durban harbour?: (See 
Appendix A, Question 4.13.) 
 
Table 4.38: Training needs of respondents (N=30) 
Respondents (30) 
Theme Frequency Percentage 
Identification of narcotics, contraband and stolen 
goods 
6 20% 
Criminal law, security law and port procedures 3 10% 
Identification of security risks 5 16.67% 
Identification of false documentation 3 10% 
Access control and search procedures 4 13.33% 
Home affairs and immigration system 2 6.67% 
Investigation of Organised Crime 2 6.67% 
Effective search procedures 3 10% 
Intelligence gathering and profiling methods 2 6.67% 
Totals 30 100% 
 
In terms of training needs, 20 per cent of the respondents indicated that they 
required training in the identification of narcotics, contraband and stolen goods, 
followed by 16.67 per cent who required training in the identification of security risks, 
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13.33 per cent in access control and search procedures, and 10 per cent in effective 
search procedures and the identification of false documentation. A small minority of 
20 per cent of the respondents (3 groups of 6.67 %) required training in the 
investigation of organised crime, intelligence gathering and profiling methods, and on 
the Home Affairs and immigration systems. It can be established that training in 
security risks and weaknesses is lacking in both the security and law enforcement 
environments. 
 
4.10.10 Measures to reduce security risks and vulnerabilities concerning 
illegal movement of goods and persons 
The respondents were asked the question: “What do you feel should be done to 
reduce the security risks or vulnerabilities that threaten the harbour with respect to 
the prevention of the illegal movement of goods and persons in and out of the 
harbour?” (see Appendix A, Question 4.14.) 
 
Table 4.39: Measures to reduce security risks and vulnerabilities (N=30) 
Respondents (30) 
Theme Frequency Percentage 
Regular security risk assessments to be conducted 4 13.33% 
Establish a joint risk steering committee comprising 
of all role-players 
3 10% 
Drafting and implementing security policy and 
procedures 
3 10% 
Overall security measures to be improved 6 20% 
Strengthen the Border police function with a crime 
intelligence or profiling component 
5 16.67% 
Strengthen the Customs section with an increased 
Anti-smuggling section 
4 13.33% 
Increase the total number of security officials at the 
harbour 
5 16.67% 
Totals 30 100% 
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In answering this question, 20 per cent of the respondents recommended that the 
overall security measures at the harbour be improved. followed by 16.67 per cent of 
the respondents who recommend that the policing and the security functions be 
upgraded with additional staff members. Another 16.67 per cent of the respondents 
suggested that the total number of security officials be increased at the harbour, and 
13.33 per cent of the respondents suggested that regular risk assessments be 
conducted. A further 13.33 per cent agreed that the Customs section be empowered 
by increasing the anti-smuggling component and by conducting regular security risk 
assessments, and 10 per cent recommended that a joint risk-steering committee, 
comprising all the relevant role-players, be established. It can be deduced from the 
responses that there are several measures that can be implemented to reduce the 
security risks at the harbour. The implementation of an access control policy and an 
increase in the number of trained personnel in access control would improve the 
current situation at the Durban harbour. Having policies in place and ensuring that all 
law enforcement agencies operating in the harbour are aware of the crime problem 
in the Durban harbour could assist in reducing the number of illegal goods entering 
the Durban port. 
 
4.10.11 Measures to combat the illegal movement of goods and persons at 
Durban harbour 
The respondents were asked the question: “What do you feel should be done to 
improve the security measures at the harbour to combat the illegal movement of 
goods and persons in and out of the harbour? (See Appendix A, Question 4.15.).  
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Table 4.40: Measures to improve security situation at the Durban harbour 
Respondents (30) 
Theme Frequency Percentage 
Increase the number of security officials deployed at 
access/egress control points and goods storage 
areas. 
6 20% 
Implement digital security systems such as 
biometrics for access/egress control 
5 16.67% 
Establish a central permit issuing authority for all 
persons visiting the harbour 
3 10% 
Invest in acquiring better equipment such as CCTV 
digital systems, container scanners and X-ray 
machines 
7 23.33% 
Enhance the Border police function with a crime 
intelligence and narcotics detection component 
4 13.33% 
Improve the physical security measures such as 
perimeter fencing and security lighting 
5 16.67% 
Totals 30 100% 
 
In terms of measures to improve the security situation at the Durban harbour, 23.33 
per cent of the respondents recommended increasing the numbers of technological 
equipment, such as container and X-ray scanners and CCTV, followed by 20 per 
cent who suggested increasing the number of security officials posted at 
access/egress control points, while 16.67 per cent suggested improving the state of 
the perimeter fencing and lighting. Another 16.67 per cent recommend the 
implementation of digital security systems, such as biometrics for access/egress 
control and the centralisation of a permit control office for all persons working and 
visiting the harbour. It can be deduced from these responses that there are several 
measures that can be implemented to improve the security measures at the harbour.  
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4.11 CONCLUSION 
This chapter dealt with the issue of how the data which had been collected from the 
different sources was to be analysed, presented and interpreted. The chapter was 
divided into three primary sections, each one dealing with the analysis of a specific 
data collection instrument. The first section dealt with the data that was collected 
from the analysis of SAPS dockets from the Maydon Wharf police station pertaining 
to incidents of theft and contraband smuggling that had occurred at the Durban 
harbour. The second section dealt with the information collected during the onsite 
audit of the Durban harbour with respect of the existing security measures in place at 
the harbour. The last section dealt with the data that was obtained from the one-on-
one interviews with security officials, customs officials and border police who are 
deployed at the Durban harbour. The analysed data was presented in the form of 
frequency tables, together with researcher’s interpretations and deductions. 
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Chapter 5  
RESEARCH FINDINGS, RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
The aim of this study was to investigate the existing security measures, identify 
shortcomings and gaps at the Durban harbour, and to identify the crime risks 
associated with the illegal movement of goods so that appropriate security risk 
control measures may be recommended to mitigate the threats. For this purpose, the 
researcher collected data through a variety of sources, namely a literature study, a 
documentary study of police case dockets on theft and contraband smuggling, an 
onsite evaluation of the existing security measures at the Durban harbour, one-on-
one interviews with customs, security and police officials working at the harbour, and 
lastly, from the researcher’s personal experience. This chapter concludes with the 
findings and recommendations made in this study.  
 
5.2 RESEARCH OVERVIEW 
Seaports or harbours play a vital role in the logistical chain, since they handle the 
largest volumes of containerised cargo and bulk goods that enter any country. South 
Africa’s maritime sector, and in particular its eight commercial ports-of-entry, play a 
major role in the South African economy, as well as those of South Africa’s 
neighbouring landlocked countries. One of South Africa’s busiest seaports-of-entry is 
the Durban harbour. This study set out to investigate the challenges with the illegal 
movement of goods from the Durban harbour. The research sought to establish how 
the goods were being moved illegally through the Durban harbour area. The focus 
was on the security risk control measures and risks associated with the threats of 
criminal conduct that gave rise to the illegal movement of goods from the Durban 
Harbour. 
 
5.3 RESEARCH FINDINGS 
5.3.1 Findings related to the research rationale 
The rationale of this study was to identify the gaps in security measures at the 
Durban Harbour, as there was a lack of research on the factors contributing to this 
problem. Although there is an abundance of literature on problems associated with 
ports-of-entry, it has been found that no previous research had been undertaken on 
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the evaluation of security measures at ports-of-entry, or on the identification of any 
gaps within these measures. In addition to the above, the researcher’s personal 
observation, as well as the results of the security risk assessment exercise, revealed 
that there are indeed several gaps within the existing security measures resulting in 
the existing security protection systems being ineffective. Confirmation of this result 
was obtained during the penetration exercises of the actual security measures which 
displayed certain shortcomings within each measure, thereby confirming the 
existence of gaps within these measures.  
 
5.3.2 Findings related to the problem statement 
This study set out to investigate the challenges associated with the illegal movement 
of goods from the Durban harbour. It sought to establish how the goods were being 
moved illegally through the Durban harbour area and focused on the security risk 
control measures and risks associated with the threats of criminal conduct that gave 
rise to the illegal movement of goods from the Durban Harbour. The challenges 
associated with the illegal movement of goods at the Durban harbour were 
investigated and the modus operandi on how goods were being moved illegally 
through the harbour was established. The security risk control measures were 
evaluated and the specific risks within each measure were identified. 
 
5.3.3 Findings related to the research questions 
The first question was to establish what type of security risk control measures are in 
place at the Durban harbour. The researcher intended to gain an understanding of 
the current situation in the Durban harbour in terms of existing security protection 
systems and to identify any shortcomings or problems within those measures. 
 
The second question was aimed at identifying the risks associated with the illegal 
movement of goods at the Durban harbour. The research sought to establish the 
reasons why the problem existed with regard to the unlawful transfer of goods 
through the port’s harbour and to discern the specific problem areas or factors which 
resulted in, or contributed to, this problem. 
 
The third question was aimed at identifying the different types of security measures 
that could be put in place at the Durban harbour to prevent the illegal movement of 
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goods. By means of this question, the researcher proposed to identify resolutions to 
the difficulty of the illegal movement of goods through the harbour. 
 
The following findings are based on the documentary analysis of police case 
dockets, the onsite security audit of the Durban harbour, and the responses received 
from the respondents during the semi-structured interviews and were evaluated in 
terms of the research questions of this study. 
 
Research question 1:  
What type of security risk control measures are in existence at the Durban Harbour? 
 
It was found from the data collected during the onsite security audit and the semi-
structured interviews, that different classes of security measures existed at the 
Durban harbour, namely physical security measures and aids, technical security 
aids, and human resources. The physical security systems included measures such 
as perimeter fencing around the harbour, access control points, security lighting, and 
high fencing in certain warehousing areas, safes, security doors and window guards. 
The human resources included the in-house security officials employed by Transnet, 
SAPS border police officials, and customs anti-smuggling officials. It was also found 
that all human resources were equipped with security aids, namely two-way radios, 
handcuffs and cell phones. However, only half (50 %) of the human resources were 
equipped with torches and batons. The study found there are no formal written 
security policies and procedures in place at Durban harbour.  
 
Despite the harbour being equipped with several categories of security measures, 
such as security personnel and CCTV, the study found that there were several 
problems with these measures. The measures concerned were inadequate in 
providing sufficient protection against any crime risk or vulnerability. Firstly, the 
shortage of security personnel and customs officials deployed per shift, coupled with 
the lack of training on harbour-related issues, crimes and security risks, indicate the 
ineffectiveness of this measure in combating any crime or security risks that the 
harbour is faced with. Secondly, the harbour does not have sufficient technological 
aids to effectively support the physical security measures, such as container 
scanners, X-ray machines, CCTV and alarm systems which are needed to deal with 
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security or crime risks. It was found that the Durban harbour was equipped with only 
one container scanner, despite it being the busiest port in South Africa. As a result, 
only a small percentage of containers can be scanned for contraband and illegal 
goods, thereby increasing the risk of contraband and illegal goods going through the 
port without being detected. Thirdly, there was no broad security policy in place, nor 
any specific security procedures for any of the security measures concerned, e.g. 
access control policy, fraud and corruption prevention policy, and asset removal 
policy. Security procedures were also lacking, such as rotation of staff procedures, 
and goods removal procedures.  
 
Although the primary function of providing security rests with Transnet, which is 
mandated to administer all seaports along the South African coastline, it is 
complemented by the SAPS Border Policing and Customs Anti-Smuggling 
components, which are responsible for the inspection of goods and persons entering 
or leaving the harbour. It was also found that all of these agencies work in silos, 
resulting in a lack of communication, cooperation and coordination between all the 
role-players in attending to security-related issues. Information on security risks and 
vulnerabilities is not shared amongst these components, which results in a gap 
within the existing security system.  
 
Research question 2:  
What are the risks associated with the illegal movement of goods at the Durban 
harbour? 
 
It was found that several security-related risks existed at the Durban harbour 
concerning the illegal movement of goods. The risks identified during the analysis of 
data, and ascertained during the interviews and the onsite audit, included ineffective 
security protection systems. It was established firstly that the security measures 
offered inadequate protection against security risks. Secondly, internal threats, such 
as the opportunity to commit fraud, and corruption between staff members or staff 
members who have not been vetted but are in key security positions, are some of 
the other threats facing the harbour. Owing to the amount of money associated with 
cargo containers, the external risk of corruption also exists where staff members can 
fraudulently release containers in exchange for money.  
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It was found that, of the several categories of crime risks that were identified by the 
respondents, the most prevalent crime risks were that of theft, corruption and fraud. 
Theft was the priority crime which affected the harbour, because of the number of 
containers and items of cargo that had been stolen. In certain instances, the theft 
occurred with the aid of corrupt security or law enforcement officials or through the 
use of fraudulent documentation.  
 
It was found during the interviews that 23 per cent of the respondents highlighted 
poor or insufficient security measures as primary cause of these security risks. As 
mentioned above, the poor security measures included the lack of access control, 
insufficient human resources, such as security officials and customs officials, 
insufficient security lighting, and a damaged perimeter fence, as well as the lack of a 
broad security policy. Other poor measures include difficient technological assets, 
such as the inadequate CCTV systems intended to cover the entire harbour area. 
This finding is also supported by the results obtained from the documentary study of 
police dockets on theft and contraband smuggling. 
 
Research question 3:  
Which type of security risk control measures can be put in place to prevent the illegal 
movement of goods through the Durban harbour? 
 
In undertaking the security audit, the researcher identified certain security measures, 
such as security lighting, security policies and procedures, parking areas and access 
control points in relation to the security risks and vulnerabilities identified in the 
Durban harbour. The most effective security control measures identified were 
improving the access and egress control, as well as improving the digital surveillance 
system that would then assist in preventing the illegal movement of goods from the 
harbour.  
 
The first issue that needs to be addressed is access control, which if performed 
correctly, would eliminate almost 60 per cent of the crime and security risks within 
the harbour, such as thefts, contraband smuggling and illegal movement of goods 
through the ports. Another desirable security measure would be the installation of a 
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new CCTV surveillance system to cover all high-risk areas within the ports, as well 
as the access and egress control points. The introduction of a biometric system 
controlling access to high risk areas within the port would also go a long way in 
reducing the number of containers being stolen or tampered with. Some of the other 
measures include the drafting of a comprehensive security policy with procedures 
which encompasses all security-related activity at the Durban harbour, the 
conducting of regular security risk assessments at the harbour, and improving the 
overall security measures at the harbour. Another measure is to increase the 
capacity of security and law enforcement agencies and to establish a joint steering 
committee on security comprising the aforementioned role-players. An integrated 
approach is urgently needed to resolve the issue of the illegal movement of goods 
from the harbour.  
 
5.3.4 Findings related to the research objectives 
The first objective was to examine the existing security risk control measures at the 
Durban harbour. The second objective was to assess the risks associated with the 
illegal movement of goods at the Durban harbour. 
 
The third objective was to identify the security risk control measures to prevent the 
illegal movement of goods at the Durban harbour. 
 
5.3.5 Findings related to the docket analysis 
It was found that most incidents of theft and contraband smuggling took place over 
weekdays, as opposed to weekends, although it can be seen that the number of 
incidents do increase with the approach of the weekends. The majority of the 
incidents occurred within a 24-hour period, while a few (12 %) of the incidents 
occurred over a number of days. The recorded times of the incidents indicated that 
most crimes took place between 06h00 and 18h00 and that the areas of the harbour 
which were most vulnerable to these crimes were the general storage area, which 
had the highest number of incidents, followed by the container terminal area, both of 
which are located within the harbour boundaries. The methods used by criminals to 
execute these crimes involve the use of false documentation and tampering with 
container locks and seals, as well as being assisted by law enforcement and security 
officials to perpetrate these crimes. Lastly, the types of items that were at the 
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greatest risk were electronic goods, textiles and tobacco. This finding suggests that 
the high risk areas are easily accessible and not properly secured, indicating that 
access control is either poor or lacking at the harbour. 
 
5.3.6 Findings related to the security audit of the Durban harbour 
In respect of the physical and technical security protection systems at the harbour, it 
was found that they were lacking in many respects, rendering them ineffective in 
providing adequate levels of security. The key findings are discussed below: 
 
Security policies and procedures: 
It was found that the harbour did not have any written security policy or procedure in 
place. This is a serious shortcoming as these dictate what needs to be done, and the 
manner in which it should be done, to render effective security against any risks or 
vulnerabilities. It was found that, without an access control policy or a search and 
seizure policy, there was very little a security official could do at any access or 
egress control point to prevent any illegal goods or persons entering or leaving the 
harbour. In addition to this, no security measure can be effectively implemented 
without a proper policy and procedure document. 
 
Parking areas: 
It was established that most of the parking areas were either unguarded or only 
monitored by means of CCTV surveillance. It was also found that that some of these 
parking areas were within close proximity to storage areas and that there was no 
access control to these parking areas. The researcher surveyed the parking areas 
and established that there are four official parking areas within the Durban harbour. 
These parking areas accommodate staff parking and visitors to the Durban harbour. 
The study found that all four of the parking areas were not sufficiently protected with 
physical security measures, such as security officials or CCTV surveillance. The 
study further found that the lighting does not provide for sufficient illumination at 
specific areas in the parking areas to adequately monitor security risks. The 
researcher found that access into the parking areas was not controlled and that 
some of these parking areas were within close proximity to the storage areas. 
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Access Control:  
The lack of access control is core to many of the problems within the harbour, as it 
was pointed out by 91 per cent of the respondents during the interviews. This finding 
was confirmed during the onsite security audit, which established that access control 
was almost non-existent at the harbour, hampered by a lack of an access control 
policy, unstaffed and characterised by ill-equipped access control points. The 
analysis of the police dockets also indicated that 66 per cent of the thefts took place 
from the container terminal and general storage areas within the harbour, which 
indicates the lack of access control to these high-risk areas. 
 
Security Lighting: 
The study found that although most of the perimeter is equipped with security 
lighting, there are some points along the perimeter fence in the container depot 
where there is a lack of security lighting. The container depot is an area which is 
used for the loading and off-loading of containers. Another shortcoming was that the 
existing lighting does not provide a sufficient degree of illumination for the inspection 
of goods and vehicles. In addition, the high-risk areas within the harbour are not 
equipped with emergency standby lighting, which is necessary in the event of power 
failures. The study further found that although lighting was fitted to critical areas in 
the Durban harbour, the lights were not being switched on, possibly owing to human 
neglect and a lack of electronic day and night automatic switches.  
 
Closed Circuit Television: 
The study found that not all areas of the harbour are monitored by CCTV cameras. 
The storage areas and certain access control points were not fitted with CCTV 
cameras. The study found a total of 120 cameras which were positioned along the 
perimeter of the Durban harbour, which included 13 PTZ (Pan, Tilt and Zoom) 
cameras. These cameras report to a central control room, which the study found is 
not being adequately manned. The study found that these devices record poor-
quality images, which creates difficultly in analysing the number plates of vehicles 
and the facial recognition of people. The study found that the cameras were not 
tamper proof, since their power connections were easily accessible and could be 
interfered with by rogue elements. The cameras were not linked to an alarm which 
would activate the recording of images in the event of an alarm, nor was the camera 
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connected to a backup power supply or battery which would enable it to record 
images in the event of a power failure. These findings were reinforced when it was 
established during the docket analysis that in most of the cases, there was no 
available CCTV footage, which tends to indicate that the cameras are not operational 
at all times.  
 
5.3.7 Findings related to the semi-structured interviews 
Security training:  
It was found that a large majority of the respondents only underwent basic training at 
their respective institutions and were not equipped with any specialised harbour-
related training. The frequency of training took place quarterly, according to most of 
the respondents, which indicates that there are shortcomings in this aspect and that 
only a small minority of the respondents were trained in assessing security threats 
and conducting a security risk analysis. 
 
Areas of vulnerability:  
It was found that the main areas of weakness were the lack of implementation of 
access control, owing to the lack of an access control policy, and the insufficient 
number of security personnel deployed at the main access and egress control points 
within the harbour. Poorly-trained law enforcement and security officials were also 
cited as another major weakness, coupled with ineffective security protection 
systems. Areas of weakness within the harbour included the container storage areas 
and the container terminal area, which were often subjected to crimes of theft and 
container tampering. Another aspect with this area was the issue of containers being 
left unattended for long periods of time, thus making them vulnerable to theft and 
tampering.  
 
Type of goods at risk: Illegal movement of goods through the harbour:  
It was found that the type of goods which were at the highest risk was electronic 
items, followed by illicit narcotics, counterfeit cigarettes and counterfeit clothing. The 
methods used most often to either steal the containers or smuggle contraband were 
through the use of false documentation and outright theft. 
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Crimes associated with the Durban harbour:  
It was found that the most prevalent crimes affecting the harbour were corruption, 
theft and the smuggling of narcotics. In determining the causes for these crimes, it 
was found that factors, such as insufficient security measures, corruption involving 
shipping agents, law enforcement and security officials, as well the lack of equipment 
to detect contraband, such as scanners, were the principle issues related to the 
specific problem of illegal goods and the Durban harbour. 
 
Most common methods to commit theft or smuggle contraband: 
It was found that the corruption of port officials by criminals was the most popular 
method for committing thefts and smuggling contraband. Other popular methods 
used by criminals included the use of false documentation to remove goods from the 
harbour and gaining the illicit assistance of port officials in either stealing goods and 
containers or smuggling the contraband. Another method of how goods were either 
smuggled or removed from the harbour was conceal the contraband to avoid 
detection. 
 
Factors leading to theft/contraband smuggling at the harbour: 
It was found that the most common factors leading to the theft of containers and 
goods or the smuggling of contraband from the harbour were the insufficient number 
of containers being scanned and inspected to detect contraband, insufficient security 
control measures, such as proper access and egress control, corruption and bribery 
involving shipping agents, law enforcement and security officials, and the lack of 
training of security and law enforcement officials in detecting false documentation. 
Only between 3 to 5 per cent of containers are being scanned at the Durban harbour 
on a daily basis, which in effect means that 95 per cent of containers are being 
allowed to enter the Durban port without proper inspection. 
 
Shortcomings in existing security measures:  
It was found that all security measures had, to a certain degree, shortcomings within 
themselves. The major shortcoming identified with regard to all existing security 
measures was the lack of proper access and egress control, which is responsible for 
most of the security-related risks, such as container theft and contraband smuggling 
from the harbour. Another important security measure linked to the issue of access 
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control was the perimeter fence, which was damaged in certain sections and also not 
properly secured. Also associated with access control was the CCTV surveillance 
equipment, which was firstly lacking in certain high-risk areas and access and egress 
control points. Secondly, some of the cameras were not capable of recording at night 
and were also not tamperproof. Other shortcomings include the lack of scanning 
equipment and metal detectors and the lack of alarm systems linked to perimeter 
fences and high risk areas so as to alert security officials in the event of a security 
breach. 
 
5.4 RECOMMENDATIONS 
5.4.1 Recommendations to Transnet 
It is recommended that Transnet, which is mandated with the responsibility for 
securing the Durban harbour, improve the existing security measures at the Durban 
harbour by undertaking the following:  
 Increasing the number of security officials at the harbour. 
 
 Improve the access/egress control points by installing a guard house, boom gate 
and installing Pan, Tilt and Zoom (PTZ) surveillance cameras, and hydraulic 
spikes linked to the boom gate and an alarm system. 
 
 Secure all access/egress control points with a minimum of two security officials 
who are equipped with hand-held metal detectors and two-way radios. 
 
 Improving the layout and design of the harbour with the aim of minimising the 
access/egress control points and by moving the parking areas away from the 
storage areas. 
 
 Improving the security lighting at the harbour by increasing the illumination at 
access control points, the perimeter fencing, container terminals and storage 
areas. 
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 Drafting a security policy and procedures for all security measures. 
 
 Ensuring that all personnel are fully trained in the identification and detection of 
contraband, counterfeit goods and false documentation. 
 
5.4.2 Recommendations to SAPS Border Police:  
It is recommended that the SAPS Border Police increase their capacity in dealing 
with crimes affecting the harbour, by doing the following: 
 Increasing the number of detectives by 25 %, crime intelligence officers by 50 %, 
and the patrol officers by 30 %. These officers should be attached to the Border 
policing section of the Durban harbour. 
 
 The number of scanners should be increased from one to four and placed at the 
container terminals and storage depots. This will effectively increase the numbers 
of containers being scanned, which in essence will reduce the illegal movement 
of goods and contraband. Four X-ray scanners should be purchased and 
installed at the main access and egress points. All border, customs and security 
personnel performing duties at these points should be trained in the operation of 
this equipment. The cost to implement these measures would cost the ports 
authority about R10 million rand to implement over a three year period. The 
return on the investment would far outweigh the smuggling of contraband which 
is in the region of R100 million rand per year. 
 
 Regular vetting of border police officials by means of submitting them to integrity 
testing, polygraphs, and lifestyle audits.  
 
 Increasing the investigative and intelligence capacities of the border policing 
section by purchasing high-tech equipment, introducing members to specialised 
training, the use of more informers to obtain insider information, and the 
infiltration of undercover agents into organised crime syndicates. 
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 Ensuring that all personnel are fully trained in the identification and detection of 
contraband, counterfeit goods and false documentation. 
 
5.4.3 Recommendations to customs officials:  
It is recommended that Customs increase their capacity in dealing with crimes 
affecting the harbour by doing the following: 
 Increasing the personnel at container profiling and anti-smuggling components.  
 Increasing the number of containers for the purposes of inspection. 
 Profiling and audits on importers and exporters. 
 Ensuring that all personnel are fully trained in the identification and detection of 
contraband, counterfeit goods and false documentation 
 
5.4.4 General Recommendations: 
 It is recommended that all role players work together in providing a risk-free 
environment at the Durban harbour by establishing a joint steering committee on 
risk and security. 
 
 All security and law enforcement officials undergo an Anti-corruption training 
program and are regularly vetted to establish their integrity. 
 
5.5 CONCLUSION 
The goal of this study was to evaluate the existing security measures at the Durban 
harbour and to identify the risks associated with the illegal movement of goods, so 
that appropriate security risk-control measures may be recommended to mitigate the 
threats. In order to achieve this goal, the researcher made use of a qualitative 
approach and several data collection methods, such as a documentary study of theft 
and contraband smuggling cases, an onsite audit of the existing security measures, 
and finally, one-on-one interviews with security, police and customs officials 
employed at the Durban harbour.  
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The results of the study indicate that there are indeed risks that exist that are 
associated with the illegal movement of goods, such as theft and contraband 
smuggling. These were caused by security weaknesses or gaps within the existing 
security measures, such as lack of access control, lack of communication and 
coordination of security-related activities between security and law enforcement 
agencies, and the employment of untrained staff at Durban harbour. The study has 
made recommendations on how to improve the situation to ensure that the harbour 
is free from vulnerabilities and security risks and to reduce the number of illegal 
goods and contraband that move through Durban harbour. 
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Appendix A 
INTERVIEW SCHEDULE 
 
AN INVESTIGATION INTO THE ILLEGAL MOVEMENT OF GOODS FROM PORTS-OF-
ENTRY: DURBAN HARBOUR 
  
Instructions: 
Please answer all of the questions as honestly as possible. The information collected for this 
study will be analysed in order to develop an accurate picture for this research project on the 
“THE ILLEGAL MOVEMENT OF GOODS FROM PORTS-OF-ENTRY: DURBAN HARBOUR”. It will 
assist the researcher to make findings and recommendations to reduce the illegal movement 
of goods through the ports. You do not need to identify yourself and, similarly, the researcher 
will uphold anonymity in that there will be no possibility of any respondent being identified or 
linked in any way to the research findings in the final research report. Where required please 
indicate your answer with a cross (X) in the appropriate box or write a response in the space 
provided, using a black ballpoint pen. For the open ended questions please write your 
responses clearly and legibly in the space provided. If there is not sufficient space for your 
response please number a blank sheet of paper with the question number and continue writing 
your response on the extra piece of paper. 
 
 
SECTION 1. 
 
BIOGRAPHICAL DATA 
 
 
1.1  Indicate your present employer: 
 
Security Customs Border Police 
1 2 3 
 
 
1.2 What is your current position at your company? 
 
Guard Patrol Officer Investigator Supervisor Manager 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
1.3  How long have you been working in this position with your current company / 
employer? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1.4   What duties do you perform at the harbour? 
 
 
 
Less than one 
year 
One to two 
years 
Between two 
and three 
years 
Over three 
years but less 
than five years 
More than five 
years 
1 2 3 4 5 
Access Control Patrol Duties Guard Duties Inspections of 
Goods/Permits 
Surveillance/Control 
Room 
1 2 3 4 5 
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1.5  Have you undergone security related training pertaining to the Durban Harbour? 
 
YES  NO 
 1  2 
1.6  Was the training beneficial to improving your work performance at the Durban 
Harbour?  
 
YES  NO 
 1  2 
 
 
1.7  How often is on-site training provided by your company? 
 
 
 
 
 
1.8 How often should on- site training be provided in order to improve work 
performance? 
 
 
 
 
 
1.9   What skills and abilities do you possess to work in the harbour? 
_____________________________________________________________-
_________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________ 
  
 
 
 
  
  
Daily Weekly Twice a week Once a month Once in three 
months 
1 2 3 4 5 
Daily Weekly Twice a week Once a month Once in three 
months 
1 2 3 4 5 
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SECTION 2 
 
SECURITY WEAKNESSES 
 
2.1 What is your understanding of the concept “Security Weaknesses” 
___________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________ 
 
2.2  Where in the Durban harbour are you deployed? 
___________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________ 
 
2.3  What are your responsibilities? 
_________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________ 
_________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
2.4   Are you aware of any illegal movement of goods taking place at the Durban 
harbour? 
 
 YES   NO 
 1  2 
 
If (YES), answer the following: 
2.4.1 What type of goods are being moved? 
_________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________ 
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2.4.2 What methods are being used to move these goods identified in question 2.4.1 
_________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________ 
 
2.5  Have you have encountered any security weakness whilst working at the Durban 
harbour? 
 
_________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________ 
 
2.6  Can you tell me in which area of the harbour is the security weakness that 
contributes to the illegal movement of goods? 
_________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
2.7  Can you identify some of the security weaknesses observed by you? 
_________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________ 
 
2.8  For how long has this been a security weakness? 
 
0-3 months 4-6 months 7-12months More than 1 year 
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Section 3 
SECURITY RISKS 
 
3.1 What is your understanding of the concept “Security Risks” 
___________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________
________________________ 
 
3.2 How many incidents of crime do you discover during a month?  
1-5 incidents 6-9 incidents 10-14 
incidents 
15-19 
incidents 
20 and more 
incidents 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
3.3 Which specific crimes are associated with the harbour? 
_________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________ 
 
3.4 Which are the most prevalent crimes affecting 
theharbour?__________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________
__ 
 
3.5  What are the causes of the crimes mentioned under question 3.4 ? 
_________________________________________________________________________ 
_________________________________________________________________________ 
_________________________________________________________________________ 
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3.6 Some of the more common methods of goods smuggling have been listed below. 
From your own experience, indicate by means of a number (1-5), which method is 
used for the smuggling of goods through the harbour?  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.7   Some of the more common methods of container theft have been listed below. From 
your own experience, indicate by means of a number (1-5), which method is used for 
the theft of containers from the harbour?  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.8 Some of the more common methods pertaining to the theft of goods have been listed 
below. From your own experience, indicate by means of a number (1-5), which 
method is used for the theft of goods from the harbour?  
  
  
 
 
 
3.9  What are the factors which lead to crimes such as the smuggling of illegal goods 
(contraband) through the harbour? 
_________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
Concealment False 
documentation 
Counterfeit 
goods 
Assistance by 
Security 
Personnel 
Corruption by 
Port Officials 
1 2 3 4 5 
Poor 
access/egress 
control 
False 
documentation 
Corruption by 
Port Officials 
Assistance by 
Security 
Personnel 
Container 
Tampering 
1 2 3 4 5 
Poor 
access/egress 
control 
Concealment False 
documentation 
Corruption 
by Port 
Officials 
Assistance 
by Security 
Personnel 
Container 
Tampering 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
 132 
3.10  What are the factors which lead to crimes such as theft of containers from the 
harbour? 
_________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________ 
 
3.11  Can you tell me if there are shortcomings or problems in any of the physical 
protection systems mentioned below? Indicate your answer by inserting a number 
(between 0-3) alongside each measure? 0= no risk & 3 = high risk 
 
 
PHYSICAL PROTECTION SYSTEMS RISK CATEGORY 
Access Control  
Egress Control  
Perimeter Fencing  
Security Lighting  
Human Security/Guards  
CCTV cameras  
X Ray Scanners  
Metal Detectors  
Alarm systems  
Parking areas  
Storage areas  
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SECTION 4 
 
4.  SECURITY RISK CONTROL MEASURES 
 
4.1 What is your understanding of the concept “Security Risk Control Measures” 
_________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________ 
_________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________ 
 
4.2  From your experience, can you tell me what physical security risk control measures 
are in place to reduce or eliminate the illegal movement of goods at the Durban 
harbour? 
_________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________ 
_________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________ 
 
4.3 What is your understanding of the concept “Physical Protection Systems” 
_________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________ 
_________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________ 
  
4.4  From your experience, can you tell me what physical protections systems are in 
place to reduce or eliminate the illegal movement of goods at the Durban harbour? 
_________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________ 
_________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________ 
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4.5  From your experience, can you tell me what security procedures or policies are in 
place to reduce or eliminate the illegal movement of goods at the Durban harbour? 
_________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________ 
_________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________ 
 
4.6 From your experience can you tell me if all of the areas in the Durban harbour are 
secured with physical protection systems? 
_________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________ 
 
4.7  From your experience can you tell me if the physical security protection systems are 
adequate to reduce or eliminate the illegal movement of goods facing the Durban 
Harbour? 
_________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________ 
 
4.8  In the event of power outages, is there an uninterrupted power supply for the 
electronic security systems? 
_________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________ 
 
4.9  How would you describe access control at the Durban harbour? 
_________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________
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_________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________ 
 
4.10  What physical security system is in place to assist in access control? 
_________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________ 
 
4.11  Are the current systems effective in providing access control?  
 
 YES   NO 
 1  2 
 
4.11.1 If your answer to question 4.11 is NO, give reasons for your answer? 
___________________________________________________________________ 
___________________________________________________________________ 
___________________________________________________________________ 
___________________________________________________________________ 
___________________________________________________________________ 
 
4.12  In the event of the access control system being ineffective, what measures can you 
suggest to improve the current system? 
_________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________ 
 
4.13  What training do you suggest that needs to be provided to officials in your 
department who are employed at the harbour? 
_________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 136 
4.14  What should be done to reduce the security risks that threaten the harbour in respect 
of the illegal movement of goods at the Durban harbour? 
_________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________ 
 
4.15   What should be done to improve the security measures with regard to the illegal 
movement of goods at the Durban harbour? 
_________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________ 
 
4.16  Is there anything else that you can think of or feel that is important or can be done in 
curbing the illegal movement of goods into and out of the harbour? 
___________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
 
Thank you for the opportunity to allow me to conduct this interview with you. Your 
cooperation is highly appreciated.  
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Appendix B 
 
CONSENT FORM 
 
1. I__________________________, hereby agree to participate in this research 
project: Title: An investigation of the illegal movement of goods into-and-from 
seaports-of-entry: A case study at Durban harbour. 
 
By filling in the survey sheet/questionnaires Yes No 
Granting permission to be interviewed Yes No 
Granting permission for the interview to be recorded either in writing or 
using a tape recorder 
Yes No 
Agreeing that follow up interviews may be conducted  Yes No 
Agreeing that the information I provide may be used in the research 
report 
Yes No 
Agreeing to cancel or opt out of the interview at any point in time 
should the need become necessary 
Yes No 
Accept that the information obtained up until this point during the 
interview could still be used by the researcher 
Yes No 
Agree that specific information should not be revealed during the 
interview by the researcher 
Yes No 
Accept that I will not in any way be reimbursed for the information 
rendered or for my participation in the research project 
Yes No 
Agree that I will not derive any personal benefit from taking part in this 
research project; 
Yes No 
Agree to answer all questions honestly and not to mislead the 
researcher 
Yes No 
 Agree that I will receive a copy of the interview upon signing it  Yes No 
Agree that the aims and objectives of this research project was 
explained to me by the researcher 
Yes No 
Agree that I understand the contents of this agreement and the 
implications of signing it 
Yes No 
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2. I, Mr Devan Moodley in co-signing this agreement: 
 
Agree to treat all information received from the respondent in a 
confidential manner 
Yes No 
Agree to preserve the respondent’s anonymity. Yes No 
Agree to protect the identity and the subject and the information 
provided by the interviewee 
Yes No 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Signed at--------------------------------------------------on ---------------------------------- 
 
 
 
Signature of respondent --------------------------------------- 
 
 
 
 
Signature of researcher ----------------------------------------  
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Appendix C 
 
19
 
October 2012  
 
Brigadier Gopaul 
Ports-of-entry 
South African Police  
Durban 
 
Dear Mr Gopaul 
 
REQUEST FOR PERMISSION TO DO RESEARCH FOR THE MTECH DEGREE 
(SECURITY MANAGEMENT) ON THE SECURITY MEASURES AT THE DURBAN 
HARBOUR  
 
Mr Devandran Moodley is currently a Masters student at the University of South Africa 
(UNISA), busy with his research study for a MTech in Security Management. His 
research title is “AN INVESTIGATION INTO THE ILLEGAL MOVEMENT OF GOODS 
FROM SEAPORTS-OF-ENTRY 
 
The research goal is: 
To evaluate the security risk control measures at the Durban Harbour 
 
Research Objectives are as follows: 
 
- To identify vulnerabilities and risks associated with the illegal movement of goods 
at the Durban Harbour 
 
- To determine the type of physical security systems that are in place at the 
Durban Harbour to detect the illegal movement of goods 
 
- To implement security risk control measures to prevent the illegal movement of 
goods through the Durban Harbour 
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The research study seeks to identify the type of commodities that are being trafficked 
and stolen from the port by means of conducting probes, evaluating analytical data and 
studying the incidents involving the movement of illegal goods into and out of the country 
via the Durban sea port of entry. In addition to this, the researcher wanted to establish 
whether there was any pattern in relation to this, with a view to establishing if such 
incidents were as a result of lack of security measures at the port. 
 
The researcher will conduct interviews with the use of an interview schedule (for SAPS 
Border Police members, SARS Customs and Excise officials, Transnet In-house 
Security Officers, Contract Security Officers and Immigration Officials) at the Durban 
Seaport of Entry. The researcher will develop specific interview questions to inform the 
participants of the three key objectives of the research study.  
 
These interviews will focus on the problems associated with the illegal movement of 
goods through the port with the aim of identifying the root causes of theft and fraud 
which results in such losses at the Durban Seaport of Entry. 
 
Follow-up interviews or telephone interviews will be done if necessary received from the 
participants will be treated with confidentiality (eg. Respondents will remain anonymous 
and no reference will be made as to where they are employed. 
Currently, there is very limited research that has been undertaken in this field, more 
particularly at sea borders in South Africa. This study will contribute to the existing 
database of research in this specific area. 
The research findings may improve policing methods in the area of Organised Crime at 
the sea ports. Although, research has been conducted into the policing of borders and 
ports within South Africa, it was not sufficient to address the problem of goods and 
people being moved illegally through the ports and to develop a comprehensive security 
management programme for the ports. This study will identify any shortcomings in 
current security measures with respect to each department’s responsibility and provide 
guidelines on improving these measures which will ultimately reduce or minimise the 
illegal movement of goods through the port. This research will contribute to existing and 
previous research that has been undertaken in this specific field. 
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The private security industry will also benefit from this research as shortcomings will be 
identified in the current security measures and in the technology being utilised. 
Hopefully, the private security industry can improve on security methods and technology 
which can be utilised to enhance security and prevent the smuggling of contraband, 
illegal aliens and assist in the identification of fraudulent documentation. 
 
The research study will prioritize the problems at the Durban seaport so that they can be 
addressed in order to minimize illegal movements. The research findings may improve 
policing methods in the area of Organised Crime at the sea ports. 
 
Attached for your information is the research proposal, inclusive of the draft interview 
questions.  
 
 (Prof)  
A. de V. Minnaar  
Programme Head: Security Management  
Department of Criminology & Security Science  
School of Criminal Justice, College of Law  
 
MTech Student  
Programme: Security Management  
Department of Criminology & Security Science  
Student No: 32313969 
Tel: 082 567 4189 
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Appendix E 
          
 
          08 August 2012  
Mr P Moodley 
Tax and Customs Enforcement investigations 
South African Revenue Service 
Pretoria 
 
Dear Mr Moodley 
 
REQUEST FOR PERMISSION TO DO RESEARCH FOR THE MTECH DEGREE 
(SECURITY MANAGEMENT) ON THE SECURITY MEASURES AT THE DURBAN 
HARBOUR  
 
Mr Devandran Moodley is currently a Masters student at the University of South 
Africa (UNISA), busy with his research study for a MTech in Security Management. 
His research title is “AN INVESTIGATION INTO THE ILLEGAL MOVEMENT OF 
GOODS FROM SEAPORTS-OF-ENTRY: A CASE STUDY AT DURBAN 
HARBOUR.” 
 
The primary aims of this research project include: 
 
 To identify the causes of the illegal movement of goods via the sea ports-of-
entry and the persons/departments involved  
 To identify the modus operandi or methods of smuggling goods and people 
through the sea ports-of-entry. 
 To examine and evaluate the security measures which are currently in place at 
the Durban Harbour. 
 To recommend control measures and security management plans to manage 
the risk of smuggling and theft at the ports-of-entry. 
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The research study seeks to identify the type of commodities that are being trafficked 
and stolen from the port by means of conducting probes, evaluating analytical data 
and studying the incidents involving the movement of illegal goods into and out of the 
country via the Durban sea port of entry. In addition to this, the researcher wanted to 
establish whether there was any pattern in relation to this, with a view to establishing 
if such incidents were as a result of lack of security measures at the port. 
 
The researcher research interviews with the use of an interview schedule (for SAPS 
Border Police members, SARS Customs and Excise officials, Transnet In-house 
Security Officers, Contract Security Officers and Immigration Officials) at the Durban 
Seaport of Entry. 
 and administer will develop specific interview questions to inform the four key 
objectives of the research study.  
 
These interviews will focus on the problems associated with the illegal movement of 
goods through the port with the aim of identifying the root causes of theft and fraud 
which results in such losses at the Durban seaport –of-entry. Follow-up interviews or 
telephone interviews will be done if necessary received from the participants will be 
treated with confidentiality (eg. Respondents will remain anonymous and no 
reference will be made as to where they are employed. 
Currently, there is very limited research that has been undertaken in this field, more 
particularly at sea borders in South Africa. This study will contribute to the existing 
database of research in this specific area. 
The research findings may improve policing methods in the area of Organised Crime 
at the sea ports. 
Although, research has been conducted into the policing of borders and ports within 
South Africa, it was not sufficient to address the problem of goods and people being 
moved illegally through the ports and to develop a comprehensive security 
management programme for the ports. This study will identify any shortcomings in 
current security measures with respect to each department’s responsibility and 
provide guidelines on improving these measures which will ultimately reduce or 
minimise the illegal movement of goods through the port. This research will 
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contribute to existing and previous research that has been undertaken in this specific 
field. 
The private security industry will also benefit from this research as shortcomings will 
be identified in the current security measures and in the technology being utilised. 
Hopefully, the private security industry can improve on security methods and 
technology which can be utilised to enhance security and prevent the smuggling of 
contraband, illegal aliens and assist in the identification of fraudulent documentation. 
 
The research study will prioritize the problems at the Durban seaport so that they 
can be addressed in order to minimize illegal movements. The research findings may 
improve policing methods in the area of Organised Crime at the sea ports. 
 
Attached for your information is the research proposal, inclusive of the draft interview 
questions.  
 
 (Prof)  
A. de V. Minnaar  
Programme Head: Security Management  
Department of Criminology & Security Science  
School of Criminal Justice, College of Law  
 
MTech Student  
Programme: Security Management  
Department of Criminology & Security Science  
Student No: 32313969 
Tel: 082 567 4189 
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Appendix F 
Zimbra online2213998@telkomsa.net 
 
RE: PERMISSION LETTER: MTECH DISSERTATION 
 
 
From:  Kumaren Moodley <pmoodley@sars.gov.za>  
Subject:  
RE: PERMISSION LETTER: MTECH 
DISSERTATION 
To:  online2213998@telkomsa.net  
Wed, July 31, 2013 09:49 AM  
 
Dear Mr. Moodley  
 
Unfortunately, I am away from the office currently and trust 
that the email will suffice, if not please advise 
accordingly. 
 
Your request to interview the members of the Tactical 
Intervention Unit is establishing methodologies and 
approaches to dealing with smuggling activities related to 
imported or exported goods is acknowledged and it would be 
requested that any recommendations and observations on 
improvement in addressing the risks of smuggling is duly 
provided to this office for further consideration.  
 
 
Regards 
 
Kumaren Moodley  
Executive: Tactical Interventions Unit  
Tax and Customs Enforcement Investigations  
Fax: +27 86 546 7957 
E-mail: pmoodley@sars.gov.za 
Cell: +27 82 465 5964  
Office: +27 12 4226557 
Le Hae La SARS, 299 Bronkhorst Street, Brooklyn, Pretoria, 
0075, Block G, Ground Floor  
Personal disclaimer: Important - this e-mail and all 
attachments, data or information it contains is confidential, 
legally privileged and protected by law. Access to and use of 
this e-mail for any purpose is unconditionally prohibited 
since access is authorised to the intended recipient(s) only. 
If you have received this e-mail in error, please delete from 
your mailbox immediately. For SARS’ corporate disclaimer 
please go to: www.sars.gov.za/email_disclaimer.pdf 
 Please consider the environment. Do you really need to 
print this email? 
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From: online2213998@telkomsa.net 
To: pmoodley@sars.gov.za 
Sent: Wednesday, July 31, 2013 8:50:45 AM 
Subject: PERMISSION LETTER: MTECH DISSERTATION 
 
Good Morning Mr Moodley 
 
Please find request for permission to conduct research, as 
discussed. 
 
 
Kind regards 
DM MOODLEY 
 
Please Note: This email and its contents are subject to our 
email legal notice which can be viewed at 
http://www.sars.gov.za/AllDocs/Documents/email_disclaimer.pdf 
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          10 August 2012  
 Mr Bongi Nzuza 
Transnet Security 
Durban Harbour 
 
 
Dear Mr Nzuza 
 
REQUEST FOR PERMISSION TO DO RESEARCH FOR THE MTECH DEGREE 
(SECURITY MANAGEMENT) ON THE SECURITY MEASURES AT THE DURBAN 
HARBOUR  
 
Mr Devandran Moodley is currently a Masters student at the University of South 
Africa (UNISA), busy with his research study for a MTech in Security Management. 
His research title is “AN INVESTIGATION INTO THE ILLEGAL MOVEMENT OF 
GOODS FROM SEAPORTS-OF-ENTRY: A CASE STUDY AT DURBAN 
HARBOUR.” 
 
The primary aims of this research project include: 
 
 To identify the causes of the illegal movement of goods via the sea ports-of-
entry and the persons/departments involved  
 To identify the modus operandi or methods of smuggling goods and people 
through the sea ports-of-entry. 
 To examine and evaluate the security measures which are currently in place at 
the Durban Harbour. 
 To recommend control measures and security management plans to manage 
the risk of smuggling and theft at the ports-of-entry. 
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The research study seeks to identify the type of commodities that are being trafficked 
and stolen from the port by means of conducting probes, evaluating analytical data 
and studying the incidents involving the movement of illegal goods into and out of the 
country via the Durban sea port of entry. In addition to this, the researcher wanted to 
establish whether there was any pattern in relation to this, with a view to establishing 
if such incidents were as a result of lack of security measures at the port. 
 
The researcher research interviews with the use of an interview schedule (for SAPS 
Border Police members, SARS Customs and Excise officials, Transnet In-house 
Security Officers, Contract Security Officers and Immigration Officials) at the Durban 
Seaport of Entry. 
 and administer will develop specific interview questions to inform the four key 
objectives of the research study.  
 
These interviews will focus on the problems associated with the illegal movement of 
goods through the port with the aim of identifying the root causes of theft and fraud 
which results in such losses at the Durban Seaport of Entry. 
 
Follow-up interviews or telephone interviews will be done if necessary received from 
the participants will be treated with confidentiality (eg. Respondents will remain 
anonymous and no reference will be made as to where they are employed. 
Currently, there is very limited research that has been undertaken in this field, more 
particularly at sea borders in South Africa. This study will contribute to the existing 
database of research in this specific area. 
The research findings may improve policing methods in the area of Organised Crime 
at the sea ports. 
Although, research has been conducted into the policing of borders and ports within 
South Africa, it was not sufficient to address the problem of goods and people being 
moved illegally through the ports and to develop a comprehensive security 
management programme for the ports. This study will identify any shortcomings in 
current security measures with respect to each department’s responsibility and 
provide guidelines on improving these measures which will ultimately reduce or 
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minimise the illegal movement of goods through the port. This research will 
contribute to existing and previous research that has been undertaken in this specific 
field. 
The private security industry will also benefit from this research as shortcomings will 
be identified in the current security measures and in the technology being utilised. 
Hopefully, the private security industry can improve on security methods and 
technology which can be utilised to enhance security and prevent the smuggling of 
contraband, illegal aliens and assist in the identification of fraudulent documentation. 
 
The research study will prioritize the problems at the Durban seaport so that they 
can be addressed in order to minimizie illegal movements. The research findings 
may improve policing methods in the area of Organised Crime at the sea ports. 
 
Attached for your information is the research proposal, inclusive of the draft interview 
questions.  
 
 (Prof)  
A. de V. Minnaar  
Programme Head: Security Management  
Department of Criminology & Security Science  
School of Criminal Justice, College of Law  
 
MTech Student  
Programme: Security Management  
Department of Criminology & Security Science  
Student No: 32313969 
Tel: 082 567 4189 
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Appendix H 
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Appendix I 
 
DOCUMENTARY STUDY CHECKLIST 
 
DAY OF THE WEEK WHEN THEFT WAS COMMITTED  
Monday  
Tuesday  
Wednesday  
Thursday  
Friday  
Saturday  
Sunday  
PERIOD WHEN THEFT OCCURRED  
Over a period of days  
Same day  
WEEKDAYS OR WEEKENDS ON THEFT INCIDENTS  
Weekdays  
Weekends  
TIME OF OCCURRENCE  
06h00 – 11h59  
12h00 – 17h59  
18h00 – 23h59  
00h00 – 05h59  
METHODS USED TO REMOVE GOODS FROM THE 
HARBOUR 
 
Passed through security control check point  
Did not go through security control checkpoint  
False documentation used  
Assisted by security officials  
Assisted by Law Enforcement officials  
Container door forced open  
Container locks picked or cut open  
Container Seals removed   
Container seals tampered with  
Gate locks forced open  
Climbed over perimeter fence   
Access gained through unmanned security checkpoint  
Other methods used  
PLACE OF THEFT  
General Storage area  
Hazardous Goods storage area  
Bonded Warehouse  
Container terminal area  
Customs Warehouse  
Customs Detention Facility  
SAPS Scanning area  
Other places  
TYPE OF GOODS STOLEN  
Electronic goods  
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Textiles  
Manufactured clothing items  
Machinery   
Stationary   
Furniture  
Tobacco  
Alcohol  
Spices   
Meat  
Maize  
General goods  
Other  
INSURANCE  
Were goods insured?   
INVESTIGATION  
Name of criminal charge investigated  
Who was arrested? Custom officials/ private security/border 
police officials or private persons. 
 
Motive for the illegal activity.  
Result of the investigation  
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Appendix J 
OBSERVATION CHECKLIST 
ACCESS CONTROL 
OBSERVATION DATE:  
   ALLOCATED 
WEIGHT 
SECURITY 
EFFECTIVE
NESS  
COMMENTS 
1 Is access control needed for this asset/risk? 1-10   
2  Is there an access control register at the entrance/exit? 1-10   
3  Is there a security official monitoring the access control 
register? 
1-10   
4 Is the access control register inspected on a daily basis 
by the security supervisor? 
1-10   
5 Is every port worker in possession of an access control 
permit? 
1-10   
6 Is every visitor issued with a access control permit? 1-10   
7 Is there a central office established for the issuing of 
these respective permits? 
1-10   
8.  Is there a intercom system at the security 
gate/checkpoint?  
1-10   
9 Are all offices/companies linked to the intercom system at 1-10   
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the main access point? 
1
0 
 Is there a digital photo system located at the entrance? 1-10   
1
1 
Is the access control point fitted with number plate 
recognition software? 
1-10   
1
2 
 Is there a X-ray scanner located at the access point? 1-10   
1
3 
 Is there firearm safe located at the access point? 1-10   
1
4 
Is the access /egress control points monitored by means 
of CCTV cameras 
1-10   
1
5 
 Are visitors escorted to their destinations?  1-10   
1
6 
 Are visitors /employees searched when entering/exiting 
the premises 
1-10   
1
7 
Are records kept of all employees visiting the port office 
outside of working hours?  
1-10   
1
8 
Are all goods leaving or entering the harbour 
accompanied by documentation? 
1-10   
1
9 
Are the security officials trained in the detection of 
fraudulent documentation? 
1-10   
2
0 
Are physical examinations carried out on container seals? 1-10   
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2
1  
Are the security officials trained in the identification of 
tampered container seals? 
 
1-10   
2
2 
Is there an alarm panic button at the access control desk? 
 
1-10   
 
Desired Security:  
 
Current Security’:  
 
Percentage shortfall or security weakness:  
 
Security effectiveness factor: divided by 100 =  
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PARKING AREAS 
OBSERVATION DATE:  
  ALLOCATED 
WEIGHT 
SECURITY 
EFFECTIVENESS 
COMMENTS 
1 Is a parking area needed for this asset/risk? 1-10   
2  Is there more than one parking area at the 
harbour? 
1-10   
3  Is the employees’ parking area situated outside 
the perimeter? 
1-10   
4 Is the employees’ parking area situated inside 
the perimeter? 
1-10   
5 If situated inside, is the parking area sited away 
from any storage or production area? 
1-10   
6. Is the visitor’s parking situated outside the 
perimeter? 
1-10   
7. Is the reception office sited close to the visitor’s 
parking? 
1-10   
8 Is there a security control point sited at each 
parking area? 
1-10   
9 Is there a security official placed at each parking 
area? 
1-10   
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10.  Is there a intercom system at the security 
gate/checkpoint?  
1-10   
11 Is the parking area fitted with a CCTV camera? 1-10   
12. Is the parking area equipped with security 
lighting? 
1-10   
 
Desired Security 
 
Current Security:  
 
Percentage shortfall or security weakness:  
 
Security effectiveness factor: divided by 100 =  
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PERIMETER FENCING 
OBSERVATION DATE:  
  ALLOCATED 
WEIGHT 
SECURITY 
EFFECTIVENESS 
COMMENTS 
1 Is the Harbour fitted with a perimeter fence? 
 
1-10   
2 Is the fence securely positioned? 
 
1-10   
3 Is the fence fixed securely means of concrete/steel 
poles 
 
1-10   
4. Is the material used in the construction of the fence of 
high strength steel? 
 
1-10   
5 Are the gaps between the steel bars less than 100mm  
 
1-10   
4 Is the fence designed to withstand high impact from 
collisions by heavy duty vehicles? 
1-10   
5 Is the fence 2, 6metres high? 
 
1-10   
6 Is the fence fitted with a microwave alarm? 1-10   
7 Is the fence monitored by CCTV cameras? 1-10   
8 Are all openings/gates in the fence secured with burglar 
resistant locks? 
 
1-10   
9 Is the perimeter patrolled every two hours during a 
twelve hour shift? 
1-10   
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10 Are all adjoining walls to the fence fitted with spikes? 
 
1-10   
11 Is the fence fitted with barbed wire overlap at the top of 
the fence? 
 
1-10   
12  Is the fence fitted with security lighting? 
 
1-10   
13 Are any security notices displayed on the general public 
side of the fence? 
  
1-10   
14 Is there a gate/gates in the perimeter fence? 
 
1-10   
15 Are all gates the same height as the perimeter fence?  
 
1-10   
16 Are all drainpipes and cableways beneath the fence 
secured? 
1-10   
17 Is the fencing wire in good condition? 
 
1-10   
18 Are all vehicles or other objects that could aid climbing 
over the fence at 
least 5 metres away from it? 
1-10   
19 Is a record (register) of fence inspections kept? 
 
1-10   
20  Is there a budget to provide for the maintenance and 
replacement of the 
fence? 
 
1-10   
21 Is the fence subjected to a penetration exercise once a 
year? 
1-10   
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Desired Security:  
 
Current Security:  
 
Percentage shortfall or security weakness:  
 
Security effectiveness factor: divided by 100 =  
 
SECURITY LIGHTING 
OBSERVATION DATE:  
  ALLOCATED 
WEIGHT 
SECURITY 
EFFECTIVENESS  
COMMENTS 
1 Is security lighting needed for this asset/risk? 1-10   
2  Is the perimeter of the harbour equipped with security 
lighting? 
1-10   
3  Are all perimeter lights equivalent or greater than 10 lux of 
luminance? 
1-10   
4 Are all floodlights along the perimeter aimed towards the 
outside of the perimeter fence? 
1-10   
5 Is the access/egress control point fitted with security 
lighting? 
1-10   
6 Is the lighting at the access/egress control point a 
minimum of 300 lux luminance? 
1-10   
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7 Are all general areas of the harbour equipped with security 
lighting? 
1-10   
8. Do these areas require continuous lighting at night?  1-10   
9 Are these areas equipped with high pressure sodium 
lamps? 
1-10   
10  Are these lights mounted on high towers and housed in 
deep parabolic reflectors? 
1-10   
11 Are all high risk areas equipped with standby emergency 
lighting systems? 
1-10   
12  Is the emergency lighting linked to a standby generator or 
automatic secondary battery system? 
1-10   
13  Is there a generator or back up battery for all floodlights at 
the harbour?  
1-10   
 
Desired Security:  
 
Current Security:  
 
Percentage shortfall or security weakness:  
 
Security effectiveness factor: divided by 100 =  
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STORAGE AREAS 
OBSERVATION DATE:  
 
  ALLOCATED 
WEIGHT 
SECUIRTY 
EFFECTIVENESS  
COMMENTS 
1 Is a storage area needed for this asset/risk? 1-10   
2  Is there more than one container storage area at 
the harbour? 
1-10   
3  Are the container storage areas fenced or 
barricaded? 
1-10   
4 Are the container storage areas demarcated? 1-10   
5 Are the container storage areas covered by 
CCTV cameras? 
1-10   
6. Are the container storage areas patrolled at 
regular intervals? 
1-10   
7. Is there an inventory control system in place for 
each container storage area? 
1-10   
8 Is the inventory control system monitored at daily 
at regular intervals?  
1-10   
9  Is the entire fence near the storage area well lit? 
 
1-10   
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10 Is there a security control point sited at each 
storage area? 
1-10   
11 Is there a security official posted at each storage 
area? 
1-10   
 
Desired Security:  
 
Current Security:  
 
Percentage shortfall or security weakness:  
 
Security effectiveness factor: divided by 100 =  
 
CLOSED CAMERA CIRCUIT TELEVISION 
OBSERVATION DATE:  
  ALLOCATED 
WEIGHT 
SECURITY 
EFFECTIVENESS 
COMMENTS 
1 Is CCTV measures needed for this asset/risk? 1-10   
2 Are there any CCTV cameras installed in the 
harbour? 
1-10   
3  Is a CCTV camera fixed at the access/exit point of 
the harbour? 
1-10   
4  Is a CCTV camera fixed at the entrance/ exit point of 
each storage area? 
1-10   
5 Are all areas of the harbour covered with CCTV 
camera surveillance? 
1-10   
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6  Are the cameras fixed on the uppermost part of the 
wall? 
1-10   
7  Are the CCTV cameras tamper proof? 1-10   
8.  Is the CCTV system linked to a back up battery in 
the event of power failure? 
1-10   
9  Is the CCTV system linked to an alarm that will 
activate the recording of images? 
1-10   
10  Are the cameras linked to a security control room? 1-10   
11  Are the cameras linked to a 24 hour recording device 1-10   
12  Are the cameras capable of recording images at 
night? 
1-10   
13  Are the areas that are being monitored properly lit? 1-10   
 
Desired Security:   
 
Current Security:  
 
Percentage shortfall or security weakness:  
 
Security effectiveness factor: divided by 100 =  
 
 
 
